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FINAL DRAFT- NOT FOR
IMPLEMENTATION**

**COUNTERINSURGENCY
OPERATIONS**

AUGUST 2004

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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INTRODUCTION

COIN is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the full spectrum of military operations and supports and influences a Host Nation's (HN) Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) program. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of psychological operations (PSYOP). Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in COIN.

Types of Support

Indirect support emphasizes the principles of HN self-sufficiency and builds strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities. It includes security assistance (SA), joint and combined exercises, and exchange programs.

Direct support (not involving combat operations) involves the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. These are joint-or Service-funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually include training local military forces. Direct support (not involving combat operations) includes civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, and logistics.

Direct support (involving combat operations) introduces the use of US combat forces into COIN operations. The use of combat forces is a presidential decision and serves only as a temporary or provisional solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace.

Responsibilities for COIN

Geographic combatant commanders are responsible for planning and executing military operations in their regions in support of COIN. Close coordination with the US Ambassador or diplomatic representative and Country Team within supported HNs is essential in order to build an effective regional COIN program.

Planning Imperatives

Current doctrine speaks about effects-based operations and the conduct of COIN is no different. The effects noted in Chapter two include protect, establish, enforce, limit and exploit. Each effect is discussed in detail in that chapter. Planners must consider longer-term strategic and operational effects of all US assistance efforts before implementing COIN programs. They must tailor military support of COIN programs to the environment and the specific needs of the supported HN, and must understand that a basic premise of the COIN program is that the ultimate responsibility rests with the HN. Geographic combatant commanders may develop theater strategies and/or campaign plans that support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) taskings. Regardless of how commanders may tailor the planning process, military

activities in support of COIN requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the operational level down to and including the tactical level.

COIN Planning Procedures and Considerations

The five phases of deliberate planning procedures and considerations are initiation, concept development and review, plan development, plan review, and supporting plans. The initiation phase begins with the Combatant Commander's receipt of planning guidance from CJCS. Concept development and review includes a mission analysis that looks at threats to HN stability; HN social, economic, and political environment; analysis of assigned tasks; and development of a mission statement. Plan development includes coordination with the American Ambassador and his Country Team, legal authorizations and restrictions. Planning considerations include, HN sovereignty and legitimacy, third-country interests, restrictive use of force, long term planning, maximizing intelligence capability, unity of effort, tailoring COIN operations to the needs and environment of the HN, rules of engagement (ROE), economy of force measures, and criteria of success. Plan review entails coordination with senior, subordinate, and adjacent commands, and supporting agencies (USAID, CIA, and others). Supporting plans are then developed by the agencies and organizations mentioned in the plan. These supporting plans include a greater level of detail and focus on how and when the support is provided. Several areas deserve special attention when discussing employment of forces in COIN operations: intelligence support; psychological impact; SOF; public information programs; logistic support; operations security, and, lessons learned.

Direct Operations

The primary mission for combatant commanders and other joint force commanders is to prepare for war and, if engaged in war, to terminate it on terms favorable to the United States. Commanders must consider CA, PSYOP and SOF must be discussed and reviewed when employing combat forces in support of COIN. Other considerations are: maintaining close coordination with the HN IDAD organization; establishing transition points; maintaining a joint, interagency and multinational focus; identifying and integrating intelligence, logistics, and other combat support means in US combat operations; conducting offensive operations when necessary to protect personnel, resources, and restore or establish order; reviewing human rights considerations; following the ROE; preventing indiscriminate use of force; maintaining the US interagency intelligence network; and integrating with other COIN programs. The command and control relationships established for the combat operation will be modified based on the political, social, and military environment of the area. Sustainment of US forces is essential to success. Political sensitivities and concerns for HN legitimacy and minimum US presence change the complexion of sustainment operations in the COIN environment.

There are three direct operations critical to supporting COIN: Civil-Military Operations, Combat Operations, and Information Operations. Civil-military operations (CMO) span a very broad area in COIN and include activities such as civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, humanitarian assistance (HA), civic assistance, and military civic action across the range of military operations. Using CMO to support military activities in a COIN program will enhance preventive measures, reconstruction efforts, and combat operations in support of efforts to stabilize and rebuild a HN. Combat operations are developed to neutralize the insurgent and, together with population and resources control measures, establish an environment within which political, social, and economic progress is possible. Information operations (IO) integrate all aspects of information to

support and enhance the elements of combat power, with the goal of dominating the battlespace at the right time, at the right place, and with the right weapons or resources.

Training

Training of HN forces must be consistent with national goals. Leaders must ensure that individuals and units training HN forces receive instruction in the following: area and cultural orientation; language training; standards of conduct; the integration of intelligence development, collection and analysis to support COIN programs; coordinating relationships and actions with other US Government (USG) agencies; legal guidelines; ROE; and tactical-level force protection training. Training must prepare HN forces for military operations to include institutional and unit training. The training must also be designed to support a mix of personnel ranging from language-trained and culturally focused SOF to those totally untrained in the specific area where the COIN program is executed.

Effects

COIN missions must achieve the goals established by the President. Leaders at all levels must keep in mind the fundamental effects of their operations that contribute to the national goals. Essential effects are:

Protect the Population.

Establish Local Political Institutions.

Reinforce Local Governments.

Eliminate Insurgent Capabilities.

Exploit Information from Local Sources.

PREFACE

“Campaigns of this kind are the more likely to continue because it is the only kind of war that fits the conditions of the modern age, while being at the same time well suited to take advantage of social discontent, racial ferment and nationalist fervours.”

B.H. Liddell Hart
Foreward to *Mao Tse Tung and Che
Guervara: Guerilla Warfare*, Cassell,
1962

The American Way of War as we have come to know it includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American warfare. Since the American Revolution, America’s armies have engaged in stability operations, support operations and counterinsurgency (COIN). Over the past half-century alone the U.S Army developed considerable experience in fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq). Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely on the shoulders of special operations forces (SOF); however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact with insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size, weaponry, and the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of conventional forces. Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination, kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices aimed at friendly and coalition forces, the host country’s leaders, and ordinary citizens. This type of warfare is known as asymmetrical warfare.

The stunning victory over Saddam Hussein’s army validated our conventional force TTP, but the ensuing aftermath of instability caused by an active Iraqi insurgency has caused us to review the lessons from our historical experience and that of our sister services and Allies. One of the key recurring lessons is that the U.S. cannot win other countries’ wars for them, but we can certainly help. In the end, U.S. forces can assist a country suffering an insurgency to put its house in order by providing a safe and secure environment at the local level and continuously building on the incremental success.

The impetus for this Field Manual-Interim (FM-I) came from the Iraq insurgency and the realization engagements in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) would likely use COIN TTPs. Consequently this FM-I reviews what we know about COIN and explains the fundamentals of military operations in a COIN environment. This FM-I expedites delivery of urgently needed doctrine to satisfy the immediate need for COIN principles.

In the past, many terms such as guerrilla, revolutionary, terrorist, thug, dissident, spoiler, rebel, partisan, religious extremist and enemy have been used to describe those opposing the established authorities. In order to maintain consistency throughout this publication the term insurgent is used to describe those taking part in any activity designed to undermine or to overthrow the established authorities.

Scope

To make this text useful to leaders involved in counterinsurgency operations regardless of where these operations may occur, the doctrine and TTP contained herein are broad in scope and involve principles applicable to various areas of operations. We have not intended to make this FM-I specific to any region or country. We realize insurgencies have some common characteristics while at the same time their ideological basis may vary widely. Fundamental to all counterinsurgencies is the need to help local authorities establish safety, security and stability because insurgents thrive on chaos and instability.

Applicability

The primary audience for this manual is conventional force division leaders and below. The focus of the manual is on the articulation and application of principles and fundamentals of military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. This manual will also assist Army schools in instructing the theory and conduct of counterinsurgency operations.

The Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD) within the Combined Arms Command (CAC) is the Army proponent for counterinsurgency doctrine. CADD has informally collaborated with the USAJFK Special Warfare Center and School (SWC) and the Doctrine Department of the Marine Corps Combat Developments Center (MCCDC) to develop this interim manual, and the US Army Combined Arms Center has published the FM-I. We encourage users of this manual to submit recommended changes or comments to improve the manual. Comments should be focused and note the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Provide reasons for each comment to ensure understanding and complete evaluation. Forward comments direct to the CADD POC @jan.horvath@leavenworth.army.mil.

FORWARD

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To Be Published

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Chapter 1: Overview

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“Guerrilla (insurgent) warfare is neither a product of China nor peculiar to the present day. From the earliest historical days, it has been a feature of wars fought by every class of men against invaders and oppressors.”

Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare, 1937

Definition of Insurgency

1.1 An insurgency is an armed political movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government, or separation from it, through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency.

1.2 Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics based on its strategic objectives, its operational environment, available resources, operational method and/or tactics (i.e. philosophy: mass mobilization through political action or the FOCO theory, which is mobilization from above – the insurgents just show up; and, all with a greater use of terror; and, urban versus rural). Insurgencies frequently seek to overthrow the existing social order and reallocate power within the country.

1.3 The goal of an insurgency is to mobilize human and materiel resources in order to form an alternative to the state. This alternative is called the counterstate. The counterstate may have much of the infrastructure possessed by the state itself, but this must normally be hidden since it is illegal. Thus the counterstate is often referred to by the term “clandestine infrastructure.” As the insurgents gain confidence and power, the clandestine infrastructure may become more open as observed historically in communist regions during the Chinese Revolution, in South Vietnam after the North Vietnamese 1972 Easter Offensive, and in Colombia.

1.4 Successful mobilization provides active and passive support for the insurgency’s programs, operations, and goals. At the national level, mobilization grows out of dissatisfaction by some elite members (e.g., a group of educators – in most of the world school teachers are considered members of the elite) with existing political, economic, or social conditions. At the regional level, members of an elite have become marginalized (i.e., they have become psychologically alienated from the system), and have established links with followers by bringing them into the counterstate. At the local, district and province-levels, local movement representatives called the cadre address local grievances and do recruiting. The cadre give credit to the insurgent movement for all local solutions. Loyalty to the insurgent movement is normally won through deeds but may occur through appeal to abstract principles. Promises to end hunger or eliminate poverty may appeal to a segment of the population, while appeals to eliminate a foreign presence or establish a government based on religious or political ideology may appeal to others. Nonetheless, these promises and appeals are associated with tangible solutions and deeds.

Elements of the Insurgency

1.5 An insurgent organization normally consists of four elements: the leadership; the combatants (main forces, regional forces, local forces); the cadre (local political leaders that are also called the militants); and the mass base (the bulk of the membership). The proportions relative to the larger movement depend upon the strategic approach adopted by the insurgency. To the extent state presence has been eliminated in particular areas, the four elements can exist openly. To the extent the state remains a continuous or occasional presence, the elements must maintain a clandestine existence.

1.6 Leadership figures engage in command and control of the insurgent movement. They are the idea men and the planners. They see solutions to the grievances of society in structural terms. They believe only altering the way the institutions and practices of society fit together will result in real change. Reforms and changes in personalities are deemed insufficient to “liberate” or “redeem” society. Historically, insurgencies have coalesced around a unifying leader, ideology and organization. This precedent can no longer be assumed. It is possible that many leaders will emerge at the head of several organizations with different ideologies but united by a singular goal of overthrowing the government or ridding the country of a foreign presence.

1.7 The combatants do the actual fighting and are often mistaken for the movement itself. This they are not. They exist only to carry out the same functions as the police and armed forces of the state. They only constitute part of the movement, along with the planners and the idea men. In many insurgencies the combatants maintain local control, as well as protect and expand the counterstate. Combatants who secure local areas are the local forces. The local forces use terror initially to intimidate and establish local control and later to enforce. They conduct limited ambushes of government forces and police, also. Combatants who link local areas and provide regional security are the regional forces. Both of these elements normally are tied to specific areas of operation (AO). Main forces, in contrast, are the “heavy” units of the insurgent movement and may be deployed in any AO. Rather than employing terror (local forces) and guerrilla warfare (the main activity of regional forces), they engage in mobile warfare and positional warfare, both subsumed under the “conventional warfare” rubric but different in emphasis when used by insurgents. Due to the growing possibility of separate leaders in different regions with various goals, this force-role linkage may not be present. Instead, independent insurgent leaders may carry on military operations, to include terror, independent of other insurgent forces. Conventional warfare may be minimized. Ultimately, time is on the side of the insurgent. Fear, intimidation and violence – coupled with the television and internet – may achieve the social upheaval the insurgent seeks and force foreign powers to abandon the HN because of pressures from their own people at home.

1.8 The cadre are the political activists and local political leaders of the insurgency. They are referred to as militants since they are actively engaged in struggling to accomplish insurgent goals. The insurgent movement provides guidance and procedures to the cadre, and the cadre use these to assess the grievances in local areas and carry out activities that satisfy those grievances. They then attribute the solutions they have provided to the insurgent movement itself. Deeds are the key to making insurgent slogans meaningful to the population. Larger societal issues, such as foreign presence, facilitate such action, because these larger issues may be blamed for life’s smaller problems. Insurgents, however, may have no regard for popular dissent or local grievances. The insurgents play by no rules, and they will use fear as a means to intimidate the populace and thereby prevent cooperation with the HN.

1.9 The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement that are the population of the counterstate. Mass base members are recruited and indoctrinated by the cadre, who implement instructions and procedures provided by the insurgent leadership. Though they do not actively fight for the insurgency, mass base members provide intelligence and supplies. Mass base members may continue in their normal positions in society, but many will either lead second, clandestine lives for the insurgent movement, or even pursue new, full-time positions within the insurgency (e.g., combatants normally begin as members of the mass base before becoming armed manpower).

1.10 The insurgent leadership thus provides organizational and managerial skills to transform areas and provinces into an effective force for armed political action while the cadre accomplishes this same transformation at the community and mobilized individual level. What results, as in any armed conflict, is a contest of resource mobilization and force deployment. A state is challenged by a counterstate. No objective force level guarantees victory for either side. It is frequently stated that a 10:1 or 20:1 ratio of counterinsurgents to insurgents is necessary for counterinsurgency victory. In reality, research has demonstrated time and again there are no valid ratios that when met guarantee victory. As in conventional war, correlation of forces in an insurgency depends upon the situation. Though objective and valid force-correlation ratios do not exist, counterinsurgency has been historically manpower intensive. Time, which often works on the side of the insurgent, just as often places serious constraints upon counterinsurgent courses of action.

Origins and Causes

1.11 Rising up against constituted authority has been a constant throughout history. The causes for such uprisings have been as numerous as the human condition. Uprisings against indigenous regimes have normally been termed “rebellions.” Uprisings against an external occupying power have normally been termed “resistance movements.” Historical particulars can at times conflate the two.

1.12 Rebellions and resistance movements are transformed into “insurgency” by their incorporation into an armed political campaign. A popular desire to resist is used by an insurgent movement to accomplish the insurgents’ political goal. The insurgent thus mounts a political challenge to the state through the formation of or desire to create a counterstate.




Figure 1: This process diagram shows how an insurgency could develop if grievances become political issues and government authorities fails to resolve those issues.

1.13 The desire to form a counterstate grows from the same causes that galvanize any political campaign. These causes can range from the desire for greater equity in the distribution of resources (poverty alone is rarely, if ever, sufficient to sustain an insurgency) to a demand that foreign occupation end. Increasingly, religious ideology has become a catalyst for insurgent movements. The support of the people, then, is the center of gravity. It must be gained in whatever proportion is necessary to sustain the insurgent movement (or, contrariwise, to defeat him). As in any political campaign, all levels of support are relative. The goal is mobilization such that the enemy may be defeated. This necessarily will depend as much upon the campaign approach (i.e., operational art) and tactics adopted as upon more strategic concerns of “support.” Operational and tactical use of violence as an insurgent strategy has become increasingly commonplace. The object of violence can be anything the insurgents deem to be obstructions to their cause. This can be HN forces, foreign forces, aid workers, civilians who do not accept the insurgents’ claims, and infrastructure.

1.14 Violence is the most potent weapon available to insurgents. Nonetheless, violence can alienate when not linked to a vision of a better life. Violence is often accompanied by a variety of nonviolent means that act as a potent weapon in an external propaganda war and assist recruiting. Historically, astute movements have recognized the efficacy of both means to the extent they have fielded discrete units charged with nonviolent action (e.g., strikes in the transportation sector) to supplement violent action. The insurgents in Algeria rarely defeated French forces in the field, but employed indiscriminate violence, successfully initiated non-violent strikes, developed associated propaganda for external use and thereby handily won their war. “People’s war” in its Chinese and Vietnamese variants did so, also. Such nonviolent action, however, does not appear to be evident in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1.15 Insurgent movements begin as “fire in the minds of men.” Insurgent leaders commit themselves to building a new world. They construct the organization to carry through this desire. Generally, popular grievances become insurgent causes when interpreted and shaped by the insurgent leadership. The insurgency grows if the cadre that are local insurgent leaders and representatives can establish a link between the insurgent movement and the desire for

solutions to grievances sought by the local population. This link does not always exist. Self-serving insurgent leaders with no regard for local conditions may launch an insurgency even if the population supports the HN and has few grievances. This can occur when the HN government is weak or even nonexistent because of other factors. If the cadre are able to indoctrinate and control the mobilized local manpower, often by creating a climate of fear, and the cadre respond to higher commands with independent tactical action, the insurgency will be operationally and strategically unified. If the opposite is true, the insurgency will remain an uncoordinated, decentralized organization.

1.16 Insurgent leaders will exploit opportunities created by government security force actions. The behavior of security forces is critical. Lack of security force discipline leads to alienation, and security force abuse of the populace is a very effective insurgent recruiting tool. Consequently, specific insurgent tactical actions are often planned to frequently elicit over-reaction from security force individuals and units. Over-reaction can extend to poorly drawn Rules of Engagement (ROE) and even strategic and operational planning that abets brutalizing a recalcitrant population. Increasingly the use of religious shrines for offensive insurgent actions can be seen as attempts to achieve such an over-reaction. Such actions can create a perception of HN and foreign military forces as oppressors rather than as liberators.

Insurgent Doctrine

1.17 Insurgent doctrine is critical in determining how the insurgents will actually implement the two types of insurgency. A defensive insurgency has much in common with a resistance movement, since the counter-state already exists and will normally adopt overt techniques necessary for self-defense. An offensive insurgency, on the other hand, is faced with the task of creating the counter-state from scratch. To do this, there are two basic approaches.

- A first approach is to emphasize mobilization of the masses. This course of action places a premium upon political action by the cadre in local areas, with strategic and operational directives coming from above. Emphasizing mass mobilization results in a hierarchical, tightly-controlled and coordinated movement. The insurgent movement that results will resemble a pyramid in its manpower distribution, with the combatants the smallest part of the movement (the apex of the pyramid).
- A second approach emphasizes armed action. This course favors violence rather than mass mobilization and normally results in an inverted pyramid, with the combatants themselves the bulk of the movement. This is the approach taken by Castro in Cuba and may be an approach some insurgents in Iraq have taken against the post-Saddam government although some efforts to mobilize have been reported.

1.18. A mass base sustains the first approach, and the second approach will have only a much smaller support base. The support base will not have the numbers of the mass base generated by the mobilization approach.

1.19 If emphasis is upon the first approach, mobilization of the masses, the combatants exist to facilitate the accomplishment of the political goals of the insurgent movement. In local areas, terror and guerrilla action are used to eliminate resistance, either from individuals who are opposed to the movement or from the local armed representatives of the state, initially the police and militia, but later the military, also. Main force units, which are guerrilla units that have been “regularized” or turned into rough copies of government units but usually more mobile and

lightly armed, are used to deal with the state's inevitable deployment of the military. The purpose of main forces is to engage in "mobile (or maneuver) warfare". The intent is force-on-force action to destroy government main force units. Tactics may include major battles as well as ambushes and small-scale engagements. These battles and engagements result in the securing and expansion of the counter-state (which may be clandestine in all or part), but are not designed to seize and hold positions as in conventional warfare. This occurs only in "positional warfare." Though the terminology is drawn especially from Russian Soviet usage, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong (VC) used both mobile and positional warfare throughout the war in Vietnam.

- The NVA and VC frequently deployed battalions and regiments (i.e., brigades) using classic mobile warfare even as terror and guerrilla action continued against the United States forces from 1965 until the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973.
- Classic war of position was seen three times in the Vietnam War: the Tet Offensive in January-February 1968; the Spring 1972 "Easter Offensive," which resulted in the permanent seizure and loss of portions of South Vietnamese territory; and the Spring 1975 offensive, which saw the fall of South Vietnam and its absorption into the larger unified Vietnam. In the latter two of these campaigns, enemy divisions and even corps were used, with terror and guerrilla action assuming the role of special operations in support of conventional operations. During Tet, the NVA employed all 52 VC battalions exclusively, and multiple battalions attacked objectives simultaneously though these battalions were under individual command and control.
- More recently, in El Salvador, where the US successfully supported the counterinsurgency, government forces twice, in 1981 and 1989, had to beat back "positional warfare" offensives designed to seize widespread areas, including portions of the nation's capital.
- In Colombia, where the US is similarly involved in support of the counterinsurgency, the insurgents of FARC (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*) initiated their mobile warfare phase in 1996. There followed a string of Colombian Army (COLAR) defeats that culminated in a FARC positional warfare attack that seized a department capital, Mitu, in mid-1998. The relief of Mitu galvanized a military reform effort that led to government success in a half dozen major mobile war battles fought between 1998 and 2001. The largest of these involved a FARC force of eight battalion equivalents engaged by an equal number of COLAR counterinsurgency battalions. FARC consequently returned to an emphasis upon terror and guerrilla action.
- In Nepal, where US assistance has played an important role in government counterinsurgency, the people's war approach adopted by the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), has progressed in classic fashion. Widespread use of terror and guerrilla action has been complemented by mobile warfare to overrun government positions up to company strength. Mobile warfare targets have been chosen operationally (i.e., as part of campaign planning) to position the CPN (M) for anticipated positional war offensives, notably against major population centers.

1.20 If emphasis is upon the second approach, armed action, the political goal is to be accomplished primarily by violence rather than mass mobilization. The insurgents attempt to

inflict such a level of casualties and destruction the counterinsurgent is incapable or unwilling to continue. Both approaches emphasize inflicting casualties. The distinction is whether mobilization or armed insurrection is the initial emphasis. The insurgent may also employ terror because he lacks a mass base, does not have the time needed to create such a base, or whose objectives do not require such a base. In this approach, the combatant force rarely moves beyond terror and guerrilla action, with small and more specialized units, frequently no more than squad or platoon strength. Sympathizers provide recruits for the support base, but these sympathizers are actively involved only occasionally, though they are often central to the information warfare component of the insurgent campaign.

- An illustration of this approach is “The Troubles,” 1968-98, in Northern Ireland (Ulster). An initial mass mobilization approach followed by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) allowed state penetration, and hence it was abandoned in favor of a cellular “Active Service Unit” (ASU) methodology. Normally with no more than 300-man strength, the ASU network engaged almost exclusively in terror actions and was sustained by a support base that numbered only in the thousands out of a total 1.5 million population in an area the size of Connecticut. Sympathizers came overwhelmingly from a minority within the Catholic community, thus forming a minority within a minority. At its peak, however, this sympathetic base proved capable of mustering 17% of the votes in democratic elections and served to keep open to question the legitimacy of British rule, which was actually favored by a substantial majority.
- More recently, the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan have used this approach. Terror and low-level guerrilla action have been focused upon indigenous supporters and infrastructure of the new regimes in Baghdad and Kabul. Simultaneously, attacks upon US forces have sought to inflict casualties to break the will of the US public to continue. The insurgents have recognized the indigenous regimes cannot continue in the short-term without US backing and assistance. Neither will the new regimes be able to continue if their populations can be suitably terrorized into sullen neutrality as the US begins to withdraw.

Dynamics of Insurgency

1.21 There are seven dynamics that are common to most insurgencies. These dynamics provide a framework for analysis that can reveal the insurgency’s strengths and weaknesses. Although the analyst can examine the following dynamics separately, he must study their interaction to fully understand the insurgency. These seven dynamics are leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, and phasing and timing.

LEADERSHIP

1.22 Leadership is critical to any insurgency. Insurgency is not simply random political violence. It is directed and focused political violence. It requires leadership to provide vision, direction to establish and set the long-term way ahead, short-term guidance, coordination, and organizational coherence. Insurgent leaders must make their cause known to the people and gain popular support. Although theoretically the insurgent leader desires to gain popular support for the cause, that desire is often accompanied by a terror campaign against those who do not support the insurgents’ goals. Their key tasks are to break and supplant the ties between the people and the government, and to establish legitimacy for their movement. Their education,

family, social and religious connections and positions may contribute to their ability to think clearly, communicate, organize and lead a an insurgency, or their lack of education and connections may delay and/or impair their access to positions where they are able to exercise leadership as Mao Tse-Tung experienced. .

1.23 Insurgencies are dynamic political movements that result from real or perceived grievance or neglect that leads to alienation from an established government. Alienated elite members, however defined (e.g. in most of the world educators and teachers are members of the elite; in Islamic and many Catholic nations, religious leaders are elite members) advance alternatives to existing conditions. As their movement grows, leaders must decide which body of “doctrine” to adopt. In the mass mobilization approach, leaders recruit, indoctrinate, and deploy the cadre necessary to carry out the actions of the movement. In the approach that emphasizes armed action, there is often a much more decentralized mode of operations, but this is usually guided by a central organization. Extreme decentralization results in a movement that rarely functions as a coherent body but is nevertheless capable of inflicting substantial casualties and damage.

1.24 The power base of some insurgencies is collective and does not depend on specific leaders or personalities to be effective. Such insurgencies are easier to penetrate but recover rapidly when they lose key personnel. Other organizations may depend on a charismatic personality to provide cohesion, motivation, and a focal point for the movement. Organizations led in this way can make decisions and initiate new actions rapidly, but they are vulnerable to disruptions if key personalities are removed or co-opted by the enemy.

OBJECTIVES

1.25 Effective analysis of an insurgency requires interpreting strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Understanding the root causes of the insurgency is essential to analyzing the insurgents’ objectives. The strategic objective is the insurgents’ desired end-state, the seizure of political power and the overthrow of an existing government. Operational objectives are the decisive points (military, political and ideological) along lines of operation toward the strategic objective, and they are the means to link tactical goals with strategic end states. One of the political decisive points is the total destruction of government legitimacy. Tactical objectives are the immediate aims of insurgent acts. Tactical objectives can be psychological and physical in nature. Some examples include the dissemination of psychological operations (PSYOP) products or intimidation (psychological objective) or the attack and seizure of a key facility (physical objective).

IDEOLOGY

1.26 In its ideology, an insurgency sets forth a political alternative to the existing state. Both theoretically and actually, it offers a counter-state. This may involve claims to better life-chances or simply a vision of a more perfect, just and/or religious and ideological world under an alternative, non-foreign regime. The most powerful ideologies tap latent, emotive concerns of the populace, such as the desire for justice, the creation of an idealized religious state, or liberation from foreign occupation. Ideology influences the insurgents’ perception of the environment by providing the prism, to include vocabulary and analytical categories, through which the situation is assessed. The result is that ideology shapes the movement’s organization and operational methods.

ENVIRONMENT AND GEOGRAPHY

1.27 Environment and geography, including cultural and demographic factors, affect all participants in a conflict. The manner in which insurgents and counterinsurgents adapt to these realities creates advantages and disadvantages for each. The effects of these factors are immediately visible at the tactical level, where they are perhaps the predominant influence on decisions regarding force structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures. Insurgency in an urban environment often presents a different set of planning considerations than in rural environments. These planning considerations affect structure, doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures directly.

EXTERNAL SUPPORT

1.28 Access to external resources and sanctuaries has been a constant throughout the history of insurgencies. Rarely, if ever, has an insurgent force been able to obtain the arms and equipment (particularly ammunition) -- necessary for decisive action -- from within the battle area. External support can provide political, psychological, and material resources that might otherwise be limited or totally unavailable.

1.29 A recent phenomenon has been the advent of internal sanctuaries. These may be in the form of religious structures. They may be large cities where neither HN nor external military forces are sufficiently strong to counter the insurgents.

PHASING AND TIMING

1.30 Insurgencies have often passed through common phases of development. The conceptualization generally followed by insurgents is drawn from that postulated by Mao Tse-Tung. Regardless of its provenance, movements as diverse as communist or Islamic insurgencies have used the Maoist conceptualization because it is logical and based upon the mass mobilization emphasis. It states insurgents are first strategically on the defensive (Phase I), move to stalemate (Phase II), and finally go over to the offensive (Phase III). Strategic movement from one phase to another incorporates the operational and tactical activity typical of earlier phases. It does not end them. The North Vietnamese explicitly recognized this reality in their "war of interlocking" doctrine, which held that all "forms of warfare" occur simultaneously, even as a particular form is paramount.

1.31 Not all insurgencies experience every phase, and progression through all phases is not a requirement for success. The same insurgent movement may be in different phases in other regions of a country. Successful insurgencies can also revert to an earlier phase when under pressure, resuming development when favorable conditions return.

1.32 Political organization occurs throughout. While on the defensive, however, in Phase I per Mao, a movement will necessarily fight the "war of the weak," emphasizing terror and guerrilla action. These will be used to eliminate resistance from individuals and local government presence, especially the police. Invariably, the government must commit its main force units (normally the army) to reclaim what it has lost. Knowing this, insurgents form their own main force units. These are used to defeat government forces in detail as the latter disperse to engage in area domination. It is through such action that stalemate, Phase II, is achieved. The government's forces in the contest of armed power are systematically neutralized through mobile

(or maneuver), force-on-force warfare. Only in Phase III does a transition to the holding of position occur (hence the term, “positional warfare”).

1.33 If the insurgents adopt the second approach, a strategy emphasizing armed action, these phases do not necessarily apply. Inflicting an unsustainable level of pain on HN or external military forces may eliminate the need to form main force units. Pressure from within the HN or country providing the forces may lead to capitulation or withdrawal. In attacking democratic societies, insurgents using this approach attempt to tap the purported aversion of democratic societies to protracted, costly conflicts that appear endless. They seek to break the will of the state to continue the struggle.

“You know you never defeated us on the battlefield, “ said the American colonel.

The North Vietnamese colonel pondered this remark a moment.
“That may be so, “ he replied, “but it’s also irrelevant.”

Conversation in Hanoi, April, 1975
between Colonel Harry Summers, Chief
Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation
and Colonel Tu, Chief, North Vietnamese Delegation

State Approach to Insurgency

1.34 Counterinsurgency is the neutralization by the state of the insurgency and its effort to form a counterstate. While many abortive insurgencies are defeated by military and police actions alone, if an insurgency has tapped into serious grievances and has mobilized a significant portion of the population, simply returning to the status quo may not be an option. Reform may be necessary, but reform is a matter for the state, using all of its human and material resources. Security forces are only one such resource. The response must be multifaceted and coordinated, yet states typically charge their security forces with “waging counterinsurgency.” This the security forces cannot do alone.

1.35 The state first decides upon its goal (restoration of legitimate government writ); then, produces a plan to accomplish that end. All elements of national power are assigned their roles in carrying out the plan. The government establishes the legal framework and command and control (C2) mechanisms to enable the plan to be implemented.

- The legal framework normally includes a series of extraordinary measures that are associated with emergency situations or even martial law. It will frequently expand military powers into areas delegated solely to the police in “normal times.”
- Historically, effective C2 architecture has involved setting up local coordinating bodies with representation from all key parties. This local body directs the counterinsurgency campaign in the AO concerned, though one individual will have the lead. Minimally, such a coordinating body includes appropriate representatives from the civil authority, the military, the police, the intelligence services, and (though not always) the civil

population. The most effective use of coordinating bodies has given permanent-party individuals (e.g. a district officer) responsibility for counterinsurgency C2 in their AOs and given them control over any civil or military assets sent into their AOs. Reinforced intelligence bodies, in particular, have been assigned as permanent party. Involvement of local officials and civilians can defeat the insurgents attempt to undermine the political system.

1.36 HN military and police forces must be the most visible force to the people. Security forces sent into an area to engage in counterinsurgency perform as follows:

- Strategically, they serve as the shield for carrying out reform. It is imperative that HN military and police forces protect the populace and defend their own bases while simultaneously fighting an insurgency.
- Operationally, they systematically restore government control.

Key Tasks to countering an insurgency are:

1. Separate the insurgents from the population.
2. Identify and neutralize the insurgents.
3. Create a secure environment.
4. Neutralize enemy propaganda.

MG Geoffrey C. Lambert
Commander, Special Warfare Center,
July 2003

- Tactically, security forces eliminate insurgent leadership, cadre and combatants, through death and capture, by co-opting individual members or by forcing insurgents to leave the area (the Mau Mau in Kenya and the MCP in Malaya). This is analogous to separating the fish from the sea, and the local populations (that also provide the insurgent mass base) are then secure and able to engage in normal activities. The forces also assist with civic action projects. These actions convey to the people a sense of progress and concern by the central government.

1.37 The counterinsurgency plan will initially analyze the basis of the insurgency in order to determine it's form and center(s) of gravity (COG). The form and COG(s) will dictate the most effective type force to employ (police, militia and military or primarily military and police) and insurgent vulnerabilities. The COIN plan will detail the scheme to reclaim what has been lost and establish priority of effort and timelines. Concurrently, secure the critical infrastructure of the state and the government's centers of power. As a general principle, the government moves from strength to weakness, "holding" in areas of lesser priority while successively concentrating assets in priority areas.

1.38 A key action is COIN operations must balance elimination of grievances (i.e., reform, to include elimination of human rights abuses) and security force action that eliminates the insurgents. The security forces provide the populace the protection necessary for the restoration of government presence, basic services and control.

1.39 COIN plans and operations must exploit shifts in the internal or external situation that work against the insurgent and favor the state. This normally involves an extended period of time, a "protracted war". This makes it difficult for representative governments to sustain counterinsurgent campaigns, particularly in the present world environment where other than

the U.S. and a minority of other nations, there appears to be a lack of overt, sustained agreement regarding strategic interests, ends and means, much less operational and tactical concerns.

1.40 The US (and other nations) must assist the HN in implementing a sustainable approach when participating in a counterinsurgency. To the extent the HN has its basic institutions and security forces intact, the burden upon US and multinational forces and resources is lessened. To the extent the HN is lacking basic institutions and functions, the burden upon the US and multinational forces is increased. In the extreme, rather than building upon what is, the US and other nations will find themselves creating elements (e.g., local forces and government institutions) of the society they have been sent to assist. Military forces thus become involved in nation building while simultaneously attempting to defeat an insurgency. US Forces often lead because the U.S. military (and possibly several other militaries) possesses and exercises the capability to project sustainable force (i.e., rapid movement of troops and material). This involves them in a host of current activities regarded as non-standard from supervising elections to restoring power and facilitating and conducting schooling.

1.41 Leaders and planning staff need to be aware there will always be constraints upon the prosecution of counterinsurgency within the theater of operations. Constraints must be identified and analyzed systematically, because they will impact upon the conduct of operations at all levels. They ought to be re-evaluated regularly. The bottom line is forces have to operate in the environment as it is, not as they might wish it to be. Some constraints may include:

- Time. Strategic/political factors may dictate the time frame during which effects must be created or applied. See COIN Effects in Chapter 2, Planning.
- Means. The means (e.g. weapons, equipment, mature concepts and TTP) available are likely to be limited. See Chapter 3, Operations and Appendix C, Population Resource Control (PRC).
- Legal. The international, US, and host nation legal frameworks will inevitably place constraints upon the conduct of operations (e.g., ROE, powers of arrest, ability to prosecute/rules of evidence, powers of detention). See Chapter 2, Planning and Appendix K, Legal Considerations in COIN.
- Geography. In addition to terrain factors, there may be areas where, for reasons of political, cultural, religious, or environmental sensitivity, the ability to conduct operations is constrained, moderated, limited or prohibited, e.g. cross-border operations, hot pursuit, and bombing sanctuaries. See Chapters 2 and 4, Planning and Intelligence, respectively and the six associated appendices.
- Domestic and International Considerations. Events in the theater of operations are likely to be subject to media scrutiny and reporting (both accurate and inaccurate). It is a reality that US domestic and international considerations must be weighed, and these may constrain or limit how operations are conducted. See Chapters 2 and 3, Planning and Operations, respectively, as well as Appendix C, PRC.
- Multinational Partners. Multinational partners may have differing political and legal imperatives. The need to maintain cohesiveness among members of a coalition may create requirements to constrain or moderate US force behavior. See Chapter 2, Planning.

- The Host Nation. The host nation's leadership, culture, and politics (among many possible factors) will inevitably generate a wide range of pressures, some conflicting, upon the military that must be considered carefully. These will create a further source of constraints or limitations. See Chapter 2, Planning and the two associated appendices.

Chapter 2: Planning in a COIN Environment

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

“In war nothing is achieved except by calculation. Everything that is not soundly planned in its details yields no results.”

Napoleon, 18 September 1806

Section 1: Introduction

GENERAL

2.1 COIN has certain aspects that make planning for it unique. Planners must consider several basic imperatives when developing counterinsurgency plans.

2.2 Insurgencies are protracted politico-military struggles with political power as the central issue. Therefore, military planners must ensure a closer and more effective coordination of military operations between the country team, interagency personnel, the HN, and military organizations than would exist during the normal planning of conventional operations. This coordination will normally be at the strategic and/or operational levels. U.S. government policy towards a HN and the insurgents is the overriding determinant for military action.

2.3 Planners must consider long-term effects of all US assistance efforts before implementing COIN programs. This long-term consideration is especially important in building HN development and defense self-sufficiency, both of which may require large investments of time and materiel.

2.4 Planners must tailor military support to other elements of COIN operations while considering the environment and the specific needs of the supported HN. They must consider the threat, as well as local political, tribal, religious, social, and economic factors when developing military plans to support COIN. Overcoming the tendency to use a US frame of reference is important because this potentially damaging tendency can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance.

2.5 Planners must understand a basic premise of the COIN approach is the ultimate responsibility for Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) rests with the HN. US planners must measure all COIN plans against this precept.

2.6 Political and military leaders must realistically evaluate troop requirements in a COIN environment. In addition to those tasks that are inherent in any military situation—base security, offensive combat operations—some tasks occur with greater frequency in COIN and deserve special attention. Among these are:

- Military operations primarily in cities
- Protection of government facilities

- Protection of infrastructure
- Protection of commercial enterprises vital to the HN economy
- Protection of cultural facilities
- Prevention of looting
- Military Police functions
- Close interaction with civilians
- Assistance with reconstruction projects
- Securing the HN borders
- Training or retraining HN military forces.

2.7 Faced with these additional tasks, the joint force command may be required to provide more units, and a different mix of units, than would be required for operations against a conventional force the same approximate size as the insurgent force. The preponderance of many of these units may only be available in the Reserve Component. All planning must consider the long-term implications and second-and-third order effects of COIN missions. COIN is a long-term approach and effort political and military leaders must be willing to support. Additionally, leaders must recognize COIN operations will involve nation building as this is a sub set of COIN. COIN often involves nation building, but not all nation building involves COIN.

2.8 At all levels, counterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through coordination among HN forces and agencies, assigned US organizations, multinational partners, international organizations (IOs), or non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that may influence the mission.

Desired Effects

2.9 Planning for a counterinsurgency focuses on the effects the force must attain to be successful:

Protect:

Protection of the population is an imperative. This is security from the influence of the insurgents initially. The population is then mobilized, armed and trained to protect itself. Effective security allows local political and administrative institutions to operate freely and commerce to flourish

Establish:

Establishing conditions favorable for the development of government institutions consistent with U.S. objectives. These conditions include the establishment of law enforcement and freely

elected political leaders where possible, public information, health care, schools, public works, and fire fighting capabilities.

Reinforce:

Reinforce is both tangible and psychological. Local security forces must reinforce and be integrated into the plan at every stage. This local integration is reinforced and emphasized with the local and HN police, military and civil leaders constantly through deeds, and to ensure these forces have great visibility with the populace. Psychologically, the populace must be assured continuously and effectively that conditions are becoming better to counter insurgent propaganda.

Eliminate:

Eliminate insurgent capabilities to exploit grievances. Work with local authorities and leaders to resolve the issues that are creating concern in order to legitimize governmental institutions.

Exploit:

Exploit information and intelligence obtained from local sources to gain access to the insurgent's economic and social base of support, order of battle (OB), tactics, techniques and procedures.

Section II: Role of the Army in COIN

2.10 The role of the Army is to administer, train for and successfully execute offensive, defensive and stability and support operations (SASO). Counterinsurgency is one of the stability operations within SASO. Each regional combatant commander advises the Department of State in developing theater engagement program packages appropriate for the situation. Each combatant command provides military forces under the program as well as military advice, tactical and technical training, and intelligence and logistic support. Army forces help the Host Nation (HN) police, paramilitary, and military forces perform counterinsurgency, area security, or local security operations. They advise and assist in finding, dispersing, capturing, and destroying the insurgent force. Army forces emphasize the training of HN national, state, and local forces to perform essential defense functions. They aim to provide a secure environment in which developmental programs can take effect while respecting the rights and dignity of the people.

2.11 US policymakers determine the scope of military participation based on US interests and the desires of the HN. The US military aims to improve the effectiveness of the HN security forces and to assist in preventing support for the insurgents. To prevent the overthrow of a government friendly to the U.S. or to provide security while a new government is established, U.S. forces may be required to engage in combat. As quickly as possible, though, HN military and police must assume the primary combat role (see Appendix L, Development and Training of Indigenous Security Forces). A long-term U.S. combat role may undermine the legitimacy of the host government and risks converting the conflict into a U.S.-only war. That combat role can also further alienate cultures that are hostile to the U.S. On the occasion when the threat to US interests is great and indirect means have proven insufficient, preemptive US combat operations may be required. Direct use of US combat forces in counterinsurgency operations remains a

policy option for the President, and Army forces must provide it when required. Host-nation forces should conduct internal stability operations when necessary employing concepts such as population and resource control (see Appendix C, Population and Resource Control). When U.S. forces are involved, the HN must provide representatives to assist U.S. forces in their contacts with local populations.

2.12 US forces may conduct offensive operations to disrupt and destroy insurgent combat formations. These operations prevent the insurgents from attacking government-controlled areas. They also disrupt insurgent efforts to consolidate and expand areas already under their control. US combat forces may conduct stability and support operations in support of host-nation stability operations or to assist the HN to expand its mobilization base. U.S. forces may also be required to secure HN borders to prevent third nation elements from supporting and/or joining the insurgency. Success in stability operations enables the HN to resume the military aspects of its counterinsurgency campaign and creates conditions in which U.S. combat forces may be allowed to withdraw.

Section III: COIN in the Military Decision Making Process

2.13 Insurgencies are armed political movements, protracted politico-military struggles using guerrilla tactics and terrorist activities. Planners must analyze the mission and develop COIN concepts to defeat each element of the insurgency. The specific steps followed in this phase of the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) are detailed in FM 5.0, *Army Planning and Orders Production*. This section addresses important COIN considerations.

2.14 Before beginning COIN planning, the commander's staff conducts a thorough mission analysis of the operational environment and threat. This mission analysis establishes the operational framework for COIN planning. Areas to be considered when analyzing the mission are:

- Viability of the HN government. Determine this in conjunction with other government agencies and the HN. If there is an existing government, the legitimacy and viability of the existing government may determine the level of military and civilian agency support required.
- Threats to HN IDAD. Threats may be specific, such as insurgents or illicit drugs, or they may be more general as in instability and social unrest. This allows civil and military leaders to also target long-term causes rather than short-term symptoms. In the event of an insurgency, planners must identify the basis of an insurgency in order to determine its form, center(s) of gravity (COG) and the root cause. This is key because the form and COG(s) will dictate the most effective type force to employ (police, militia and military or primarily military and police) and identify insurgent vulnerabilities. A COIN plan should describe a scheme to reclaim any cities and towns that have been lost and establish priority of effort and timelines. Concurrently, the critical infrastructure of the state and the government's centers of power must be identified and secured.

2.15 The HN Social, Economic, and Political Environment. COIN, as a sub set of both SASO and the overarching IDAD strategy, supports IDAD operations in a manner that is acceptable to the HN's political and cultural realities. Planners must consider factors such as the capability of the HN leadership and government as well as existing treaties and social and economic infrastructure. This assessment may lead to the conclusion the best solution from a U.S.

perspective may not be the best solution for the supported HN. This will be resolved through diplomatic channels and may conclude SASO-related operations other than COIN are the most effective solution for the US and the HN governments.

- The intelligence estimate is essential to identify the threat upon which to base COIN efforts. The intelligence estimate supporting COIN operations will have an orientation quite different from that of a conventional estimate. A comprehensive and intimate knowledge of the environment is essential in building this estimate. The conventional J-2 intelligence estimate concentrates on enemy situation, enemy capabilities, an analysis of those capabilities, and, finally, conclusions drawn from that analysis. In COIN, however, planners must expand this concept beyond conventional enemy analysis to focus more on the local population and its probable reactions to potential US or insurgent actions. This emphasis requires knowledge of the ethnic, tribal, racial, economic, scientific, technical, religious, and linguistic groups in the HN, as well as their locations and an understanding of how they may perceive future operations. Understanding the operating environment and the HN's social, economic, and political order are essential in order to build effective COIN programs to support the local IDAD program. The COIN intelligence planner views the battle space very differently from that of the conventional planner. See Annex A, Civil Affairs Assessment Checklist.
- The CMO estimate examines each military course of action for CMO requirements and CA assistance and reviews potential operations for any civil administration implications. CMO will also complete area studies where operations are likely. For military operations to support COIN, these assessments focus on social, economic, and political factors that relate to existing or potential lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. These assessments may include overlays that show local demographics, civil supply support, public utilities, and population displacement. CA support planning must be incorporated into all COIN planning and operations.
- Planning at the tactical level in COIN operations requires a far greater analysis of the civil environment than in conventional operations. For a detailed discussion of Civil Considerations within METT-TC, read FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, Appendix B, Information, PP B-8 – B-12 or see Appendix A, Civil Affairs Assessment Checklist. Areas for analysis (ASCOPE) are:
 - Areas—Terrain analysis from a civilian perspective. Analyze how key civilian areas affect the missions of respective forces and how military operations affect these areas. Examples are political boundaries, locations of government centers, by-type enclaves, special regions (Ex. mining or agricultural), trade routes and possible settlement sites.
 - Structures—Includes traditional high-payoff targets, protected cultural sites, and facilities with practical applications. The analysis is a comparison how a structures' location, functions and capabilities can support operations as compared to costs and consequences of such use.
 - Capabilities—Assess in terms of those required to save, sustain, or enhance life, in order. Can refer to the ability of local authorities to provide key functions and

- services. These can include areas needed after combat operations and contracted resources and services.
- Organizations—Non-military groups or institutions in the JOA. These may be indigenous, come from the outside or be U.S. agencies, and they influence and interact with the populace, force and each other. Current activities, capabilities and limitations are some of the information necessary to build situational understanding. This becomes often a union of resources and specialized capabilities.
 - People—A general term describing all non-military personnel military forces encounter in the JOA. This includes those personnel outside the JOA whose actions, opinions or political influence can affect the mission. Identify the key communicators and the formal and informal processes used to influence people.
 - Events—Routine, cyclical, planned or spontaneous activities that significantly affect organizations, people, and military operations such as seasons, festivals, holidays, funerals, political rallies, and agricultural crop/livestock and market cycles and paydays. Other events such as disasters and those precipitated by military forces stress and affect the attitudes and activities of the populace, and include a moral responsibility to protect displaced civilians. Template the events and analyze them for their political, economic, psychological, environmental, and legal implications.

Section IV: Command and Control

2.16 Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform C2 for COIN using the same system as in other military operations. Commanders must often coordinate with other agencies that will not be present on a conventional battlefield.

C2 OF COIN FORCES

2.17 Planning C2 in a COIN environment is extremely complex. Based on mission requirements, commanders plan to conduct full-spectrum operations anywhere within their area of operations and the adjacent battlespace after conducting necessary coordination. Therefore, task organization must have flexibility built into it to support a rapid change of focus during operations.

2.18 In addition to other agencies, U.S. contractors may be heavily involved in COIN operations. Contractors' management and control differs from that of Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians. Commanders make provisions for contractor management during planning to include using the contracting process to define required conditions. The terms and conditions of the contract establish the relationship between the military and the contractor to include command relationships, authority, or responsibilities. Commanders then exercise management control through supervisors employed by the contractor because only a contractor can directly supervise contract personnel. See FM 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* for more information on contractors.

2.19 During multinational operations, command and support relationships may not be well-defined and therefore more open to interpretation. In some international organizations such as

the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), command and support relationship terms may have different meanings from those in Army doctrine. For example, the NATO definitions of operational control (OPCON) and tactical control (TACON) are different from US Army definitions. In addition, other terms for command and support relationships may exist. In such cases, commanders seek clarification from their higher commander, from orders, or from the agreements that established the force (for example, NATO standardization agreements [STANAGs]). Commanders use agreed-upon multinational command and support relationships when controlling multinational forces.

ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (ARSOF)

2.20 Within a joint force, ARSOF assets (less PSYOP and CA units) are ordinarily attached to and under OPCON of a designated joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander. The special operations command and control element (SOCCE) assists the JSOTF commander in fulfilling his supporting commander responsibilities. A SOCCE is based on a Special Forces operational detachment-B (SFODB) and is augmented with a special communications package and personnel as required. It may include a Ranger liaison officer (LNO), PSYOP and CA representatives, and special operations aviation (SOA) personnel. The SOCCE is normally collocated at corps-level and above, with smaller liaison teams operating at division-level and below. The supported unit provides the SOCCE the required administrative and logistics support. The SOCCE is the focal point for coordination and synchronization with conventional forces. At corps-level, the SOCCE coordinates with the corps operations center, fire support element (FSE), deep operations coordination cell, and battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) to deconflict targets and operations. It provides ARSOF locations through personal coordination and provides overlays and other friendly order of battle (OB) data to the FSE and BCD. The SOCCE can exercise C2 of designated ARSOF units when the JSOTF commander determines the need for such a command relationship.

SPECIAL FORCES LIAISON ELEMENT

2.21 A Special Forces liaison element (SFLE) is an SF or joint special operations (SO) element that conducts liaison between US conventional forces division-level headquarters and subordinate HN or multinational forces brigades and battalions.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

2.22 Commanders employ PSYOP (as part of IO) to influence target audience behaviors that support U.S. national policy objectives. PSYOP missions include:

- Influencing the attitudes and behaviors of foreign populations.
- Advising commanders of target restrictions during the targeting process (planning for application of effects) to minimize reactions that may adversely affect PSYOP objectives.
- Providing public information ICW the Public Affairs Office to foreign populations to support HA and to restore or maintain civil order.
- Countering enemy propaganda and disinformation.

2.23 To execute his PSYOP mission, the joint force commander may create a Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF) or a Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF). Mission requirements dictate the composition of the task force.

2.24 The regional combatant commander's staff conducts initial PSYOP planning with assistance from a PSYOP assessment team (POAT). The POAT deploys to a theater at the request of the combatant commander to assess the situation, develop PSYOP objectives, and recommend the appropriate level of support to accomplish the mission. Both the Psychological Operations Group and regional PSYOP battalion are capable of forming the nucleus of or establishing a POTF or JPOTF. Tactical PSYOP battalions provide tactical support to corps-level units and below. Tactical PSYOP companies provide tactical support to division-level and below. Tactical PSYOP teams support brigade-size elements. Tactical PSYOP teams are attached to battalions to provide loudspeaker support and to disseminate leaflets and posters.

2.25 The unified command or joint forces command level usually retains PSYOP C2 and product approval. National objectives, however, may dictate that product approval be retained at national level. For example, the Office of the Secretary of Defense held PSYOP product approval at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan). Later, approval authority was delegated to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COORDINATION ELEMENT

2.26 The special operations coordination (SOCOORD) element acts as the primary SO staff officer and advisor to an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force (MEF) commander and his staff on SOF integration, capabilities, and limitations.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS (CMO) AND CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

2.27 FM 1-02 defines CMO as commander activities that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and non-government civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations. The purpose of CMO is to facilitate military operations and consolidate and achieve U.S. objectives. Designated Civil Affairs units as well as other military forces may perform CMO, or a combination of Civil Affairs units and other forces may also do so. CMO include:

- Coordinating foreign nation support
- Managing dislocated civilians
- Conducting humanitarian assistance (HA) and military civic action (MCA) in support of military operations and U.S. national objectives

2.28 The regional combatant commander or the JFC may create a joint civil-military operations task force (JCMOTF) to plan, coordinate, and conduct CMO in the JOA. CA soldiers assigned to the JCMOTF provide specialized expertise in the areas of support to civil administration (SCA), foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), populace and resources control (PRC), and civil action.

2.29 Four Civil Affairs commands exist within the U.S. Army. The command designated to support COIN provides the combatant commander with teams that have government

administration expertise, with planning teams to augment staffs or subordinate headquarters, and teams to provide staff augmentation, planning, and assessment support at the tactical level.

ARSOF AND INTEGRATION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

2.30 As described earlier, ARSOF and conventional ground forces may operate in close proximity to each other during COIN operations while accomplishing of the Joint Force Commander's (JFC) mission. While the JFC may determine the requirement to directly place ARSOF under a type of command relationship of a conventional ground force, he will normally maintain a centralized, responsive, and unambiguous SOF C2 structure under the JSOTF. Through his assignment of missions and supported or supporting command relationships, the JFC provides the JSOTF commander freedom to organize and employ forces to satisfy both JFC requirements and those of supported commanders. The tactical commander must consider SOF capabilities and limitations, particularly in the areas of tactical C2, sustainment and overall COIN mission accomplishment.

2.31 Historically, commanders have employed SOF in advance of conventional forces follow-on operations to ensure the timing and tempo of the overall unified campaign are maintained. During extended operations involving both SOF and conventional forces, combined control and de-confliction measures take on added significance. Because situations change rapidly, a conventional unit commander may find himself under TACON of a SOF unit, or a SOF unit commander under TACON of a conventional unit. Thus, within COIN operations, it is critical to integrate and synchronize SOF with other joint and conventional forces.

2.32 Special operations will often involve air operations that transit theater airspace control areas, air defense areas, and artillery firing patterns. Therefore, the coordination of ARSOF operations is extremely important to prevent double targeting or fratricide. The JSOTF and JTF must coordinate closely to prevent these actions.

2.33 Integration of ARSOF with conventional forces is always a critical concern for ARSOF commanders, and areas of interest typically include, but are not limited to:

- Target deconfliction
- C4
- Political concerns
- Civil populace
- Possible linkup of ARSOF with conventional forces
- Intelligence -Collection Efforts
- Surface or airspace deconfliction
- Fire support coordination
- Coordination of logistics and theater support
- Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)

2.34 The exchange of liaison elements between the staffs of appropriate conventional forces and SOF further enhances integration of all forces concerned. This normally is accomplished through a Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). The SOLE typically works with the Army special operations task force (ARSOTF) commander to accomplish this integration, but works for the Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC). These liaison elements aid mission execution, preclude fratricide, and eliminate duplication of effort, disruption of ongoing

operations, or loss of intelligence sources. These efforts are crucial to maintaining the commander's overall unity of effort, coordination of limited resources, and campaign tempo.

MULTINATIONAL FORCES

2.35 C2 relationships must remain flexible within and among multinational and coalition forces. Inherent in these relationships are the possibility of competing objectives and conflicting laws of coalition countries. U.S. commanders must be aware of and sensitive to such conflicts. Depending on the operational and tactical environment, command relationships may change over time. In general, US forces will remain under the command of US commanders. It is important to note, however, that conditions will determine C2 relationships in the tactical JOA. When a Foreign Nation's (FN's) forces are available, they may be operating either alongside US forces, or under TACON of US forces. See FM 100-8 which is being re-published as FM 3-16, *The Army in Multinational Operations* and/or JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations* for further discussion of related issues.

Section V: Coordination

2.36 Information sharing across US government and national boundaries is an important concept in COIN. There are likely to be several government agencies operating in a HN, and all are exposed daily to information valuable to COIN operations. This situation requires a strong focus on lateral coordination and the development of an effective program of interagency information exchange. In addition, the very nature of COIN denotes the sharing of information between the supported HN and the US joint force headquarters controlling COIN operations. This information exchange may be further complicated by a friendly third nation participating in COIN operations. The U.S. government can complicate information exchange by restricting third nations access to information.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

2.37 There are many organizations and extensive resources available to aid developing nations, and the commander should not overlook the aid these organizations may provide. Each size force from squad on up that is assigned an area of operations or function should determine which Departments and agencies are assisting in that area and coordinate actions so that there is no duplication of effort. Such Departments, councils and agencies include:

- National Security Council (NSC)
- Department of Defense (DOD)
- Department of State (DOS)
- Department of Justice (DOJ)
- Department of the Treasury
- Department of Homeland Security (DOHS)

- Department of Agriculture (DOA)
- Department of Commerce (DOC)
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Department of Transportation (DOT)
- Various government Departments directly administer and/or support other government agencies. Examples of these US agencies are.
 - US Agency for International Development (USAID)
 - The Coast Guard (DOHS)
 - The FBI (DOJ)
 - Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE) (DOHS)
 - Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
 - Peace Corps
- Nongovernmental Organizations. There are several thousand organizations of this type. Many of these organizations will focus on relief or short-term support, development or long-term support, or a combination of the two. Some NGOs do not want to be seen as cooperating or associating with U.S. military forces. Gaining their support and coordinating operations can be a difficult and frustrating task. Some examples of NGOs are:
 - World Vision
 - Medecin Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders)
 - Catholic Relief Society
 - CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere)
 - OXFAM (Oxford Committee for Famine Relief)
 - International Committee for the Red Cross and Red Crescent
- International Organizations. The most notable of these is the United Nations. Regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS) may also be involved. Depending on the level of relief or development needed in the country involved, any one of several of their organizations may be present such as:
 - World Food Program (WFP)

- United Nations Refugee Agency (known by its director, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR))
- United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
- United Nations Development Program
- Regional programs such as Alliance for Progress (Latin America)
- Multinational Corporations. U.S. and other multinational businesses such as petroleum companies, manufacturing corporations, and import-export companies often engage in reconstruction and development activities through community relations programs. At a minimum, commanders must know which companies are present in the area of operations and where those companies are conducting business. Such information can prevent fratricide or destruction of private property.


COORDINATION WITH HOST NATION CIVIL AUTHORITIES

2.38 Sovereignty issues will be most difficult for the commander executing COIN missions to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by the host nation. Often, the commander will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be acknowledged and often the commander and subordinates must act as diplomats as well as warriors. Commanders should address all sovereignty issues in advance through the chain of command to the US Ambassador and his country team to ensure that operations are not adversely affected. Examples include: collecting and sharing information, basing, over flight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, location and access, railheads, border crossings, force protection, jurisdiction over members of the U.S. and multinational forces, and operations in the territorial sea and internal waters. The commander may create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. To facilitate cooperation and build trust military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN may chair these committees. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. However, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status of forces agreements (SOFAs). In many cases security assistance organizations (SAOs), NGOs, and international organizations resident in the HN, having detailed knowledge and the potential to establish good will in these areas, may be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or the establishment of a positive and constructive relationship in the HN.

2.39 This coordination and support can exist all the way down to the community and village levels. Forces should be aware of both the political and societal structures in the AOs they are assigned. The political structure will usually have designated leaders within the community who are responsible to the government and people. However, the societal structure may have other leaders who operate outside of the political structure. These leaders may be economic such as businessmen, theological such as clerics and lay leaders, informational such as newspaper publishers or journalists, or family-based, such as elders or patriarchs. Some societal leaders may develop due to charisma or other intangible influences. Commanders and the country team must determine the key leaders, assess their level of support for U.S. objectives, and influence and co-opt them as appropriate.

COORDINATING STRUCTURES

2.40 At the HN national level, the US Country Team is the primary coordinating structure for COIN. Where multinational or coalition partners join the US, a national level coordinating structure would be formed where the US Country Team participates in/or leads the multinational effort. At each subordinate political level of the HN government, a coordinating structure, the Civil Military Coordination Center (CMCC) will be established between the HN, HN forces, and US and multinational forces. This coordination center facilitates the integration of all military and political actions into one functional operation. Below the lowest political level, additional structures may be established comparable to Neighborhood Watch where lower level commanders and leaders can meet directly with local populace leaders to discuss issues. Where possible, IOs and NGOs should also take part in coordination meetings to ensure their actions are integrated and de-conflicted with military and HN plans. The essential U.S. goal is a single, controlling agency to direct all efforts with one person in charge of all military and U.S. agency operations. The purpose of this agency is to produce a unified goal and direction.



DCM becomes Charge D'Affairs when the Ambassador is out of the country or when an Ambassador has not yet been appointed

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Figure 2.1: Country Team Concept

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER (CMOC)

2.41 One mechanism for bringing all of the above elements together for coordination is the CMOC. CMOC's can be established at all levels of command. The CMOC coordinates the interaction of US and multinational forces with government organizations, international organizations, NGOs, and FN agencies and authorities. The CMOC is not designed as, nor should it be used as, a C2 element. It is a coordination cell between nonmilitary agencies and military forces. It is an extension of the task force commander's guidance. Overall management of a CMOC may be assigned to a multinational force commander, shared by a US and a multinational commander, or shared by a US commander and a civilian agency head. The CMOC provides both access and CMO-related data and information from and to nonmilitary agencies operating away from the military headquarters. The CMOC has no set composition. It is mission-oriented and staffed appropriately. In an army-managed CMOC, the Plans Officer/ Civil Affairs

Coordinator is normally responsible for the management of, or participation in, the CMOC. It may be composed of, or augmented by, military and civilian representatives from many different agencies. However, it normally consists of a director, deputy director, and representatives from the operations, logistics, and medical sections of the supported headquarters. It may include other elements, the personnel of which may come from the military, NGOs, international organizations, and FN, based on the situation. Senior CA officers normally serve as the director and deputy director of the CMOC.

Section VI: Rules of Engagement (ROE)

2.42 ROE are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. The proper application of force is a critical component to any successful counterinsurgency operation. In a counterinsurgency, the center of gravity is public will. In order to defeat an insurgent force, US forces must be able to separate the insurgent from the population. At the same time, US forces must conduct themselves in a manner that enables them to maintain popular domestic support. Excessive or indiscriminant use of force is likely to alienate the local populace, thereby increasing support for insurgent forces. Insufficient use of force results in increased risks to US and multinational forces and perceived weakness that can jeopardize the mission by emboldening insurgents and undermining domestic popular support. Achieving the appropriate balance requires a thorough understanding of the nature and causes of the insurgency, the end state and the military's role in a counterinsurgency operation. Nevertheless, U.S. forces always retain the right to use necessary and proportional force for individual and unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent.

2.43 In planning counterinsurgency operations, it is imperative that leaders and soldiers understand that military force is not an end in itself, but is just one of the instruments of national power employed by the political leadership to achieve its broader objectives. A military commander will never be given the absolute authority to act without ultimate accountability. Military action and the application of force will be limited by a variety of political and practical considerations, some of which may not seem sensible at the tactical level. Leaders and soldiers at all levels need to understand the nature of such limitations and the rationale behind them in order to make sound decisions regarding the application of or restraint in the use of force.

2.44 Determining the appropriate level of military force is one of the most difficult issues confronting leaders and soldiers. Tactical decisions regarding the application of force can often have strategic implications. Typically, US forces look to the ROE as the primary method to determine the appropriate application of force. ROE impose political, operational, practical, and legal restrictions on the otherwise permissible use of military force. The nature and extent of the restrictions contained in the ROE will vary dramatically based on the justification for the initial involvement of US forces, the tactical situation, the presence of civilians, and the type of terrain in which forces are operating (urban or rural). Leaders conducting COIN operations are likely to find themselves operating with a much more constrained set of ROE. Soldiers may find it difficult and frustrating to conduct offensive operations because of the restrictive ROE. For example, defense of designated non-US Forces and/or designated foreign persons and their property requires Secretary of Defense or President of the U.S. approval.

2.45 Care must be taken to ensure the mission drives the ROE and not vice-versa. The ROE may exercise a significant influence on a unit's ability to accomplish its mission. Therefore, it is

imperative for commanders and staff to critically evaluate the ROE in light of their mission. The impact of the ROE must be fully developed and addressed in staff estimates. ROE should be used to assist in course of action (COA) development, wargaming, analysis, and the COA selection process. The commander should aggressively seek modifications to the ROE if the ROE are inadequate in light of the mission and anticipated threat level. The development, modification, distribution, and training of ROE must be timely and responsive to changing threats. Changes must be distributed immediately.

2.46 Leaders must recognize the ROE are applicable in all situations. While ROE govern the use of force in all situations, they do not dictate a certain amount of force will be used in all situations. ROE often identify specific circumstances where the use of force is required. However, ROE do not identify every situational permutation Soldiers may encounter in a COIN environment. Instead, leaders and soldiers must rely on their knowledge and understanding of ROE and apply sound judgment, a thorough understanding of the mission, intent and operational environment, situational awareness and understanding and sound SOPs and TTP to determine the level of appropriate force permitted by the ROE. Finally, leaders must balance the safety of their Soldiers with the safety of civilians.

2.47 Knowledge of the ROE itself is not sufficient to help soldiers make informed decisions regarding the appropriate application of force. Consistent and effective application of the ROE requires extensive training and discipline to develop the judgment, depth of knowledge, skills, and procedures necessary to apply force in a COIN environment. Leaders must stress basic troop leading procedures and situational-based training; comprehensive planning and rehearsals; effective pre-combat checks and mission-related patrol briefs; briefbacks, and debriefs. Effective communication is equally essential. Leaders must ensure that every soldier understands completely the mission and commander's intent and has comprehensive situational understanding at all times. The appropriate level of situational understanding, realistic training, and disciplined adherence to basic troop leading procedures will equip soldiers with the tools necessary to make informed decisions regarding the decision to use or refrain from the use of force. ROE are most effective when they are simple, clear, and able to be condensed onto a small card.

Section VII: CMO Mission Planning

2.48 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) assist leaders in planning for the transfer of control of a COIN operation to a nonmilitary organization. Planning for transition is an integral part of mission planning for COIN because of the need to transfer control to the HN. MOE assist HN, U.S. government, NGO, IO, FN, UN, and military forces to assess and evaluate the status of the CMO portion of the COIN operations.

MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

2.49 Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) refer to observable, usually quantifiable, objective data as well as subjective indicators that a task is proceeding along a desired path. A leader uses MOE to determine how well or poorly an operation is achieving the goals of the operation per his mission statement. He uses MOE to identify effective strategies and tactics and to determine points at which to shift resources, transition to different phases, or alter or terminate the mission.

2.50 MOE are a product of mission analysis. They differ for every mission and for different phases of a single mission. As leaders and their staff identify specified, implied, and critical tasks, they define what constitutes successful completion of each task. The leader and his staff decide how the MOE will be identified, reported, and validated. They determine what action will be taken when the MOE are achieved, as well as contingency plans in case MOE are not achieved according to the original plan. MOE are often adjusted as the situation changes and higher-level guidance develops.

2.51 Although planners begin the process of determining MOE when they develop the civil-military lines of operation, the Commander's objectives must be a strong, up-front consideration. Planners are not limited to these civil-military lines. The civil-military lines of operation normally follow the six CA activities: foreign nation support (FNS), population resource control (PRC), humanitarian assistance (HA), military civic action (MCA), emergency services, and support to civil administration. Along each line of operation, the planners identify civil-military objectives, civil decisive points, and desired outcomes of the civil decisive points. Then they determine MOE to evaluate the effectiveness of those outcomes.

2.52 MOE to assess the success of the COIN operations should be designed with the same considerations in mind as for any other types of missions. COIN planners should ensure that MOE are:

- Appropriate - MOE must correlate to the Commander's objectives and should relate to the audience objectives. If the objective is to present information to those outside the command, MOE should be general and few in number. If the objective is to assist on-site commanders, then MOE should be more specific and detailed.
- Mission-related - MOE must relate to the mission. If the mission is relief, MOE should help the commander evaluate improvements in living standards, mortality rates, and other related areas. If the mission expands, so should MOE. Planners should tailor MOE to address strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- Measurable – Objective, quantitative MOE reflect reality more accurately than qualitative or subjective MOE, and, hence, are generally the measure of choice when the situation permits their use. When using qualitative or subjective MOE, clear and specific measurement criteria should be established and disseminated to prevent misinterpretation. Where possible, try to measure a specific aspect of the insurgency.
- Numerically reasonable - MOE should be limited to the minimum required to effectively portray the relief environment. Avoid establishing excessive MOE; MOE become unmanageable or collection efforts outweigh the value.
- Sensitive - MOE should be sensitive to force performance and accurately reflect changes related to joint force actions. Extraneous factors should not greatly affect established MOE.
- Useful - MOE should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable the commander to respond immediately and effectively.

2.53 In multinational or multi-agency operations, COIN planners should coordinate MOE with those of participating nations and agencies. In some cases, they may also collaborate on how the

MOE will be measured and reported. For example, emergency indicators commonly used by the NGO community can be used as a baseline for developing MOE.

2.54 In addition to deciding what the MOE are, COIN planners must decide certain aspects about each one, such as:

- Who will observe the MOE? (For example, task a specific individual or team.)
- When will the MOE be observed? (Is the MOE event-driven or time driven? How often will the MOE be tested?)
- How will the MOE be observed? (What method will be used to detect indicators? Is it direct observation or all-source analysis?)

Section VII: Other Planning Considerations

PLANNING FOR THE MEDIA TEAM

2.55 Counterinsurgency is a war of ideas and is punctuated by moves and counters based on flexible and agile thinking and calculation. Yet, if COIN is predicated on ideas and thinking, then influence over the medium that most easily and effectively gains access to and influences ideas, thinking, and those related processes would seem to be essential, and so it is. This medium is the information network, the media – print and broadcast. The heart of the matter is the Media has access to government leaders, decision makers, the public in most nations and our own Soldiers to influence and shape opinions. The media is neither a friend nor enemy, but is a tool and weapon to create effects and conditions in which COIN operations will be successful, or may be used directly and indirectly against those same operations. DOD identified the strengths and expected outcomes of both the media and military organizations/ teams prior to OIF – the result was embedded reporters. Planning for all exigencies must include the Media, period.

2.56 The media, print and broadcast (radio, television and the internet), play a vital role in societies involved in counterinsurgency. Members of the media have a significant influence and shaping impact on political direction, national security objectives and policy and national will. The media will be a factor in military operations. It is their right and obligation to report to their respective audiences on the use of military force. They demand logistical support and access to military operations while refusing to be controlled. Their desire for immediate footage and on-the-spot coverage of events, and the increasing contact with units and Soldiers (embedded reporters) require that commanders and public affairs officers provide guidance to leaders and Soldiers on media relations. However, military planners must provide and enforce ground rules to the media to ensure operational security. Public affairs offices should plan for daily briefings and special briefing after each significant event because the media affect and influence each potential target audience (TA) external and internal to the JOA. Speaking with the media in a forward-deployed area is an opportunity to explain what our organizations and efforts have accomplished. Leaders should follow these general PAO guidelines.

2.57 Media Principles. To Be Published.

USE OF INTERPRETERS

2.58 In conventional operations soldiers rarely have the need for interpreters. During COIN, there are occasions when Soldiers will lack the linguistic ability to communicate personally and effectively with the local populace in the AO. The use of interpreters is often the best or only option. The proper use and supervision of interpreters can play a decisive role in the mission. Leaders must plan for the use of interpreters and their integration into tactical units when necessary. See Appendix B, Use of Interpreters.

Appendix A - Civil Affairs Assessment Checklist

Appendix B - Use of Interpreters

Chapter 3: Counterinsurgency Operations

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

Section I: Concept of Operations

“Now an enemy may be likened to water, for just as flowing water avoids the heights and hastens to the lowland, so an army avoids strength and strikes weakness.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
c. 4th Century B.C.

GENERAL

3.1 Military operations in support of counterinsurgency fall into three broad categories: civil military operations, combat operations and information operations. Civil-military operations are primarily oriented towards the indigenous population in villages, cities and regions. Combat operations are oriented against insurgent leaders and cadre, smaller units as well as insurgent main force organizations (battalions, brigades, division-size units) depending on the phase of the insurgency. Information operations potentially assure a common operational picture appropriate to every level of an organization, down to the individual soldier. The overall mission of all military operations in support of counterinsurgency is to provide a safe and secure environment within which governmental institutions can address the concerns of the people.

3.2 Considerations:

- Programs for countering insurgency must all be completely integrated with the U.S Country Team throughout planning, preparation, and execution.
- Counterinsurgency must be initiated as early as possible. An escalating insurgency becomes increasingly difficult to defeat.
- Intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operations are vital parts of all programs.
- Effective local government is vital to carry effective counterinsurgency programs to the local populations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

3.3 The leader should ascertain the organization for counterinsurgency within his area and where none exists should influence and/or induce his counterpart to establish such an organization. At all levels, counterinsurgency planning and direction should be accomplished through area security coordination centers (SCC). These centers are composed of elements of:

- All HN forces and agencies.
- Assigned U.S. military and interagency representatives / multinational personnel.

3.4 The chief of an SCC should be a military or political leader. A civil-military advisory committee (CMAC) composed of representatives from the areas major economic and social groups and activities in each SCC facilitate communication with and participation of the local populace, and serves as a sounding board to reflect the progress of the counterinsurgency effort.

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

3.5 Normally, NGOs, private foreign corporations, host country private enterprises, and U.S. governmental activities cooperate in local counterinsurgency programs. Non-military personnel supervising U.S. Government efforts may be assigned at major subordinate levels of government, and often, visiting technical representatives will operate at lower levels. The administrative area advisor must coordinate his efforts and those of the U.S. government nonmilitary representatives. In the absence of civilian advisors, the administrative area advisor may be directed to monitor the execution of programs initiated but not supervised by other U.S. Government agencies.

3.6 Host country and USAID civil resources are devoted to executing economic, social, psychological, and political programs. Military resources will often be employed to augment and sometimes to substitute for civil resources in executing these programs. This is called military civic action.

Section II: Civil-Military Operations

GENERAL

3.7 Local political authorities bridge the gap between the remote and sometimes impersonal national government and the people. To the extent that these authorities are able to satisfy the aspirations of the people and to the extent they create the image of a responsive and capable government, the openings for subversion will diminish. The military works with the local civil authorities, the populace and NGOs through civil-military operations. Military participation is accomplished through civic action and populace and resources control. The leader must be ready to propose civic action projects based on the capabilities of the unit advised and must be prepared to give guidance on the techniques of applying these capabilities in accordance with an overall counterinsurgency plan. To perform these functions the leader must be aware of the objectives and principles of CMO as noted below. Prior to implementation of military civic action projects, military operations are coordinated with the U.S. Ambassador and his Country Team (see Figure 3-1 -- The Country Team Concept). This coordination is essential to ensure the accomplishment of U.S. national security interests. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the U.S. Government agency responsible for nation building. USAID activities are coordinated through the U.S. Embassy. At the tactical level, direct coordination with USAID avoids duplication of effort and ensures adequate resources and technical assistance are made available.

3.8 Objectives of CMO in COIN operations are to:

- Make substantial contributions to national development.
- Gain the support, loyalty, and respect of the people for their government.

3.9 Principles of CMO include:

- Conserving resources and developing an integrated economy. As such, all projects must proceed within the framework of a coordinated plan.
- Conformance to guidance issued through command channels.

POPULATION AND RESOURCE CONTROL

3.10 The insurgent's primary target is the people; therefore, counterinsurgency must separate the insurgent from the people and their resources. Population and resource control is implemented as required to support counterinsurgency operations and to complement the programs of environmental improvement. The leader must be knowledgeable regarding the principles, concepts, tasks, and techniques of population and resource control in order to train and work with his counterpart on their implementation. The primary objectives of population and resource control are to separate the insurgents from the populace and identify and eliminate the insurgents, their organization, their activities, and influence while doing so.

3.11 Civil control measures are very similar to police functions. Civil police should initiate controls because:

- They are best suited by cultural background, training and experience.
- Their area orientation results in a closer relationship with the local population.
- They permit military forces to concentrate on offensive counterinsurgent operations.

3.12 Where local police require reinforcement or are incapable, local paramilitary forces, including home guards, village militia, and police auxiliaries are mobilized and/or created, organized and trained as reserves.

3.13 Military forces are used only as expedients since extended assignment to this duty detracts from their main mission of counterinsurgent offensive operations.

3.14 Continuous psychological operations (PSYOP) are mounted to:

- Counter the effects of insurgent propaganda.
- Relate controls to the security and well being of the population.
- Create a favorable governmental image.

3.15 Control measures must:

- Be authorized by national laws and regulations (counterparts should be trained not to improvise unauthorized measures).
- Be tailored to fit the situation (apply the minimum force required to achieve the desired result).
- Be supported by effective local intelligence.
- Be instituted in as wide an area as possible to prevent bypass or evasion.
- Be supported by good communications.
- Be enforceable.
- Be lifted as the need diminishes..

CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION

3.16 A control program may be developed in six phases:

- Securing and defending the area internally and externally
- Organizing intelligence, internal security, and defense activities, and forces.
- Executing cordon and search.
- Screening and documenting the population (a detailed census)
- Conducting public administration to include resource control.

SECURING AND DEFENDING THE AREA

3.17 Security and defense begin concurrently with, or immediately subsequent to, offensive operations. Since a district contains several villages, and larger communities, the entire political administrative unit (region, province, district, village), as well as each individual community, must be secured 24/7. In areas under insurgent influence, it will be necessary to construct defenses around existing villages and concentrate rural populations into defendable population units. Normally, this will be accomplished concurrently with counterinsurgent warfare, environmental improvement, and population and resources control programs.

3.18 Defended Urban Area: Defended urban areas may be established if:

- Less restrictive measures have failed to eliminate population support of the insurgent.
- Government forces have been unable to provide defense or internal security.
- The population must provide their own defense to release military forces to conduct counterinsurgent warfare. However, the populace must be armed and trained to be effective.
- They are required as bases from which to mount operations.

3.19 Leaders can assist in the development of the defended community by:

- Coordinating requests for USAID support with appropriate USAID area representatives.
- Planning urban defenses to include provisions for support.
- Organizing, equipping, and training, urban defense forces.
- Ensuring military defense forces are provided until such time as local defense forces are adequate and are supported by regional paramilitary and military forces.
- Implementing control techniques (curfews, alert and warning systems, systems of identifying both friendly and insurgent forces).
- Military civic action projects based on self-help.
- Establishing local government by organizing urban civil-military leader committees, electing community officials (where possible) and building governmental institutions.

3.20 Relocation. The most severe of the restrictive measures, is accomplished when:

- Wide dispersion of the population prevents effective defense, internal security, and control.
- Requirements exist to evacuate or populate selected areas.

3.21 Leaders can contribute to the implementation of this technique by providing assistance in the following areas:

- PSYOP to prepare the population for relocation.
- Defense during relocation. If relocation is combined with the defended urban area technique, the leader can further assist, once relocation is completed
- Logistical requirements, such as subsistence, transportation, and medical assistance, to facilitate movement and relocation of the population and their possessions.

ORGANIZATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, INTELLIGENCE, AND SECURITY ACTIVITIES

3.22 The following police services should be provided:

- Police command group.
- Records and communications division.
- Patrol division.
- Detective division.
- Laboratory facilities.
- Identification facilities.
- Prisoner custodial facilities.

CORDON AND SEARCH

3.23 A techniques used by military and police forces in both urban and rural environments.

- Frequently used by counterinsurgency forces conducting a population and resources control mission against small centers of population or subdivisions of a larger community.
- Must have sufficient forces to effectively cordon off the target area and to thoroughly search target areas, to include sub-surface level areas.
- Allocate ample time must to conduct thorough search and interrogation of residents of affected areas.
- Operation should be rehearsed thoroughly whenever possible.
- Firm but fair treatment must be the rule. Every effort must be made to avoid any incident that results in unnecessarily alienating the people.
- PSYOP, civic action, and specialist interrogation teams should augment cordon and search forces to increase the effectiveness of operations.
- Cordon and search operations may be conducted as follows:
 - Disposition of troops should:
 - Facilitate visual contact between posts within the cordon.
 - Provide for adequate patrolling and immediate deployment of an effective reserve force.
 - Priority should be given to:
 - Sealing the administrative center of the community
 - Occupying all critical facilities
 - Detaining personnel in place
 - Preserving and securing all records, files, and other archives
 - Key facilities include:
 - Administrative buildings
 - Police stations

- News media facilities.
 - Post offices.
 - Communications centers.
 - Transportation offices and motor pools.
 - Prisons and other places of detention.
 - Schools.
- Search Techniques include:
 - Search teams of squad size organized in assault, support and security.
 - One target assigned per team.
 - Room searches conducted by two-man teams.
 - Room search teams armed with pistols; all other personnel armed with automatic weapons.
 - Pre-search coordination.
 - Between control personnel and screening team leaders.
 - Study of layout plans.
 - Communications, i.e., radio, whistle, and hand signals.
 - Disposition of suspects.
 - On-site security.
 - Guard entrances, exits, to include roof, halls, corridors, and tunnels.
 - Contingency tasks for reserve.
 - Room searches conducted by two (or three)-man teams.
 - Immobilize occupants with one team member.
 - Search room with other team member.
 - Search all occupants. When available, a third team member should be the recorder.
 - Place documents in a numbered envelope and tag individual with a corresponding number.

3.24 Security duties. Search teams are provided security for screening operations and facilities.

SCREENING AND DOCUMENTING THE POPULATION

3.25 Screening and documentation include:

- Systematic identification and registration.
- Issuance of individual identification cards containing:
 - Picture of individual.
 - Personal identification data.
 - Fingerprint(s).
 - An official stamp (use different colors for each administration region).
 - Family group census cards, an official copy of which is retained at the local police agency, containing-
 - Picture.
 - Appropriate personal data.
- Frequent use of mobile and fixed checkpoints for inspection, identification, and registration of documents.
- Preventing counterfeiting of identification and registration documents by laminating and embossing.

- Programs to inform the population of the need for identification and registration.

ESTABLISHING INTERNAL SECURITY

3.26 Internal security measures consist of:

- Intra-community perimeter guard.
- Fixed posts at critical facilities.
- Roadblocks.
- Foot and motor patrols.
- Reserves.
- Restricted access to such installations as city hall, police headquarters, radio and TV stations, and newspaper offices.
- Passes required in addition to personal identity cards.
 - Special passes provided to selected personnel who are necessary for the health and welfare of the population.
 - Pass issuing offices not collocated with sensitive installations.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING RESOURCE CONTROL

3.27 General. Public administration at local levels is normally of the executive type. It is at this level that resources are managed and controlled. After screening has been completed, action must be taken for continuation of governmental functions, and the following factors should be considered:

- Combining internal security and defense activities under a public safety office.
- Employing population surveillance (overt and covert) based on area coverage to include:
 - Overt surveillance, the responsibility of the police patrol division, and conducted with conventional police procedures, using the officer on the beat as the lowest official of government in contact with the public.
- Police patrols:
 - Vary routes and movement frequently to avoid establishing a predictable pattern.
 - Should not be limited to the confines of the community but should include adjacent areas.
 - Must be coordinated with the activities of military and paramilitary forces to avoid duplication of effort and confusion.
 - Use military dogs to contribute to overall effectiveness.
- Covert surveillance, a collection effort, the responsibility fixed with the intelligence/security division or with the detective division of the police department. Covert techniques, ranging from application of sophisticated electronics systems to informants should include:
 - Informant nets. Reliability of informants should be verified. Protection of identity is a must.
- Block control. Dividing a community or populated area into zones where a trusted resident reports on the activities of the population. If the loyalty of block leaders is questionable, an informant net can be established to verify questionable areas.
- For a detailed discussion and checklists, see Appendix C, Population Resource Control.

Section III: Counterinsurgent Combat Operations

OBJECTIVES

3.28 The primary objective of counterinsurgency operations is to neutralize the insurgents and, together with population and resource control measures, establish a secure environment within which political, social, and economic progress is possible. COIN operations will include U.S., HN and multinational forces. Planning must include all three, and the conduct of operations must ensure close coordination among the forces of the various nations involved.

“Determine the enemy’s plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not;
 -- Agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement.
 -- Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle.
 -- Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where it is deficient.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
 c. 4th Century B.C.

INTELLIGENCE

3.29 The key to success is effective and actionable intelligence at the local level. Many insurgents are “local boys” swept up in the excitement of the moment. Others are outsiders, easily identified by the locals. In either case, when insurgents overplay their hand and place the village at risk, it is highly likely local personnel will identify these insurgents to the authorities. This information leads to the development of sound intelligence enabling commanders to focus operations toward specific objectives.

3.30. Planning for and conduct of COIN operations must adhere to several fundamentals. While many of these fundamentals apply to conventional operations, others are COIN specific. The checklist below is a leader’s guide to ensure both offensive and defensive operations reflect the unique fundamentals of COIN.

Leader’s Checklist for COIN Operations.

- Concentrate on elimination of the insurgent, not on terrain objectives.
- Maintain the offensive in all kinds of weather (do not bog down during the rainy season—limited offensive operations are preferable to passive measures).
- Provide guidelines for allocation of counterinsurgent forces.
- Get counterinsurgent forces out of garrisons, cities, and towns; off the roads and trails into the environment of the insurgent.
- Plan for and use all resources (both regular and special units).
- Avoid establishment of semi-permanent patrol bases laden with artillery and supplies that tends to tie down the force (special attention to prevent mobile units from becoming semi-fixed).
- Emphasize secrecy and surprise.
- Plans should provide for:
 - Effective and secure communications.
 - Constant indoctrination of the individual soldier.
 - Variation of methods and the use of unorthodox tactics and techniques to avoid establishing patterns.
- Assign areas of responsibility to commanders.
- Emphasize that command and staff action should include-

- Centralized planning of small-scale decentralized tactical operations.
- Emphasis on unity of command.
- Training programs that stress developing the offensive spirit, physical stamina, and a desire to seek out the insurgent and destroy him.
- Extensive contingency planning for employment of reserve forces.
- Detailed coordination of the intelligence collection effort accomplished by-
- Coordination with civil and paramilitary intelligence nets.
- Creating informer nets with the local population.
- Thorough interrogation of prisoners and suspects.
- Detailed planning and coordination of activities with civilian officials in any area of operations where the civilian population is concerned.
- Incorporation and monitoring of military civic action into the operational plan by:
 - Planning for and augmenting a plan of military civic action, propaganda, and population control to recover population under insurgent influence.
 - Requesting and distributing supplies for resettlement of population.
 - Training paramilitary forces for security operations and ensuring continuous support for these forces.
 - Detailed integration of combat support and combat service support functions (especially aerial supply) into all tactical planning.
 - Judicious application of the minimum destruction concept in view of the overriding requirements to minimize alienating the population. (Bringing artillery or air power to bear on a village from which sniper fire was received may neutralize insurgent action but will alienate the civilian population as a result of casualties among noncombatants.)
 - Consideration of the use of all means of mobility, to include aircraft, tracked and wheeled vehicles, boats, animals, and porters.
- Providing for the rapid collection and dissemination of all available information and intelligence so that counterinsurgent forces can take immediate action to destroy the fast moving insurgents.

HOST NATION SECURITY FORCE OPERATIONS

3.31 The use of HN forces is essential to developing a stable society, one that looks to the HN government for long-term security. Whenever practicable, HN security forces must operate in conjunction with US and multinational forces and assume the major burden in operations when capable of so doing. The security forces in COIN consist of the civil police, the paramilitary (also called the militia), and the military. The elements of the security force work in concert to:

- Secure, protect and separate the population from the insurgents.
- Neutralize and defeat the insurgent forces.

3.32 The first line of defense for the government is its' police forces, which may be organized either locally or nationally. In either case, their action must be well coordinated with the overall counterinsurgency operations. The first objective of the police is to identify and destroy the illegal infrastructure of the insurgent organization. Police intelligence must identify and locate leaders, penetration agents, intelligence and PSYOP agent, terrorists and recruiters. The police arrest them using the minimum force necessary.

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3.33 There are two types of offensive operations to be employed against insurgent forces. The first is at the local level where U.S. Forces (special operations forces and/or trainers) work with local authorities to find, fix, and destroy local insurgents who seek to exert control in the communities, cities and regions. These forces are normally small but well armed. Examples of this type insurgent force include the Viet Cong in South Vietnam, the FMLN in El Salvador, or al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Chechnya. They move freely within the population and use raids, ambushes, and small hit-and-run attacks intended to drive out occupation forces or destabilize established authorities. The second type of offensive operation is conducted by regular army formations of the HN or multinational forces against main force insurgent units. An example of this type of insurgent force is the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) that infiltrated into South Vietnam.

3.34 Small units handle local COIN operations most effectively. These small units are usually company size, operating within a community or group of communities to find, fix and destroy the insurgents. When these companies are habitually associated with a particular community, they can develop the intelligence necessary to identify and destroy the insurgents. Harassment operations may assist in locating and fixing the insurgent. Operations of this type will prevent the insurgent from resting and reorganizing, will inflict casualties, aid in gaining detailed knowledge of the area of operations and cause the insurgent to expend his limited resources. When an insurgent force has been located, every attempt to encircle the force should be made, even if piecemeal deployment is required. Normally, such operations require that the counterinsurgent force be much larger than the insurgent force (FM 90-8, *Counter Guerrilla Operations*). Company commanders can call on support from their next higher headquarters that also maintains a company reserve element. The diagram at Figure 3-2 illustrates this concept.

3.35 The American way of war has been to substitute firepower for manpower. As a result, U.S. Forces have frequently resorted to firepower in the form of artillery or air any time they make contact. This creates two negatives in a counterinsurgency. First, massive firepower causes collateral damage, thereby frequently driving the locals into the arms of the insurgents. Second, it allows the insurgents to break contact after having inflicted casualties on friendly forces. A more effective method is to attack with ground forces to gain and maintain contact with the goal to completely destroy the insurgent force. This method of operation dictates that military forces become skilled in the conduct of pursuits. The unit that makes the initial contact with the insurgent force will require rapid augmentation to maintain pressure against the fleeing force, envelop it, and destroy it. These augmentation (reaction) forces should be given the highest priority for use of available transport to ensure their delivery to the scene of action as soon as possible.




Figure 3.1: Typical company operational area where platoons are given their separate areas with one platoon in reserve. Platoons teach locals how to protect their respective communities. Squads from each platoon run training programs.

3.36 The pursuit force is organized into two elements, the direct pressure force, and the encircling force(s) (includes blocking force). The direct pressure force pursues the enemy and maintains constant offensive pressure on him as he withdraws. The encircling force(s), employing superior mobility (preferably by using airmobile or airborne forces), conducts local envelopments (single or double) to cut off insurgent forces and destroy them.

3.37 Area ambush is an effective offensive counterinsurgent technique. The area ambush consists of a primary ambush element that triggers the ambush and smaller supporting ambush groups that cover all likely routes of withdrawal. Once the ambush is triggered, the smaller ambush groups open fire as the insurgent force attempts to withdraw from the area.

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3.38 Defense is oriented on the location of the community or installation rather than upon the most favorable terrain. Since defense of the specific community or installation is paramount, plans for withdrawal to rearward positions are focused on retaining control of the community and/or installation.

3.39 Security and surveillance measures must be coordinated for 24-hour operations. The provisions for perimeter defense, as discussed in FM 7-11, are particularly applicable in defense of communities or installations against insurgent attack when regular counterinsurgent forces are preparing and conducting the defense. When using local paramilitary forces, training must instill the necessary confidence and ability to provide an effective defense for a community under attack until supporting forces are delivered or until troop reinforcements arrive.

3.40 By prearranged standing operating procedure (SOP) to include communications, forces, and fire support, larger communities and the surrounding smaller ones mutually assist in the defense of one another until other support or reinforcements arrive. In areas where offensive operations have been conducted to eliminate insurgent control of the population, regular military forces will be required to temporarily assume the responsibility for security/defense of a liberated community until adequate local defenders can be trained and equipped.

3.41 Planning for security of column movement. See Chapter 6– Special Considerations.

3.42 FIRE SUPPORT. All air and ground fire support elements within range of the route of the mounted column must take measures to ensure close and continuous fire support. Fire planning, to include registration, must be as complete as time allows. Continuous communications are essential to establish positive control in order to clear airspace and apply effects.

3.43 Individual and unit SOP for maneuver as responsive action and counter-ambush reaction.

- Pre-positioning of security elements along the route.
- Possible use of airmobile hunter-killer teams.
- Assistance available from friendly units occupying positions along or adjacent to the route.

3.44 DISMOUNTED. Security for movement when dismounted presents several considerations that are different from security for mounted columns. These include:

- Secrecy that may preclude air cover.
- Restrictions on registration of artillery and the inability to plan concentrations when the route cannot be determined in advance.

- Flank security is easier for dismounted movement, particularly if ground or air transportation can be used to position security elements.
- Silent movement of dismounted columns, particularly at night, can allow security elements to locate ambush forces.
- Extended formations that allow part of the column to be in position to maneuver against an ambush force that strikes a different part of the column.

CLEAR AND HOLD OPERATIONS

3.45 The clear and hold operation is a focus of the three primary counterinsurgency programs, supported by intelligence and psychological operations on a specific geographical or administrative area or portions thereof. The tactics and techniques used to conduct clear and hold operations are discussed throughout this manual. The clear and hold operation is executed in a specific high priority area experiencing overt insurgency and has the following objectives:

- Creation of a secure physical and psychological environment.
- Establishing firm government control of the population and the area.
- Gaining willing support of the population and their participation in the governmental programs for countering insurgency.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3.46 Clear and hold operations should expand outward from a secure base, such as an urban industrial complex whose population supports the government effort and where military forces are in firm control. No area or its population which has been subjected to the intensive organizational efforts of a subversive insurgent organization can be won back until-

- A commander, responsible for the clear and hold operation, is allocated military forces clearly superior to the insurgent force known and suspected to be in the area or immediately available in an adjacent area.
- Sufficient nonmilitary resources are allocated to effectively carry out all necessary environmental improvement and population and resources control operations within the area.
- The insurgent has been cleared from the area.
- The insurgent hard-core organization and its support structure has been neutralized or eliminated.
- A governmental organization, to which the local population gives willing support, has been established to replace that of the insurgents.

IMPLEMENTATION

3.47 The clear and hold operation is characterized by execution of four generally overlapping stages: preparation, clearing, holding, and consolidation.

3.48 PREPARATORY STAGE: Inventory, assessment, and planning are conducted during this stage, and are characterized by the following major actions:

- Selection and delineation of a specific area to undergo clear and hold operations
- Designation of chain of command and formulation of concept of operation.
- Collection of data and information on the area of operations (area assessment).
- Estimate of resource requirements, both military and nonmilitary.

- Preparation of clear and hold operations plan. During preparation of the plan, consideration to many factors will be given, included in which are the following:
 - Emergency legislation, to provide a legal basis for population and resources control measures and the legal use of armed forces.
 - Key points that may require establishing static defense posts..
 - Police forces and paramilitary forces requirements and organization.
 - Coordination, to include provisions for joint training and operations, involving military, police, paramilitary, intelligence, psychological, and civilian administrative agencies and forces.
- Psychological preparation: Psychological preparation of the population of contiguous areas to explain the necessity for these operations.
 - Deny the insurgent organization the capability to function in the area.
 - Establish the physical presence of government military and population and resources control forces throughout the area.
 - Establish firm security in the area under the protective shield of government forces.

3.49 CLEARING STAGE: The clearing stage can be initiated by sweep operations to either disperse or force reaction by major insurgent elements within the area of operations. Once this has been accomplished, units employ a combination of offensive small unit operations, such as area saturation patrolling, area ambushes, and other techniques.

3.50 Repressive actions and retribution against the general population in the area must not be condoned. A characteristic of all counterinsurgency operations is firm and impartial treatment whenever and wherever possible since often it will be impossible to identify the insurgent at the onset of operations.

Population and resources control forces introduce surveillance and restrictive control measures as necessary

3.51 HOLDING STAGE: Operations during this phase are designed to:

- Establish firm government control over the area and the population therein.
- Develop a local capability for area security.
- Establish a government political apparatus to replace the insurgent apparatus.
- Develop a dependable network of informants.
- Major actions occurring during this phase include:
 - Designating and allocating area-oriented regular military forces to continue offensive military operations in the area. Other regular military forces that participated in clearing stage actions are now re-leased or are assigned to carrying out other parts of the counterinsurgency effort in the area.
 - Introduction of elements of other agencies of the government, as the area achieves a more secure status, to begin carrying out environmental improvement programs. Resources to support these agencies and their operations should be introduced, as needed, at this time.
 - Thorough population screening to determine insurgent elements and to uncover local leadership.
 - Area surveys, assisted by local leadership, to determine resources and precise and current needs of the area and its people.
 - Motivation of population, by such actions as environmental improvements, designed to psychologically condition the population and induce them to participate in the reconstruction of the area and in the defense of their area against attack by insurgents

- Government support to those willing to participate in reconstruction, based upon their needs and upon the principle of self-help, wherever possible, and willingness to defend what they accomplish.
- Training of local paramilitary forces, including arming and involving them in one or more successful operations against insurgents.
- Establishing a communications system tying the area into a larger secure communications system.
- Progressive efforts, such as formation of youth clubs, participation of population in election of local leadership, participation in community-sponsored environmental improvement and other projects, to develop national consciousness and rapport between the population and its government.

3.52 CONSOLIDATION STAGE: During this stage all activities of the clear and hold operations are expanded and accelerated with the objectives of:

- Turning primary responsibility for local security and government over to the local population as soon as they are capable of accepting such responsibility.
- Maintaining complete security.
- Continuing the reconstruction effort with support being provided, as necessary, from local or government resources, or a combination thereof.
- Continuing development of national consciousness and the local political base willingly supported by and participated in by the local population.
- The redeployment of the bulk of the area-oriented counterinsurgent force to carry out operations in adjacent or other high priority areas occurs during this phase. However, redeployment must not take place until local paramilitary forces are capable of providing local security. Further, a general reserve force must be constituted that can respond swiftly to insurgent attacks which are beyond the capability of local or regional forces. A national level reserve force such as airmobile, airborne, or marine units may be made available to provide assistance.

OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

3.53 The attainment of clear and hold operations objectives requires a considerable expenditure of resources and time. The leader and his HN counterpart must be prepared for a long-term effort. Based upon experiences in insurgency-stricken areas in which clear and hold operations, or similar type operations, have been conducted, several years may be required to achieve complete and enduring success.

Section IV: Information Operations

3.54 Commanders conduct information operations (IO) to mass the effects of the information element of combat power. FM 3-13 defines IO as: the employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to affect or defend information and information systems, and to influence decisionmaking. COIN is an offensive approach and, therefore an element of the joint doctrinal enumeration of offensive IO is important to note: "...the integrated use of assigned and supporting capabilities and activities, mutually supported by intelligence, to affect adversary decision makers and achieve or promote specific objectives. These... include, but are not limited to OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP,

EW, physical attack/destruction, and special information operations (SIO) and could include CNA". The goal of IO is to gain and maintain information superiority [at decisive points during full spectrum operations], a condition that allows leaders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

THREATS TO IO

3.55 Insurgents target commanders, leaders and other important decision makers, C2 systems, or information systems (INFOSYS). Threats against friendly C2/INFOSYS vary in COIN operations based on insurgents' motivation and technical capabilities. Commanders must include OPSEC measures to counter insurgent IO threats.

INSURGENT THREAT CAPABILITIES AND EFFECTS

3.56 Most threats to units engaged in offensive, defensive, and stability operations are straightforward and familiar. During these types of operations, commanders expect an enemy to conduct some form of IO against them and their C2 systems. They assume enemies will use multiple means to disrupt their decision making process by denying them information and casting doubts on information they have. During COIN operations there are other multifaceted threats. These threats come from individuals, organizations, and nation states with varying capabilities. Commanders must anticipate these threats, prepare defenses, and—when appropriate—conduct IO against them.

3.57 Insurgent Capabilities. Enemy sources at all capability levels are present during COIN. The enemy will use IO as a weapon, using symbols and unconventional attacks against IO-related targets. Expect the enemy to analyze our vulnerabilities and link/associate them with our centers-of-gravity. He will then focus his capabilities against these critical vulnerable areas. Some attacks may have immediate results while others may be designed with delayed effects. Insurgent operating capabilities include —

- Hacking to gain unauthorized access to C2 systems or INFOSYS.
- Insiders. Insurgents will try and infiltrate our organizations. They will attempt to recruit and develop individuals with legitimate access to elements of a C2 system. These personnel may also be self-motivated with no direct insurgent links.
- Transnational insurgents and/or nonstate criminals using computer internet message and bulletin boards to pass intelligence and technical data.
- Terrorist attacks to destroy C2 and INFOSYS.
- Foreign IO Activities.
 - Espionage, data collection, network mapping or reconnaissance, and data theft. These sophisticated capabilities may be provided by transnational or criminal groups, drug cartels, or insurgents sponsored by another state.
 - State-sponsored offensive IO, especially computer network attacks (CNA), using state-of-the-art tools and covert techniques conducted in coordination with military operations.
 - Attacking systems and satellites by jamming, broadcasting false signals, deceptive transmissions, lasers or generating electromagnetic pulses.
- Information Fratricide is the result of employing IO elements in a way that causes effects in the information environment that adversely affect friendly forces or impede the conduct of friendly operations.

3.58 Commanders evaluate insurgents from several perspectives using the following factors:

- Insurgent C2 systems. Does the enemy C2 system include computers, digital devices and networks? Or, do the insurgents use less technical means to exercise C2, and what are they?
- Sources of Information. The sophistication and technical complexity of the insurgents C2 system determine the means required to exploit it. What is the most effective way to collect information on the insurgents C2 system?
- Insurgent Goals and Interests. What are the insurgent's short-and long-range goals? How can friendly forces affect both?
- Decision Makers, Influential groups, and Individuals. These people may be leaders within the insurgent political or counter-state and armed forces or interest groups in the information environment. They may be located within or outside the AO. Decision makers may be political leaders, commanders or trusted subordinates. Determine what individuals or groups decide and/or influence insurgents or other group actions.
- Insurgent IO Resources and Capabilities. An accurate understanding of current insurgent capabilities is essential to success in a dynamic operational environment. Determine what resources insurgents can use to protect their C2 systems or inhibit friendly mission success. Expect these to be dynamic rather than static (may change over time). Insurgents may gain, lose, or reconstitute IO resources and capabilities based on combat actions or outside support.
- Insurgent IO Vulnerabilities. How and where are insurgents vulnerable? How can we exploit those vulnerabilities? What countermeasures are insurgents using to prevent exploitation?
- Friendly Vulnerabilities to Insurgent IO Efforts. How and where are we vulnerable? What can we do to prevent insurgents from exploiting those vulnerabilities?

INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF COIN

3.59 Information operations consist of core and supporting elements as well as related activities noted below. Consider how in a COIN environment the application of these elements and activities most effectively supports the counterinsurgency. IO are enabling operations that create opportunities for decisive operations. Commanders use offensive and defensive IO simultaneously to counter insurgent actions.

Core	Supporting	Related
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electronic warfare • Computer network operations (CNA) • Psychological operations • Operations security • Military deception (MILDEC) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Physical destruction • Information assurance • Physical security • Counterintelligence • Counter deception • Counterpropaganda 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CMO • PA

Figure 3.2. IO Core and Supporting Elements and Related Activities

3.60 The elements of IO are independent activities and not organizations. When these activities are employed together and synchronized, they constitute IO. All elements may not be required for each operation. Commanders decide which IO elements are appropriate to accomplish specific aspects of the counterinsurgency. For example, CNA may be used against a transnational and sophisticated, networked insurgency such as al Qaeda. These CNA actions may be synchronized with MILDEC to influence franchise organization decision makers to act or not act. EW may target cell phone chips and associated frequencies, disrupt electronic monetary transfers, and jam frequencies. Create an information advantage by using the following effects to attack insurgents.

- Destroy. To damage a combat system so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. In IO, it is most effective when timed to occur just before insurgents need to execute a C2. Physical attack is the joint term.
- Disrupt. Breaking or interrupting the flow of information between selected C2 nodes.
- Degrade. Using temporary means to reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of insurgents command and control systems, and information collection efforts or means.
- Deny. Entails withholding information about friendly force capabilities and intentions that insurgents need for effective and timely decision-making. Effective denial leaves opponents vulnerable to offensive capabilities. OPSEC is the primary non-lethal means of denial.
- Deceive. Cause a person to believe what is not true. Military deception (MD) seeks to mislead insurgents decision makers by manipulating their understanding of reality. Successful deception causes them to believe what is not true.
- Exploit. Gain access to insurgents command and control systems to collect information or to plant false or misleading information.
- Influence. Cause insurgents or others to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. It results from applying perception management to affect the target's emotions, motives, and reasoning. Perception management also seeks to influence the target's perceptions, plans, actions, and will to oppose friendly forces.
- Protect. All actions taken to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipment and information. It denies the insurgents information about friendly capabilities and intentions by controlling indicators.
- Detect. Discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion into information systems. Detection is the identification of insurgent's attempts to gain access to friendly information and INFOSYS.
- Restore. Bring information systems back to their original state.
- Respond. Respond quickly to an insurgent information operations attack or intrusion. Timely identification of insurgents and their intent and capabilities is the cornerstone of effective response to insurgent offensive IO.

3.61 Commanders use IO to shape the environment during COIN operations. Commanders prepare databases for each IO element using contingency plans to focus their efforts. These databases contain information on possible insurgents and other significant participants. At the strategic, operational and tactical levels databases focus on one or more of the following target sets:

- Political leadership.

- Information capabilities and vulnerabilities, including military and civilian communication networks, and domestic and foreign media.
- Military leadership, operations, and infrastructure and their vulnerabilities at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
- Economic factors that affect an insurgent's ability to mount and sustain military operations, and those that affect the morale of the population and its leadership. This set includes the infrastructure that supports economic activity.
- Social effects of ethnic (clan and tribal), racial, and historical animosities and alliances.

APPLICATION OF IO ELEMENTS IN COIN SUPPORT

3.62 The overall objective during a counterinsurgency is to win the battle of ideas and the politico- military struggle for power. IO can assist the HN to explain how the HN is addressing the concerns of the people in order to provide a safe and secure environment within which governmental institutions can effectively function. Commanders conduct IO to synchronize the information element of combat power with the other elements of combat power. Well-synchronized offensive IO can cripple not only insurgent armed forces but also insurgent political decision making capabilities. IO is most effective when coordinated with kinetic operations and fully integrated into the effects planning and application and targeting process.

3.63 Counterpropaganda reduces the ability of insurgent propaganda to influence the HN populace. Counterpropaganda includes preventive actions, counteractions, and rumor control, and it attacks insurgent propaganda. Propaganda awareness programs inform friendly populations about the nature of hostile propaganda. Counteractions are measures that PSYOP units take to reduce or neutralize the effects of hostile propaganda. Rumors are a means of propaganda based on widely disseminated talk or opinion. They have no discernable source and no known authority. Rumor control seeks to counter rumors that are unfavorable to HN interests.

3-64 Failure to counter insurgent propaganda can produce significant negative effects. These range from simple confusion to disrupting ongoing operations. Common effects of hostile propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation, include —

- Prompting neutral parties not to support HN military operations or resist.
- Increasing the insurgent will to resist by fanning hatreds, biases, and predispositions.
- Inciting riots.
- Leading multinational partners to question their roles in a coalition.
- Causing refugees to block lines of communication.
- Fostering distrust for the police and HN forces. Are the police and HN forces corrupt or puppets? Do they represent the HN society or some other nation?
- Causing the HN populace not to cooperate with friendly forces.
- Causing essential communicators to deny cooperation or resist.
- Causing diversion of military assets to address problems that, while seemingly insignificant, require significant resources.
- Leading friendly governments to questions their own policies and support for COIN operations.

See FM 3-13, *Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures* and JP 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations* for a more in-depth discussion of IO.

Section V: The Media

GUIDELINES ON SPEAKING WITH THE MEDIA

3.65 The media, the printed medium, radio, television and the internet, have a vital role in societies directly and indirectly involved in counterinsurgency. The news media and other information networks' increasing availability to societies' leadership, bureaucracies and populace means members of this news and communication medium have a significant impact on political direction, national security objectives and policy and national will. Media scrutiny of military operations, the journalists' desire for immediate footage and on-the-spot coverage of confrontational events, and the increasing contact with units and Soldiers (embedded reporters) require that commanders and public affairs officers provide guidance to leaders and Soldiers on media relations. The media affect and influence each potential target audience (TA) and personnel external and internal to the JOA. Speaking with the media in a forward-deployed area is an opportunity to explain what our organizations and efforts have accomplished, but be prepared to field questions regarding perceived negative impacts, also. Leaders should follow these general PAO guidelines.

Points to Remember When Doing Media Interviews:

- Be relaxed, confident, and professional.
- Be concise: think about what you will say before you speak
- Avoid using colorful or profane language.
- Stay in your lane. Confine your discussions to areas in which you have firsthand knowledge or where you have personal experience
- Deal in facts--avoid speculation and hypothetical questions
- Label your opinions as opinions. Don't get into political discussions.
- Stay on the record. If you say it, they'll print it.
- Don't discuss classified information.
- Don't argue with the reporter. Be firm, and be polite.
- Speak plainly. Don't use military slang or jargon.

What to Do When the Media Visits Your Area of Operations:

- Do not threaten the media representative.
- Politely move the media to an area out of harm's way where they do not interfere with the performance of the mission.
- Notify the senior person present so he/she can determine what the media wants.
- Cooperate with the reporter within the limits of OPSEC and safety.
- If there are OPSEC or safety concerns that make the interviewing or filming impossible at this time, let the reporter know up front.
- At no time should a media representative's equipment be confiscated. If you feel a security violation has occurred, notify your chain of command.
- If you have problems with the media, don't get emotional. Report the incident through the chain of command to the area public affairs officer.

- Protect the record. Correct the “facts” if they are wrong.

Figure 3.3 Example of PAO Guidance Card

3.66 In addition to these general guidelines, leaders should always consult the public affairs office (PAO) guidance for guidance related to the specific operation in which they are currently involved.

Appendix C - Population Resource Control

Chapter 4: Intelligence

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

General

4.1 The successful conduct of COIN operations will always rely on the willing support and cooperation of the populations directly involved. Greater priority and awareness is needed to understand the motivations of the parties involved in the conflict and the population as a whole. The

“Determine the enemy’s plans and you will know which strategy will be successful and which will not;
 -- Agitate him and ascertain the pattern of his movement.
 -- Determine his dispositions and so ascertain the field of battle.
 -- Probe him and learn where his strength is abundant and where it is deficient.”

Sun Tzu, The Art of War
 c. 4th Century B.C.

understanding of the background and development of the conflict into which US forces are assisting is of particular significance. This requires a detailed understanding of the cultural environment and the human terrain in which the US forces will be operating and thereby places a heavy reliance on the use of Human Intelligence (HUMINT).

4.2 The commander requires intelligence about the enemy and the battle space prior to engaging in operations in order to effectively execute all missions across the full spectrum of operations. Intelligence assists the commander in visualizing his battle space, knowing the enemy, organizing his forces, and controlling operations to achieve the desired tactical objectives or end-state. Intelligence supports force protection (FP) by alerting the commander to emerging threats and assisting in security operations.

4.3 Units engaged in COIN operations may face multiple threats. The commander must understand how enemies organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. Intelligence provides an understanding of the enemy, which assists in planning, preparing, and executing operations. The commander must also understand his Operational Environment (OE) and its effects on both his own and enemy operations. The commander receives mission-oriented intelligence on enemy forces and the area of operations (AO) from the G2/S2. The G2/S2 depends upon the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) effort to collect and provide information on the enemy and battle space.

4.4 One of the most significant contributions that intelligence can accomplish is to accurately predict future enemy events. Although a difficult task, predictive intelligence enables the commander and staff to anticipate key enemy events or actions and develop corresponding plans or counteractions. The most important purpose of intelligence is to enable decision-making. Commanders receive the intelligence, understand it (because it is tailored to the commander’s requirements) and act on it. Through this doctrinal concept, intelligence drives operations.

Characteristics of the COIN Battle Space

4.5 The battle space during COIN operations consists of three primary characteristics: physical terrain/weather, society (socio-cultural – often referred to as the human terrain) and infrastructure. These characteristics provide a structure for intelligence personnel to focus and organize to provide support to COIN operations. These entities are interdependent and not

separate. These characteristics enable the commander to gain an in-depth understanding of his area of operation during COIN operations and provide a focus for the intelligence analyst.

IPB Planning Considerations

TERRAIN AND WEATHER

4.6 Expect terrain in COIN operations to be complex. Unit areas of operation (AO) may consist of various types of terrain ranging from jungles, mountains, and deserts to rural and/or urbanized areas. In conventional operations, the primary factor is the natural landscape. In COIN operations, man-made factors may be the primary terrain factors that a unit must consider. Some of these factors that ought to be considered are: the density of construction and population within the AO, the street patterns within urban areas, and compartmentalization of areas within the AO (such as areas separated by waterways or highways) and functional zones (e.g. the function(s) different areas serve within the AO such as residential, commercial, or government areas). Additionally and just as important is the human terrain. The human terrain is the population of an area and more. Specifically, this term encompasses the gender and mix of the populace, the cultural, religious and socio-economic beliefs and thinking, beliefs, attitudes, and actions of groups and individual members of the populace.

4.7 In addition to weather effects on friendly operations, COIN operations require the consideration of how weather effects the local population. For example, an ongoing drought within the unit's AO may mean that more outside aid is required. An insurgency movement may take advantage of the population's potential dissatisfaction to recruit support and may even be able to make food or other desirable aid available, thus making the insurgents look like the only competent/legitimate authorities in the region. If the government does not provide necessary aid, the population could view those they believe to be 'in charge' in an increasingly hostile manner for failing to assist to prevent a disaster.

SOCIETY (SOCIO-CULTURAL)

4.8 The center of gravity in COIN operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining indigenous support is critical to success in COIN operations. For US forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain/maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, to include its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs.

4.9 The history of a people often explains why the population behaves the way it does and the roots of an insurgency may become clear through that knowledge. A given area of operation may have several different regions each with different sets of customs. US forces can anticipate local reaction to friendly courses of action as well as avoid losing indigenous support for the mission through understanding and supporting those local customs. That support, however, must be consistent with U.S. laws and the Law of Armed Conflict.

4.10 Understanding and working within the social fabric of a local area is initially the most influential factor in the conduct of COIN operations. Unfortunately, this is often the factor most neglected by US forces. The density of civilians and the constant interaction required between them and US forces greatly increases the importance of social considerations. The fastest way to

damage the credibility of US forces and the legitimacy of our involvement with the local national government is to ignore or violate the social mores or precepts of a particular population.

4.11 The interaction of different cultures demands greater recognition during COIN operations than in other environments. This greater need for understanding comes from the increased need for interaction with the civilian populace. Every culture has a set of norms and values and these could involve such diverse areas as protocol and social skills, attitudes toward women, manners, food, sleep patterns, casual and close relationships, and cleanliness. Understanding these differences is only the start of preparation for COIN operations.

4.12 Religious beliefs and practices are among the most important, yet least understood, aspects of the cultures of other peoples. In many parts of the world, religious norms are a matter of life and death. In many religious wars, it is not uncommon to find suicidal acts in the name of their god. In those situations, religious beliefs are considered more important than life itself and are the equivalent of an ideology in other cultures.

4.13 When assessing events, intelligence professionals must consider the norms of the local culture or society. Failure to recognize, respect, understand, and incorporate an understanding of the cultural and religious aspects of the society in which US forces are interacting could rapidly lead to an erosion of the legitimacy of the US or coalition mission. For example, while bribery is not an accepted norm in U.S. society, it may be a totally acceptable practice in another society. If US intelligence professionals assess an incident of this nature using our own societal norms and values as a reference, it is probable the significance of the event will be misinterpreted.

4.14 US military planners should conduct interagency coordination to identify key government officials early in the operation. These key personnel can provide valuable information needed for successful completion of the operations to include local infrastructure, a common picture of cultural norms, suspected enemy strengths, and probable means of support and locations for enemy forces. In COIN missions US forces are often supporting a political entity. As such it is critical to understand the potential audience.

4.15 Many governments are rife with nepotism and trading favors, are indifferent to local conditions, and support no security presence at the village level. The power of officials may be based on family and personal connections, clan loyalty and age, and only after that on education, training, and competence. Corruption may be pervasive and institutionalized as a practical way to manage excess demand for local services.

4.16 A local government's breakdown from a previous level of effectiveness will quickly exacerbate problems of public health and mobility. Attempts to get the local-level bureaucracy to function along US lines may produce further breakdown, passive indifference or resentment. Any unintentional or intentional threat to the privileges of ranking local officials and/or tribal leaders or to members of their families will be stubbornly resisted. Avoiding such threats and assessing the importance of particular officials requires knowledge of family ties.

4.17 US military planners must recognize the local populace will behave in their own perceived self-interest. They will be keenly aware of five sets of interests at work: those of the US forces, the insurgent/hostile elements, the local opportunists, the legitimate government, and the general population. All five elements assess these interests constantly in order to ascertain their own stakes, risks, and advantages.

4.18 Another significant cultural challenge is the presence of refugees within a unit's AO. Rural immigrants displaced by conflict combined with city residents, can create a significant problem. Noncombatants and refugees without hostile intent can disrupt local missions. Additionally, there may be insurgent troops, criminal gangs, vigilantes, paramilitary factions, and factions within those factions hiding in the waves of the displaced.

4.19 The enemy knows it is nearly impossible for US forces to accurately identify friend from foe from disinterested. Local combat situations can change with bewildering speed as the supposed innocent becomes an active aggressor within close quarters and an indefensible position. In Chechnya, Chechen rebels and Hezbollah terrorists effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces. The Chechens counted on the ferocious nature of the Russian counterattack causing heavy civilian casualties to gain support from the indigenous population for the Chechen separatist cause.

4.20 One goal of insurgent forces will be to place incalculable stresses on the US and local national government soldiers in order to break down discipline and operational integrity. The constant pressure of differentiating friend from foe taxed and sometimes undermined ROE from Belfast to Lebanon, and in some cases, entire missions.

4.21 Defining the structure of the social hierarchy is often key to understanding the population. Identifying those local personnel in positions of authority is important. These local officials, tribal chieftains or village elders are often the critical nodes of the society and influence the actions of the population at large. In many societies nominal titles do not equal power—influence does. Many “leaders” are figureheads, and the true authority lies elsewhere.

4.22 Most areas around the world are not governed by the rule of law, but instead rely upon tradition. Often tribal membership, ethnic loyalty, and religious affiliation provide societal cohesion and the protocol of proper behavior and ethics in dealing with outsiders, such as the US and/or coalition partners. It is important to understand the complicated inner workings of a society where potential internal conflicts predominate. This is difficult and requires a thorough examination of a society's culture and history.

4.23 Identifying and understanding trends and patterns of activity provide critical information for intelligence analysts and mission planners. Every local area has discrete and discernible patterns of daily activity. The time of heaviest activity along a LOC is one case in point. Trade and business transactions, market sales, religious practices, governmental functions, and criminal activity are other examples of daily behavior that can be analyzed for consistencies. Disruptions or irregularities in these patterns serve as a warning that something is amiss in the area.

4.24 It is important to remember that while certain general patterns do exist, most regional areas are normally composed of a multitude of different peoples, each with their own standards of conduct. Treating the local population as a homogenous entity can lead to false assumptions, cultural misunderstandings, and poor situational awareness. Individuals act independently and in their own best interest, and this will not always coincide with friendly courses of action (COA). Do not ignore the presence or actions of the different population components within an AO when developing assessments.

INFRASTRUCTURE

4.25 Understanding the infrastructure and the interrelationships of various elements within a unit's AO and the relationship with neighboring AOs is critical in COIN operations. Intelligence staffs must identify critical infrastructure components and the effects that those components have on the local, regional and national populations. Insurgents will use and exploit existing infrastructure. A common method insurgents use to display the 'weakness' of the current local national government is to disrupt or destroy critical components of infrastructure such as power stations and waterworks that affect large portions of the local population. They may also create additional infrastructure where gaps in government-provided services exist in order gain the good will of the local population. This will demonstrate the government's inability to protect critical infrastructure components and their inability to provide basic services such as security for the population.

IPB Assessment

4.26 During the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), intelligence personnel provide commanders with a battlefield assessment based upon a systematic approach known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. The approach examines four areas:

DEFINE THE BATTLESPACE ENVIRONMENT

- Consider the nature and strategy of the insurgency. Are there internal factors, external factor or both that form a basis for the insurgency? Is there an identifiable pattern of insurgent activities? Does the insurgent organization function primarily within the established political system or in open competition with it?
- Determine international and national support to the insurgents. Include sources of moral, physical, and financial support.
- Consider the neighboring countries, boundaries and frontiers, coastal waterways.
- Consider third-country support for the insurgency.
- Analyze Host Nation (HN) population, government, military, demographics, and threat. Who are the vulnerable elements in the population? Are they subject to insurgent exploitation?
- Evaluate HN political structure, economics, foreign policy and relations, policies on military use.
- Consider if US presence, or potential presence, by itself could be a catalyst for insurgent activity.

DESCRIBE THE BATTLESPACE EFFECTS (TERRAIN AND HUMAN)

- Determine points of entry, infiltration and ex-filtration routes, command and control (C2) structures for operations, and agricultural areas.

- Evaluate weather effects on mobility of insurgents and their logistical efforts; for example, availability of food supply due to weather extremes.
- Consider migration and settlement patterns to identify which areas are pro-government or pro-insurgent. Identify the locations of groups that create territorial boundaries the insurgents may try to make autonomous so as to gain political advantage.
- Determine how political and religious affiliation and practices influence the people's attitudes towards both enemy and friendly operations.
- Examine efforts to create or increase unrest and dissension among the population. Are the insurgents conducting information operations against existing or proposed HN policies and programs?
- Evaluate how economics and money affect the insurgent's ability to conduct offensive operations. They will influence the populace's active support for or against the insurgency.

EVALUATE THE THREAT

- Identify which insurgent groups are present, thought to be present, or have access to your AO. Is the insurgency linked to a racial, religious, ethnic, or regional base? Does the insurgent organization function through predominately legal means or clandestine operations? What and who constitute the organizational elements of the movement?
- Identify leaders, trainers, recruiters, staff members, and logistics personnel. Is the leadership clearly defined or do competing actions exist? Is the insurgency affiliated with any political, labor, student, or social organization? What is the philosophy of the leadership?
- Develop doctrinal templates based on observed operating procedures.
- Assess and analyze at the number of functional specialties within the insurgency. For example, the number of trainers for a specific weapon might indicate the type of tactics, level of readiness and the number of personnel trained.
- Determine the types of weapons that the insurgent has at his disposal. Sophisticated weaponry may be an indicator of external support as well as the insurgent's capability to attack important and possibly well-defended targets.

The basic fundamentals for success in low intensity operations...include the absolute requirement for an effective intelligence system interfacing closely with operational units; integration of military, police and civil planning and activities at all levels...."

LTG Richard G. Stillwell
Deputy Chief of Staff for Military
Operations, United States Army, 1971
Noted in the preface of *Low Intensity
Operations: Subversion, Insurgency &
Peacekeeping*, by Brigadier Frank
Kitson, U.K. Army, 1971.

- Consider the insurgent organization. Does it have a high degree of command and control? What is the level of planning and training within the organization?
- Analyze movement patterns. Movements may coincide with operational or logistical activities.

DETERMINE ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION (ECO A)

ECO A might include the following:

- Attacks and raids on police stations, security forces, military installations or other HN government and security-related facilities.
- Attacks on public utility installations (power, water, telephone) or other forms of economic sabotage (pipelines, transmission towers, ports, marketplaces).
- Kidnapping, murder and/or intimidation of public officials (and their families or family members) supporting US or HN forces.
- PSYOP directed against the populace and/or shopkeepers and business owners.
- Ambushes of HN or friendly convoys; kidnapping of drivers and insurgent demands.

4.27 Evaluate the most vulnerable locations and facilities that can quickly affect the greatest number of the populace such as power plants, transmission lines, road, rail and water networks and local open-air markets to determine the most likely locations for potential insurgent attacks, sabotage, raids, and roadblocks -- most likely insurgent COA. Insurgent targets and attacks will not be based on a US-style of thinking and application of ethics.

Use trend and pattern analysis to template, predict and prioritize insurgent activity to include—

- Movement around potential objectives, such as infiltration or ex-filtration routes.
- Assembly points, rally points, and staging areas.
- Surveillance positions.
- Centers of pro-insurgent populations. Include an evaluation of individual villages and large political divisions such as states and provinces.
- Identify areas of anti-government influence and residences of insurgent leadership or key sympathizers.
- Location of known and suspected base camps.
- Location of known and suspected training camps.
- Logistics routes and transshipment hubs.
- Cache sites, water sources, agricultural areas, and fuel storage and production areas.

- Locations of communications equipment. Include commercial establishments and government installations where such equipment may be purchased or stolen.

The Threat

4.28 Insurgents require the support of the local population. In order to succeed, they must increase the support of the local population in their favor. To defeat the insurgency, US forces assist the local authorities in separating the insurgents from the population and ultimately in gaining the population's active support. If a substantial portion of the population does not actively oppose the insurgency, the insurgents may determine to attack soft targets and purposely inflict civilian casualties to both intimidate the local populace as well as to undermine the legitimacy of HN local authorities.

4.29 Rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. More often, one ethno-national group opposes other groups with conflicting interests. This poses a significantly more complex set of enemy or potential adversaries -- entities that leaders must understand. Insurgents will try to create conditions to defeat US and HN forces and to slow the support for friendly forces. Increasingly insurgent groups have no regard for the rules of war. They will use human shields, target innocent civilians and occupy religious and health facilities as sanctuaries. These actions and techniques offset U.S. advantages and make it more difficult to locate and defeat the enemy. U.S. reaction to these tactics can also have tremendous propaganda appeal.

4.30 Insurgents develop organizational structures that are functional for their particular operational environment. Because insurgents usually operate in a hostile environment, security is a primary consideration. Therefore, insurgent organizations may be organized both conventionally and unconventionally. This unconventional or cellular structure protects members of the organization and allows for better security. Individual elements or cells can operate relatively isolated from others elements or cells, thereby creating increased security. In the event of defection or capture, no one member can identify more than a few others. Some elements within the organization may have multifunction cells that combine several skills into one operational entity, while others create cells of specialists that come together for an operation on an ad hoc basis.

4.31 Due to its unconventional nature, the insurgent threat is difficult to determine and identify. When determining and identifying the insurgent threat consider the following:
Threat Staging Area (TSA). A TSA is a geographic area from which insurgent organizations and elements coordinate operations, logistics, finance, and recruiting, as well as stage and plan missions. These areas can be thought of as either the operational or strategic areas in which the group conducts the majority of its "behind-the-scenes" activity, as well as defines the area in which the group has the largest sympathetic base to support its goals.

4.32 Threat AO. Threat AOs are those areas in which an insurgent organization conducts operations against its adversary.

4.33 Threat Objectives. These are long- and short-term insurgent goals that may include but are not limited to —

- Attracting publicity to the group's cause.
- Demonstrating the group's power.

- Demonstrating government weakness.
- Exacting revenge.
- Obtaining logistic support.
- Causing a government to overreact.

See Annex D, Order of Battle Factors.

THREAT ANALYSIS

4.34 In COIN operations, threat analysis is a continual process of compiling and examining all available information concerning potential insurgent activities that target elements of the population, local security forces, and/or a facility or base. A comprehensive threat analysis will review the factors of an insurgent's existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat analysis is an essential step in identifying the probability of insurgent attacks and results in a threat assessment.

4.35 When conducting an insurgency, the threat will normally conform to the five low-intensity imperatives (political dominance, unity of effort, adaptability, legitimacy, and perseverance) (see FM 7-98). Under the conditions of insurgency, the analyst must place more emphasis on—

- Developing population status overlays showing potential hostile areas.
- Developing an understanding of “how” each insurgent organization operates and is organized.
- Determining primary operating or staging areas.
- Determining mobility corridors and escape routes.
- Determining most likely targets.
- Determining where the threat's logistical facilities are located and how their support organizations operate.
- Determining the level of popular support (active and passive).
- Determining the recruiting techniques and methods of each insurgent organization.
- Locating neutrals and those actively opposing these organizations.
- Using pattern analysis and other tools to establish links between each insurgent organization and other organizations.
- Determining the underlying social, political, ideological, and economic issues that caused the insurgency in the first place and which are continuing to cause the members of the organization as well as elements of the population to support it.

4.36 As discussed earlier, evaluation of the threat in COIN operations begins early and covers a wide range of factors in building an accurate threat organizational diagram. In addition to the factors discussed, consider the following:

- Group collection and intelligence capabilities.
- Does the actual desired end-state differ from that which is publicly advocated; if so, how does that impact operations?
- Do the insurgents desire a different social or political organization than that which exists under current conditions; if so, what are the differences? How will they conduct operations to achieve that goal?

4.37 Motivation (ideological, religious, monetary); depending on the echelon, there will be an opportunity to use PSYOP against the group and/or its support network.

Insurgent Means and Methods of Command and Control

4.38 While identifying the specific structure, leadership and membership of insurgent organizations is critical, it may also be extremely difficult to obtain this information. In lieu of this specific information, identifying generalities about the insurgent group(s) will be of value to the intelligence analyst.

4.39 Leader Capabilities: An insurgent organization capable of extended range command, control, and communications (C3) has greater flexibility and reach than an organization that can only operate within the limitations of the leader's C2 capabilities.

4.40 International and National Support:

- Moral: Significant leadership or cultural figure may make pronouncements in support of an organization, activity, or attack. This may have the effect of influencing international policy or increasing the success of recruitment efforts.
- Physical: This includes safe passage, safe houses, documentation, weapons, and training at sites inside the country.
- Financial: Charities, banks, informal transfer of currency by traveler and/or courier.
- Transportation: (on-hand and required).

4.41 Religious, Political and Ethnic Affiliations: Commonalities and differences are significant in terms of estimating potential support or opposition an insurgent organization may receive in a given area. However, in some cultures, such as the Muslim culture, the philosophy that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may cause strange and unprecedented relationships to form.

RECRUITING

4.42 Recruiting Methods, Locations, and Target Audience: An insurgent organization that recruits from an idealistic and naïve upper and middle class will differ significantly from one which recruits from prisons. Some insurgent organizations recruit university students, either to join the movement as operatives, support personnel, or to prepare for future leadership roles. Insurgents recruit those with little or no education because they are more susceptible to insurgent propaganda although many insurgents come from an upper-middle class background. The impact of target audiences bears directly upon the willingness of the insurgent recruit to fully commit to the cause and to sacrifice self if deemed necessary.

Civil Considerations

4.32 A thorough analysis of the population within the AO is critical to the execution of successful counterinsurgency operations. Consider the impact the local populace may have on the threat and friendly forces, as well as their location in the AO and area of interest (AOI). When analyzing the population, the following are areas to consider:

- Identify active and passive supporters.
- Determine what segment of the general population supports or assists the threat.
- Determine the extent to which the population will support or impede friendly operations.
- Identify and depict those segments of the population that are friendly or unfriendly toward US/Coalition forces.
- Identify and depict those segments of the population that are pro-government or anti-government.
- Identify terrorist and/or criminal elements and their relationship to the insurgents and the general population.
- Determine the availability of weapons to the general population.

See Figure 4.1 for a list of OCOKA Factors and how they can relate to the local population.

<p>Observation and Fields of Fire</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Individuals or groups in the population can be co-opted by one side or another to perform a surveillance or reconnaissance function, performing as moving outposts to gather information. ▪ Local residents have intimate knowledge of the local area. Their observations can provide information and insights about what might otherwise remain a mystery. For instance, residents often know about shortcuts through town. They might also be able to observe and report on a demonstration or meeting that occurs in their area. ▪ Unarmed combatants might provide targeting intelligence to armed combatants engaged in a confrontation. This was readily apparent in Mogadishu, where unarmed combatants with the ability to observe friendly force activities without the threat of being engaged instructed hidden threat forces on where to fire. ▪ Deception and adversarial PSYOP threats may hinder a clear view of the threat’s tactics or intentions. ▪ Fields of fire can be extremely limited by the presence of noncombatants in a combat zone because restrictive ROE may prohibit firing into a crowd. ▪ Figuratively, the population or regions within a local area can be targeted as fields of fire for information operations. <p>Concealment and Cover</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Civilian populations provide ubiquitous concealment for non-uniformed forces. Threat forces operating in any part of a local urban area can instantly blend into any type of crowd or activity. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Threat forces often find cover from firepower by operating within a neutral group. For instance, during the December 1999 World Trade Organization demonstrations in Seattle organized, unruly, and dangerous protestors “hid behind peaceful demonstrators, creating a situation where if [the Seattle police] were to be successful in countering their tactics, a larger number of people likely would have been hurt.” (Kim Murphy, “Anarchists Deployed New Tactics in Violent Seattle Demonstrations,” Los Angeles Times, December 16, 1999.) ▪ “Chechen rebels and Hezbollah each effectively used the cover of refugees to attack occupying forces and counted on heavy civilian casualties in the counter attack to gain support from the native populations.” (Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, The Urban Century: Developing World Urban Trends and Possible Factors Affecting Military Operations, MCIA-1586-003-98, November 1997.) The support offered by the native populations in this case provided a type of political cover that hindered respective Russian and Israeli operations. ▪ A particularly telling example of using the guise of noncombatants as cover is a story about the use of a woman by Amal fighters to reconnoiter Marine and LAF positions in Beirut between 1982 and 1984. “The most blatant of the scouts was a heavysset, middle-aged woman or large man dressed in a woman’s clothing who made trip after trip across the end of the alley. One of the Marine riflemen reached the end of his tether late in the afternoon and dropped her in her tracks with one M-16 round. An Amal gunman who was duck-walking on the woman’s ample hidden side scuttled for a nearby building when his cover fell to the
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Figure 4.1 OCOKA Factors

OCOKA Factors and the Population (Continued)

<p>street.” (Eric Hammel, <i>The Root: Marines in Beirut</i>, August 1982—February 1984, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985.)</p> <p>Obstacles</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ One of the largest obstacles to friendly operations is the portion of the population that actively supports the insurgent. ▪ People conducting their daily activities will simply “get in the way” of any type of operation. For instance, curiosity-driven crowds in Haiti often affected patrols by inadvertently forcing units into the middle of the street and pushing them into a single file. No harm was inflicted, but the unit was made move vulnerable to sniper and grenade attacks. ▪ Strategically the world audience, as well as its local contingent, can create political, cultural, and ideological obstacles to a mission. The U.S. audience watching events unfold in Vietnam could have been perceived as an obstacle to the government’s strategy of pursuing its strategic objectives. The cultural differences apparent when U.S. forces were deployed for Operation Desert Storm could have been an obstacle if not adequately addressed. For instance, a PSYOP flier produced to encourage a sense of unity among the Arab populations included a picture of two men holding hands—a sight not common in Western cultures. A flier designed in accordance with Western standards might not have been as effective. <p>Key Terrain</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ The population in COIN operations is key terrain. This is based on the idea that public opinion and their support or lack thereof can change the course or the aims 	<p>of a mission. The U.S. withdrawal from Somalia following the American outcry after seeing a dead soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu is often used in MOUT literature as an example of the power of an audience. Determining which population or portions of it are key to a mission should not be limited to broad-brush characterizations of large populations, however. Certain sectors or individuals within a population can be as pivotal in modern engagements as a piece of high ground was in past eras, or as the entire U.S. population was in regard to Mogadishu.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Captured combatants or a well-informed noncombatant can provide valuable intelligence about the enemy. These individuals can be key terrain in terms of the intelligence they can provide. ▪ A group of people that U.S. forces are deployed to protect might be considered key terrain because loss of that group’s respect could jeopardize the entire operation. ▪ Congregated people can be considered key terrain. Whether moving or stationary, a large gathering might be a ripe target for attack, closer observation, or attempts at manipulation. <p>Avenues of Approach</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Populations present during operations physically restrict movement and maneuver by limiting or changing the width of AA. ▪ People may assist movement if a group can be used as human barriers between one combatant group and another. Refugee flows, for example, can provide a concealed AA for members of an enemy force. ▪ A certain individual can provide an AA to a specific target audience when acting as a “mouthpiece” for an information operation mission.
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Figure 4.1 OCOKA Factors (Cont’d)

Types of Intelligence Support

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)

4.33 HUMINT is the collection by a trained HUMINT collector of foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities. It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander's intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.

4.34 During COIN operations, the most critical information and intelligence will come from the population and those in direct contact with them - HUMINT. The quantity and quality of this information and intelligence will depend on the credibility of the US forces, the continuous security they provide the local population and their ability to interact with the local population (communicate and establish relationships with members of the local population). Every member of the US force, whether on or off duty, is an informal HUMINT collector, and must be aware of the overall intelligence requirements and how their interactions and observations may assist in the intelligence collection plan. This awareness can and should be developed by regular briefings and debriefings.

4.35 Trained HUMINT collectors obtain information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities within and affecting the local area. HUMINT can assist to establish and more accurately understand the socio-cultural characteristics of the local area.

4.36 HUMINT sources can provide early warning of deep-rooted problems awaiting US forces during COIN operations. HUMINT collectors can conduct debriefings, screenings, liaison, HUMINT contact operations, document exploitation (DOCEX), interrogations, and tactical questioning in support of the Commander's intelligence requirements.

4.37 Information provided by HUMINT can greatly assist the intelligence staff in deducing critical patterns, trends and networks within the local area to assist with successful mission accomplishment. Tactical HUMINT (TAC-HUMINT) personnel provide these types of capabilities in support of tactical forces. The S2/G2/J2X coordinates these capabilities between the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and can provide their units with access to pertinent national level HUMINT.

4.38 Intelligence planning staffs must be aware that battle space cannot generally be defined in geographical terms for purposes of intelligence collection. This is especially critical when determining the allocation of HUMINT assets. Concentrations of humans on the battlefield do not necessarily denote a need to concentrate HUMINT assets in those locations. Threat actions outside a unit's AO may be a source of significant events inside a unit's AO. Additionally, information from sources in one AO may impact operations in a distant AO. Creating artificial intelligence boundaries can result in a lack of timely fusion of all critical elements of information that may be available.

IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT)

4.39 IMINT is intelligence derived from the exploitation of imagery collected by visual photography, infrared, lasers, multi-spectral sensors, and radar. These sensors produce images of objects optically, electronically, or digitally on film, electronic display devices, or other media.

4.40 IMINT has some severe limitations during COIN operations. Imaging systems cannot distinguish between insurgents masquerading as civilians and the general population. Additionally, imaging systems cannot see through buildings in built-up areas, so low-flying aerial imagery collection platforms often have restricted fields of vision. Likewise they cannot see threats that may be located inside buildings. Additionally, aerial platforms that do not have stand-off capabilities may be at risk of being destroyed by local enemy air defense fire.

4.41 There are several key advantages that imagery can provide to the commander. UAV imagery may be one of the fastest, least risky methods by which to conduct reconnaissance of specific areas and to update and verify current maps of that area, showing clear routes, obstacles such as damaged and destroyed buildings, and intact and destroyed bridges. The topographical team can use this imagery to create updated mapping products for planning and operational uses.

4.42 Cameras collocated with measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) systems such as the remotely monitored battlefield surveillance system (REMBASS) and activated when those systems are triggered can give the commander additional “eyes on” NAIs without wasting manpower by continuously staffing an observation post (OP) in those locations.

4.43 Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the debriefing process and allow the intelligence staff personnel to make their own judgments about items of interest that the patrol reports. Videotaping of events, such as a demonstration, can allow analysts who were not on the scene to identify key elements, leaders, and potential indicators to help preclude future incidents. Gun-camera images from aircraft that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight into enemy TTPs. Thermal sights on a vehicle patrolling an urban street late at night may note the hot engine of a vehicle on the side of the road, possibly indicating suspicious activity.

4.44 The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) could provide such information as the amount of vehicular traffic entering and leaving an area via multiple avenues which could be useful when trying to determine if the enemy is shifting forces into or out of a specific region or if there is a covert attempt to exfiltrate or infiltrate the region via lesser-used avenues. This could include monitoring traffic crossing international borders.

4.45 The National Geospatial Agency (NGA) can provide a wide range of imagery products for use prior to and during operations in the urban environment. These products are usually easier to obtain prior to deployment and are often critical to the initial planning stages of an operation.

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT).

4.46 SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination all COMINT, ELINT, and FISINT, however transmitted; intelligence is derived from communications, electronics, and foreign instrumentation signals. SIGINT has three subcategories:

- COMINT – The intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.
- ELINT – The technical and geo-location intelligence derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.
- FISINT – Technical information and intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign electromagnetic emissions associated with the testing and operational deployment of non-US aerospace, surface, and subsurface systems. Foreign instrumentation signals include but are not limited to telemetry, beaconry, electronic interrogators, and video data links. (See JP 1-02).

4.47 SIGINT is of value whenever there is any form of electronic emission, whether from communications (such as hand-held or CB radios and mobile phones), combat net radio transmissions, or for other purposes such as the radio control of explosive devices or use of radar for surface-to-air missile (SAM) guidance. The easy availability of 'high tech' communications and monitoring equipment now allows most nations to have a relatively sophisticated SIGINT capability.

4.48 Insurgent groups may use unencrypted, low-power communications systems to conduct local operations. Ground-based SIGINT collection assets must be properly positioned in advance to be certain that they can obtain the best possible intelligence from these sources.

4.49 Collection of unencrypted threat signals can provide key indicators for threat COAs. Patterns in the amount of known enemy encrypted signals provides indications of specific threat COAs. Because of signal bounce within urban areas, direction-finding (DF) capabilities for all SIGINT collection systems are significantly impaired. During COIN operations, it may be possible for the local authorities to monitor local telephone lines and provide relevant information they collect to US forces. Likewise, it may be possible for US forces to tip off local national authorities as to what telephone numbers may yield valuable intelligence.

MEASUREMENT AND SIGNATURE INTELLIGENCE (MASINT).

4.50 MASINT is technically derived intelligence that detects, locates, tracks, identifies, and/or describes the specific characteristics of fixed and dynamic target objects and sources. It also includes the additional advanced processing and exploitation of data derived from IMINT and SIGINT collection.

4.51 MASINT provides important intelligence at the tactical level. Systems such as ground surveillance radars (GSRs) have limited uses in the urban environments because of the lack of wide-open spaces in which they most effectively operate. For that same reason, they can cover large, open areas that are possible avenues of approach or infiltration/ex-filtration routes within a unit's AO. Systems such as the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System (REMBASS) and the Platoon Early Warning Device (PEWD) can play a primary role in monitoring many of the numerous AAs that cannot be covered by human observers due to manpower constraints. REMBASS can monitor avenues such as subterranean passageways (and/or entrances and exits to such passageways), entrances and exits on buildings, fire escapes on buildings, base camp perimeters, and traffic flow along routes (especially foot trails that may be used to infiltrate and ex-filtrate personnel and equipment between urban and rural areas).

Counterintelligence (CI)

4.52 Counterintelligence (CI) is focused on countering adversary intelligence collection activities against US forces. During COIN operations, CI personnel primarily investigate adversary intelligence collection threats and provide force protection assistance. In conjunction with HUMINT collections, CI agents conduct screening operations to identify personnel that may be of CI interest or have CI leads. CI screening is also conducted during the process of hiring host nation (HN) citizens (such as linguists) for Army or DOD employment. CI investigations and operations may cross-cue the other intelligence disciplines and may in term be cross-cued by the other disciplines. CI personnel work in conjunction with Military Police, Engineers, and Medical Service personnel to create threat vulnerability assessments (TVAs) that provide commanders and leaders with a comprehensive force protection assessment.

4.53 CI personnel provide analysis of the adversary's HUMINT, IMINT, SIGINT, and MASINT capabilities in support of intelligence collection, terrorism, and sabotage in order to develop countermeasures against them. CI analytical products are important tools in COA development in the military decision making process (MDMP).

CI technical services that may be available and of use during COIN operations include surveillance, Computer Network Operations (CNO) (assisting in protecting US information and information systems while exploiting and/or attacking adversary information and information systems), Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) (identifying technical collection activities being carried out by adversary intelligence entities), IO, and counter-signals intelligence (C-SIGINT). As with scouts and reconnaissance patrols, CI teams are most effective when linguist support is provided.

ISR Planning in COIN Operations

4.54 ISR tasks are the actions of the intelligence collection effort. ISR tasks consist of three categories:

- Intelligence.
- Surveillance.
- Reconnaissance.

4.55 Development of the COIN operational ISR plan is different than the plan supporting conventional operations. Due to the unconventional nature of the COIN environment, the ISR effort will be significantly more complex in combining and integrating HUMINT collectors and surveillance assets with the capabilities and tasks of limited ISR-assigned assets as well as integrating with interagency resources. Techniques must be modified for every operation to accomplish ISR requirements – each operation is unique. Additionally, local, national and coalition ISR assets must be integrated into the overall ISR plan at both the local, district and regional levels.

4.56 The key to successful ISR efforts is the integration of all ISR-capable units, local and HN government and interagency organizations throughout the entire operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess). The coordinated actions of the entire staff to develop the threat and environment portion of the COP are key to providing successful ISR support to the commander. For information on reconnaissance and/or surveillance tasks, see FM 7-15 and FM 3-55.

Appendices:

D – Order of Battle Factors

E – Intelligence Indicators

F – Intelligence Analysis Tools and Indicators

G – Pattern, Trend, and Network Analysis -- TBP

Chapter 5: Support

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION GENERAL

5.1 As discussed in Chapter 2, leaders must incorporate psychological operations (PSYOP) and military police (MP) support into planning for COIN operations. PSYOP has an integral role in influencing behaviors and attitudes of friendly, neutral, and hostile target audiences. Tactical PSYOP Teams often will accompany combat units that have close contact with indigenous personnel. Leaders must know how to use the PSYOP units effectively to enhance success of the mission. MP's assist commanders with area security, criminal investigations, maintaining law and order, and detaining prisoners or other personnel. This chapter is an overview of the roles these two support units play in a COIN environment.

Section I Psychological Operations

5.2 The purpose of PSYOP is to influence target audience (TA) behaviors that support United States (U.S.) national policy objectives and the combatant commander's intentions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. PSYOP provide a commander the means to employ a non-lethal capability across the range of military operations from peace through conflict to war and during post-conflict operations.

MISSION OF PSYOP

5.3 The mission of psychological operations (PSYOP) is to influence the behavior of foreign target audiences (TAs) to support U.S. National Objectives.

5.4 PSYOP accomplishes this by conveying selected information and/or advising on actions that influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign audiences. Behavioral change is at the root of the PSYOP mission. Although concerned with the mental processes of the TA, it is the observable modification of TA behavior that determines the mission success of PSYOP. Leaders and Soldiers must recognize that everything they do or choose not to do has a psychological impact.

5.5 PSYOP is an integral part of all COIN activities. They meet the specific requirements for each area and operation. Mission planning for PSYOP in COIN must be consistent with US and Coalition objectives—military, economic, and political. PSYOP planners must be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the HN environment in which PSYOP is employed. This includes the history, culture, economics, politics, regional influence, and other elements that affect the people in the HN.

5.6 Commanders must consider the psychological impact of military and nonmilitary COAs. PSYOP emphasize assessing the potential threat to the HN and the United States. PSYOP support the achievement of national goals by specific target audiences. In COIN, specific PSYOP goals exist for the following target groups:

- Insurgents. To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces. No single way exists to influence foreign targets deliberately.

Planning stems from the viewpoint of those affected by a conflict. The HN's government needs national programs designed to influence and win insurgents over to its side.

- Civilian populace. To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN's government and its COIN programs.
- Military forces. To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces. The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency.
- Neutral elements. To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside the HN. Effective ways of gaining support are to reveal the subversive activities and to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency.
- External hostile powers. To convince them the insurgency will fail.

5.7 PSYOP can assist COIN by reaching the following goals:

- Countering hostile propaganda
- Improving popular support for the HN government.
- Discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups and the insurgents themselves.
- Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States.
- Supporting defector programs.
- Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to CMO.
- Establishing HN command support of positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities.
- Informing the international community of HN and U.S. intent and goodwill.
- Passing instructions to the HN populace.
- Developing HN PSYOP capabilities.

TACTICAL PSYOP

5.8 At the tactical level, PSYOP are the supported commander's most readily available asset to communicate with foreign targeted audiences (TA). Tactical PSYOP forces provide a powerful capability to the supported commander whether providing information during humanitarian assistance operations or broadcasting surrender instructions while supporting combat operations. PSYOP deliver PSYOP messages at the tactical level at the most personal level, i.e., through face-to-face communication, delivery of printed material, or from the close proximity of a loudspeaker. Tactical PSYOP Soldiers have the unique ability to often obtain immediate feedback from the TA they are trying to influence. When attached to a maneuver battalion or company, the tactical PSYOP team disseminates PSYOP products using visual, audio, or audiovisual means. The tactical loudspeakers employed by the teams can achieve immediate and direct contact with a TA and are used heavily during COIN operations.

5.9 Tactical PSYOP teams can conduct other types of PSYOP functions. In addition to disseminating printed materials they perform face-to-face communication, gather and assess the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP and hostile propaganda, and acquire PSYOP-relevant information from the local populace.

TACTICAL PSYOP TEAM (TPT)

5.10 TPTs provide staff planning and PSYOP dissemination in support of operations conducted by conventional and SOF units. The TPT is a three-man team commanded by a staff sergeant. The TPT's primary purpose is to integrate and execute tactical PSYOP into the supported commander's plan. The TPT must also advise the commander and staff on the psychological effects of their operations on the TA in their AO, as well as the effects of hostile propaganda, and answer all PSYOP-related questions. The TPT can conduct face-to-face, communication, loudspeaker operations, and dissemination of approved audio, audiovisual, and printed materials. They are instrumental in the gathering of PSYOP-relevant information, conducting town or area assessments, observing impact indicators, and gathering pre-testing and post-testing data. TPTs also conduct interviews with the TA. They take pictures and document cultural behavior for later use in products. TPTs often play a role in establishing rapport with foreign audiences and identifying key communicators that can be used to achieve U.S. national objectives. Tactical PSYOP can increase the supported unit commander's ability to operate on the battlefield by reducing or minimizing civilian interference.

- Tactical PSYOP can potentially reduce the number of casualties suffered by the supported unit by reducing the effectiveness of insurgent forces he must face through surrender appeals and cease resistance messages.
- Tactical PSYOP can assist the supported unit commander in gaining the tactical advantage on the battlefield through the use of deception measures, allowing the commander to have the element of surprise.

5.11 In high intensity conflict a TPT is normally assigned to each maneuver battalion. In Stability and Support Operations (SOSO) in general and in counter insurgency in particular the TPT should support each company or Special Forces (SF) Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). The TPT must interact with the local population continuously to be effective. Most operations that interact with the population regularly are planned and executed at the company/ODA level. Given current force protection doctrine the TPT will not be effective if employed above the company/ODA level in supporting counter insurgency.

ADVISING THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER

5.12 The TPT leader plays a the key role as advisor to the supported commander. The leader should analyze proposed actions by the supported unit and how they may affect the TAs within his AO. PSYOP planners must be involved in the targeting process. For example, if the supported commander wants to destroy a bridge that is used by local civilians to transport goods to and from market, the TPT leader should advise him on the possible adverse effect this may have on the civilians. The TPT leader may also advise the commander on specific insurgent forces to target with PSYOP in order to reduce the effectiveness of insurgent forces.

LOUDSPEAKER OPERATIONS (L/S OPERATIONS)

5.13 L/S operations are an extension of face-to-face communications. During operations in which violence is an element, the loudspeaker is the most effective PSYOP medium, which achieves immediate and direct contact with the enemy. When a loudspeaker broadcasts, the enemy becomes a captive audience that cannot escape the message. The loudspeaker can move rapidly to wherever an exploitable PSYOP opportunity is found and can follow the TA when the TA

moves. The loudspeaker achieves, in effect, face-to-face communication with the adversary. Loudspeakers transmit speeches, music, news, warnings, or sound effects to the audience.

DISSEMINATING PRINTED PRODUCTS

5.14 The dissemination of printed products by TPTs and other Soldiers is a very effective way of disseminating PSYOP to TAs. TPTs will usually disseminate printed products by hand, in a face-to-face manner, which lends credibility to the product. Following is a list of some of the types of printed products a TPT might disseminate: Posters; Novelty Items; Leaflets; Handbills; Newspapers; Pamphlets; and Magazines.

FACE-TO-FACE COMMUNICATIONS

5.15 Face-to-face communication is the foundation of tactical PSYOP and the most common and effective capability that TPTs bring to the supported unit. Increasing rapport, trust, and credibility with the TA is accomplished through effective face-to-face communication. This method also allows PSYOP Soldiers the best way of engaging with a TA about complex issues. The give and take of personal communication is the most effective form of PSYOP over the long term because it builds rapport and establishes a personal connection with the target audience.

PRE-TESTING AND POST-TESTING

5.16 PSYOP personnel use pre-testing and post-testing to predict and assess the effectiveness of products on a TA. An important function of TPTs is that of testing.

TOWN / AREA ASSESSMENTS

5.17 This assessment collects detailed information that is useful for the development of PSYOP. TPTs must ensure these town and area assessments are as complete as possible and forward them up the chain of command so they can be incorporated into higher planning and shared with intelligence sections benefiting all levels of command.

RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION ASSESSMENTS

5.18 TPTs assess radio and television stations on almost every mission. Once the TPT makes contact with a station manager, it is important that they maintain that relationship. Establishing a good, habitual working relationship can be an effective way to help ensure the ability to exploit the indigenous broadcast capability, such as a radio station.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE

5.19 TPTs will often find themselves assisting in the control of crowds and defusing a potentially hostile situation. This may occur as a member of a planned quick reaction force or on the spur of the moment.

PROPAGANDA ASSESSMENTS

5.20 Propaganda is intentionally incorrect or misleading information directed against an enemy or potential adversary to disrupt or influence any sphere of national power— military

information, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, finance, and economic. This information is normally directed at the United States, allies, and key audiences in the JOA or AO. PSYOP personnel advise the supported commander and coordinating staff of the current situation regarding the use or anticipated use of adversary propaganda in the AO. PSYOP personnel advise commanders on the recommended counter propaganda measures to defeat or diminish the impact of propaganda. . Executing successful counterpropaganda involves all of the commander's assets to collect the wide variety of information and propaganda existing in an area. Due to the sheer volume of information and potential sources, PSYOP forces do not have the organic ability to collect all available information.

PSYOP CONSIDERATIONS

5.21 There are numerous historical accounts of COIN operations and methodologies from political and military standpoints. The following section highlights several of the more prominent considerations for countering hard line insurgencies from a PSYOP perspective.

- Do not approach the insurgency as only a series of criminal acts. View the situation through the microscope of root causes of insurgencies: the actions may be the beginnings of a highly organized and deeply rooted insurrection.
- Maintain the respect of the interim government officials, newly formed security forces and civilian population. Reward repentant insurgent sympathizers; build the infrastructure of cooperative areas and publicize those accomplishments to the “less-than-supportive” groups. Seeing neighbors being compensated for their help will positively influence others to join in; and, secure them and their family from insurgent retribution.
- Emphasize the Soldier's primary role is to both serve as an ambassador of goodwill to the populace and to destroy the insurgents.
- Include the interim government and HN security forces in the detailed planning, message content and operational execution of the COIN operation.
- Realize that the practice of judgment, persistency, patience, tact, justice, humanity, and sympathy are necessary on the part of the interim government and supporting multinational forces. These traits are essential to the achievement of moral and psychological superiority over the insurgents. Legitimate forces must fully recognize that they represent the "better state of things" that are being offered to the local populace.
- Follow the two guiding principles on the conduct of operations in COIN:
 - The objective is to achieve decisive gains with the least use of combat force and resultant loss of lives; and,
 - The relationship with the local populace must be based on security, truth, helpfulness, and kindness.

Section II. Combat Support - Military Police

5.22 Military Police forces provide a robust and dynamic combat capability during COIN. Military Police soldiers possess diverse mobility capabilities, lethality in weapons mix, and trained communications skills to operate in any environment. This diversity and flexibility of MP functions is reflected in the following vignette (from actual combat patrols to training Iraqi security forces):

18th Military Police Brigade Operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Soldiers of the 18th Military Police Brigade supporting OIF conducted over 24,000 combat patrols; Processed over 3,600 EPWs, detainees, and insurgents; Confiscated over 7,500 weapons; and trained over 10,000 Iraqi police forces. MP patrols came under direct or indirect attack over 300 times throughout the operations.

5.23 The MP can support COIN across the spectrum of the five MP functions: Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations (MMSO), Area Security, Police Intelligence Operations, Law and Order and Internment/Resettlement Operations.

MANEUVER AND MOBILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

5.24 MP supports counterinsurgency operations through MMSO in a variety of measures to include:

- Supporting straggler and Displaced Persons operations.
- Conducting route reconnaissance and surveillance missions.
- Conducting MSR regulation and enforcement operations (to include checkpoints and roadblocks).

AREA SECURITY

5.25 MP operations within this function to support COIN may include:

- Reconnaissance operations
- Conducting critical site, asset, high-risk personnel security, to include security of high-value convoys (CL III or V).
- Conducting combat patrols throughout the AO (to include cordon and search operations)
- The MP firepower, mobility and communications ability provide critical reconnaissance, information-collection, and response-force capabilities to the command.

POLICE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS (PIO)

5.26 MP gathers information regarding threat/insurgent/criminal groups for evaluation, assessment, targeting and interdiction. Working closely with the military intelligence personnel and turning the information into actionable intelligence products, MP conduct PIO through integrated patrols, mounted/dismounted, and coordination with joint, interagency, and multinational assets. MP patrols greatly assist in confirming or denying the CCIR.

5.27 The following vignette describes how PIO greatly enhanced operations in Kosovo, eventually leading to the arrest of an identified criminal.

TF 504 MP established the Police Intelligence Collection and Analysis Council (PICAC) in support of Task Force Falcon 3B's peacekeeping operations in Multi-National Brigade (East), Kosovo. PICAC was a joint law enforcement forum with an exclusive membership of key leaders and decision makers that spanned across national and international law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies to include UNCIVPOL, UN Border Police and UN Security; TFF ACE Chief, Analyst, and Targeter; CID Commander and Investigators; and MP S3, S2, and the Joint Law Enforcement Intelligence and Operations Officers who came together weekly for a fusion and targeting forum. The PICAC was responsible for the detention of over a dozen "Wanted" felons to include subjects of war crimes. In fact, during one PICAC meeting, a CIVPOL investigator from the Kacanik Municipality mentioned a criminal's name in association with a known gang. The criminal had been convicted for attempted murder, had not served his term, and remained at large with no means to identify him. TFF ACE Chief immediately phoned his office to crosscheck the criminal's name in the ACE databases. TFF ACE was able to provide a picture of the criminal during that same forum, enabling UNCIVPOL to identify and arrest the man the next day.

LAW AND ORDER OPERATIONS (L&O)

5.28 MP performs a variety of functions in support of COIN.

- Conducting law enforcement patrols throughout the AO; maintaining/assisting in stability and security operations.
- The conduct of criminal investigations through coordination and synchronization of Criminal Investigation Division (CID) assets.
- MPs are the ideal force for conducting crowd and riot control operations, including the extraction of leaders. MPs control antagonistic masses engaged in rioting, looting, and demonstrating.
- MP are trained and equipped to assist in the training and mentoring of local, indigenous police forces.

INTERNMENT AND RESETTLEMENT OPERATIONS (I/R)

5.29 MP conducts I/R operations to maintain stability and security throughout the AO. Critical assets to the proper conduct and success of I/R operations in a COIN environment are:

- SJA representatives
- Civil Affairs
- Engineers
- Military Intelligence
- Medical/Dental
- LNO with ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross)
- Public Affairs

DETAINEE OPERATIONS

5.30 Because of their contact with the local populace in COIN, MPs must be aware of how they are perceived by the local culture. MPs must be trained to be cognizant of cultural differences that can have a negative impact on the PSYOP campaign. There also must be clear lines of authority and responsibility established for MPs who are guarding prisoners or detainees. Negative propaganda from mistreatment of prisoners or detainees can undermine US and HN credibility. See Appendix J, Detention Operations and Considerations.

USA CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION COMMAND (USACIDC)

5.31 The USACIDC investigates offenses committed against US forces or property, or those committed by military personnel or civilians serving with US forces or where there is a military interest. The USACIDC agents investigate violations of international agreements on land warfare. CIDC missions include:

- Investigating and deterring serious crimes.
- Conducting sensitive/serious investigations.
- Collecting, analyzing, processing, and disseminating criminal intelligence (CRIMINTEL).
- Conducting protective-service operations for designated personnel.

- Providing forensic-laboratory support.
- Maintaining Army criminal records.
- Enhancing the commander's crime-prevention and force-protection programs.
- Performing LOGSEC operations.

MILITARY WORKING DOGS (MWD)

5.32 The MWD is a largely untapped resource for use by commanders during COIN. The MWD is trained in many skills, which can make a difference between success or failure of many combat missions. The MWD can be trained for patrolling, building searching, scouting or explosive detection. All of these skills compliment the MP performing any of the five MP functions. The ability of the MWD to detect an ambush, and to find an explosive device planted by insurgents can be critical to the overall success of the mission. The use of MWD teams to increase MP combat potential and enhance MP response shortages is limited only by the lack of initiative, imagination, and training of units on how to employ MWDs. Some examples of employment techniques are:

- Perimeter patrolling
- MSR patrolling
- Security of designated personnel, units, or facilities
- Use during checkpoints/roadblocks
- EPW/Detainee/Insurgent control
- Area reconnaissance operations

Appendix J, Detention Operations and Considerations

Chapter 6: Special Considerations

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

General

6.1 Although many of the considerations applicable to COIN operations are also applicable to conventional operations, some require special emphasis. This is primarily because COIN operations take place often in closer proximity to civilians than is the case in conventional operations. This close proximity requires leaders to place greater emphasis on certain areas such as health considerations, movement security, and reactions to civil disturbances. This chapter addresses those considerations.

Section 1: Health Service Support (HSS) Considerations

6.2 During COIN operations, soldiers have a greater probability of close contact with the civilian population than during many conventional operations. For that reason, leaders and Soldiers must work with Army Medical Department (AMEDD) personnel and policies, “to conserve the fighting strength.” Disease and Non-Battle Injury (DNBI) historically cause the most casualties. Proper training, appropriate risk management, and the application and enforcement of effective Preventive Medicine (PM) measures can prevent many injuries and illnesses. Enforcement and application of Health and PM standards are a leader’s responsibility.

See Appendix H, Checklist for HSS and PM.

“It may seem a strange principle to enunciate as the very first requirement in a Hospital that it should do the sick no harm.”

Florence Nightingale
Notes on Hospitals, 1859

6.3 Operational Considerations.

- Appropriate and limited medical attention may be applied to indigenous populations at the discretion of the commander and proper military medical authority. This care may be appropriate where the level of local civilian medical care is limited or non-existent. Limited medical assistance may enhance the acceptance of multinational personnel within the local population. If possible, HN medical personnel should be included when treating indigenous people. This can enhance the stature of the HN government.
- Be aware of and sensitive to local culture, customs, and taboos relative to medical care and the interactions of multinational personnel with the local population. Be tactful and culturally appropriate when giving medical or humanitarian assistance.
- Care must be taken not to over extend, or take on a mission greater than policy or capability dictates. The medical care must not interfere with operations from a logistics or personnel standpoint, nor constitute or imply an overall policy, absent the proper approval from appropriate authority.
- Be prepared if so ordered, to train indigenous forces, in first aid or other health-PM subject areas. Coordination with higher PM or veterinary service personnel may be appropriate in the indigenous population area.
- All interactions between Soldiers and indigenous populations are opportunities to make positive impressions and have the potential to change attitudes for the better with the local population. Every effort should be made for Soldiers to be viewed as friends of the local population; indeed, this may pave the way for willing acceptance of multinational personnel and activities.
- Force protection and the timely collection of potential intelligence are always primary planning and implementation factors regardless of the mission—medical, or humanitarian. Force protection is always an imperative, and intelligence gathering throughout the AO is always a top priority.

Section II- Movement Security Operations

6.4 This section contains information on aspects of convoy operations. Convoys are planned and organized to control and protect vehicle movements. They are used for the tactical movement (personnel, supplies, and equipment) of combat forces and logistical units. Movements made during a counterinsurgency operation face a variety of potential threats ranging from local individuals, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), and armed insurgents. Leaders must continually assess the insurgents' TTPs and implement measures to counter those threats. Soldiers conducting security and movement security operations must remain vigilant at all times.

CONVOY OPERATIONS

6.5 Pre-Execution Checklist: Key to the success of convoy operations is ensuring all personnel and equipment is properly prepared for mission execution.

Convoy Planning Considerations:

- Enroute recovery.
- Ambulance/medical coverage. (Note: Most ambulances have radio communications, to include casualty evacuation procedures.)
- Disperse combat lifesavers throughout convoy.
- Designate responsibilities such as aid and litter teams.
- Rest plan for drivers.
- Window screens to deflect grenades.
- Security considerations to prevent pilferage from the convoy.
- Escorts -- MP, infantry, or other.
- Disperse key personnel throughout the convoy — cross load!
- Identify and verify convoy signals.
- Identify enroute reference points and available fire support.
- Air cover (rotary-wing security, close air support, mobile interdiction & radio Freqs and call signs).
- Air guard plan.
- Deception plan.
- Closure report at destination and upon return.
- Reconnaissance of the route if possible (air reconnaissance is the preferred method).
- Enemy threat capabilities and potential courses of action (to include a mine overlay from higher, regional or local headquarters, if available).
- Civilian considerations along the route.
- Establish phase lines/checkpoints along the route to monitor progress of the convoy.

Additional Considerations:

- What are the choke points along the route – bridges, open-air markets, over-and-under passes?
- Does vegetation grow next to and away from the road and thereby provide concealment?
- What are insurgent convoy attack patterns? Base this on S2 input and pattern analysis.
- How are supply convoy SP times varied so as to keep the insurgents off balance (NMT 1 hour sooner or later)?
- Describe and verify the vehicle abandonment plan – how long do we wait before stripping and leaving a disabled vehicle or trailer? Transfer-loading plan for the cargo?
- What are the condition criteria to abandon a vehicle? Destroy it, burn it, or just leave it?
- Are the seats arranged in the back of trucks to allow Soldiers riding to face out, or must they face-in?

6.6 Briefings two hours prior to start point (SP) include:

- Tactical brief - enemy/friendly situation update from S2.
- Convoy execution matrix (all drivers get strip maps).
- Safety brief - use risk management and risk reduction (mitigating measures).
- Battle drills may include:
 - React to civil disturbance (not blocking the route).
 - React to potential opposing force (blocking the route).
 - Air attack.
 - Artillery/indirect fire.
 - Sniper fire.
 - Ambush.
 - Mines, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices
 - Mechanical breakdowns.
 - Procedures for towing and being towed.
 - React to traffic jams – partially and fully-blocked roads.
 - React to debris on the road – garbage, dead animals, other objects/trash that can be used to conceal IEDs.
 - MEDEVAC procedures (see Appendix I, MEDEVAC Procedures).

6.7 Rehearsals include:

- Battle drills – Describe expectations for everyone. Describe who does what in each situation.
- Depict routes - Paint routes and terrain features on a large piece of canvas to allow drivers to “walk” the route prior to departure. Additionally, enables the “sand table” to be moved.
- CASEVAC - What happens to all casualties? Aid and litter teams designated? Do the teams know what to do? Security teams designated and assigned cardinal directions? Rehearsed?
- Communication - Includes audio, visual, and radio. What is the back-up plan if primary communication fails? Redundant means of communication are key.
- Primary and secondary frequencies? Call signs/frequencies for close air support/fire support?
- Security forces - Are roles and responsibilities understood and rehearsed?
- What and where is/are the Response/Reaction Force(s) if the convoy becomes engaged? Call signs and frequencies for the response force?

6.8 Convoy Organization. Leaders must know how to position vehicles within the elements. Regardless of size all columns, serials, and march units have four parts: scout, head, main body, and trail. Each of these parts has a specific function.

Note: all soldiers in the convoy must have a task and purpose, and know what to do on contact during the execution of convoy operations.

SCOUT

6.9 Two scout vehicles proceed 3-5 minutes in front of the main body. The scout’s task is to ascertain road conditions and identify obstacles that may pose a threat to the convoy. When scout vehicles are employed, leaders must have an effective contingency plan to react quickly to an attack on those vehicles. However, METT-TC conditions may not allow for the use of scout vehicles. If so, consider earlier convoys acting as scouts.

HEAD

6.10 The head is the first vehicle of each column, serial, and march unit. Each head vehicle should have its own pacesetter. The pacesetter rides in this vehicle and sets the pace needed to meet the scheduled itinerary along the route. The officer or NCO at the head ensures that the column follows the proper route. He may also be required to report arrival at certain checkpoints/phase lines along the route. The head vehicle also reconnoiters for possible IEDs. When passing bridges, gunners must observe the approach and then the opposite side of the bridge. With the head vehicle performing these duties, the convoy commander has the flexibility to travel the column to enforce march discipline when the convoy speed is low. Commanders and planners should consider using heavy, well-protected vehicles as the head vehicle if a minefield or IED is expected. By so doing, the head vehicle has a greater ability to sustain damage while protecting the crew and any passengers.

MAIN BODY

6.11 The main body follows immediately after the head vehicle and consists of the majority of vehicles moving as part of the convoy. This is the part of the convoy that may be subdivided into serials and march units for ease of control. Vehicles in the main body should be armed with crew-served weapons.

TRAIL

6.12 The trail is the last sector of each march column, serial, and march unit. The trail officer/NCO is responsible for recovery, maintenance, and medical support. The recovery vehicle, maintenance vehicles, and medical support vehicles/teams are located in the trail. The trail officer/NCO assists the convoy commander in maintaining march discipline. He may also be required to report clear time at checkpoints or phase lines along the route. In convoys consisting of multiple march units and serials, the convoy commander may direct minimum support in the trail of each serial or march unit and a larger trail party at the rear of the column.

6.13 The convoy commander should provide trail security and communications in case the trail party is left behind to conduct repairs or recovery. An additional technique is to establish a heavily-armed and fast security detachment trailing the convoy by NMT 5 minutes. This time interval enables the security detachment to react and maneuver to an insurgent's flank to counter-attack in the event the convoy is fixed or otherwise unable to do so. Increased convoy speeds such as 50 MPH limit movement up and down the convoy line. When the roads are only one or two lanes wide, civilian traffic will impede any adjacent movement.

Note: The convoy must maintain 360-degree security/visibility of the surrounding areas. Attacks may occur as convoys pass a given location. Therefore, gunners must ensure rear security is maintained.

CONSIDERATIONS

6.14 The enemy may place IEDs at intersections where vehicles tend to slow down and bunch up. Ensure proper spacing at all times between vehicles, especially at intersections and turns.

6.15 When making turns, move the vehicle as far away from the curb as possible due to most IEDs being located on the inside turn.

6.16 Soldiers must maintain 360-degree security at all times.

6.17 Leaders must adapt quickly to the insurgents changing TTPs to counter threats to US/multinational forces.

VEHICLE HARDENING PROCEDURES (PRIOR TO CONVOY MOVEMENT)

6.18 Adding sandbags, armor plating, ballistic glass, and other protective devices reduces the vulnerability of a hardened vehicle to the effects of explosives and small arms fire. The primary purpose of hardening is to protect the vehicle's occupants from injury although it may make certain vehicle components and cargo less vulnerable.

6.19 Consider the following factors in determining the method and extent of vehicle hardening when a threat to friendly forces exists within the area of operations:

FLEXIBILITY

6.20 Harden vehicles to provide the proper degree of protection required while maintaining maximum flexibility in its use. Harden the cargo beds of vehicles with sandbags to protect troops.

WEIGHT

6.21 All vehicle hardening adds weight to the vehicle. One consideration is to reduce proportionally the amount of cargo that can and should be carried. Another challenge is the added vehicle maintenance and equipment durability problems.

AVAILABILITY

6.22 Consider the availability of suitable materials and the time needed to complete the project.

TYPES OF ROADS

6.23 Roads traveled may determine the amount of hardening protection needed. For example, hardtop roads generally present fewer hazards from mines than dirt roads.

MAINTENANCE

6.24 Vehicle hardening normally increases the amount of vehicle maintenance needed. If an excessive amount of weight is added, it may impact on the vehicle's mobility and operational capabilities.

6.25 Kevlar blankets are effective and minimize extra weight. Unfortunately, the excess weight destroys the tires and the drive train quickly. Excess weight forces a focus on PMCS.

VEHICLE WEAPON IMPROVEMENTS

6.26 Strengthening the vehicle weapons platforms is an additional counter measure against insurgent attacks on convoys. When convoys come under attack the key to defeating and destroying the attackers is through well-aimed, overwhelming, accurate fire. By adding to an already existing weapons mix/platform for a particular vehicle, soldiers have the capacity to exponentially enhance their own force protection while destroying any threat that attempts to strike the convoy. The following pictures are examples used during OIF.



Figure 6.1 Vehicle Hardening (Notice Sandbags)



Figure 6.2 Vehicle Hardening and pedestal mount



Figure 6.3 Gunner shields to the rear and front



Figure 6.4 Armor plating surrounding the gun platform




Figure 6.5 Armor plating surrounding the gun platform (Also on bed of the truck)



Figure 6.6 Gunner's shield and camouflage for the bed of the truck. MODIFIED FROM CALL HANDBOOK, SOSO NO 3-20.

Section III - Civil-Disturbance Measures

6.27 Active patrolling and interaction with the local populace can alert US, HN, and multinational forces to the possibility of civil disturbances. Patrols can detect changes in daily patterns that may indicate the possibility of violence, observe new people who are not residents of the area, or receive information about upcoming disturbances from those whom they have befriended.

6.28 To combat civil disturbance(s) leaders apply the minimum force necessary to assist local or HN authorities restore law and order. Leaders and Soldiers must be aware civil disturbances will be covered often by the media. Even when not covered, these disturbances are opportunities for either positive or negative PSYOP toward the US and the HN forces and government. To combat these disturbances, military force must:

- Maintain the mechanics of essential distribution, transportation, and communications systems.
- Set up roadblocks.
- Cordon off areas.
- Make a show of force.
- Disperse or contain crowds.
- Release Riot Control Agents (RCAs) when approved.
- Serve as security forces or reserves.
- Initiate needed relief measures, such as distributing food or clothing and/or establishing emergency shelter.
- Employ Non-Lethal (NL) munitions and equipment.

6.29 Leaders must develop TTPs for the probability of encountering a civil disturbance during COIN operations. TTP must include not only how individual Soldiers and units will react, but also include the use of Tactical PSYOP Teams to combat and disperse those confronted. Leaders must coordinate with local civil police to establish lines of authority and responsibility when dealing with civilian disturbances. US military leaders must ensure operations involving US forces and HN police conform to US law and/or policy.

6.30 The emphasis should be on prevention rather than confrontation. Once a confrontation arises, military forces must deal with non-combatants that have internationally recognized rights. These rights must be respected while maintaining public order.

6.31 Military forces must display fair and impartial treatment and must adhere to the principle of minimum force.

- Civil police apprehend, process, and detain civil law violators.
- Military forces perform these functions only when necessity dictates and to the minimum extent required. Return these functions to civil authorities as soon as possible.

THREAT ANALYSIS

6.32 Proportional and appropriate responses to civil disturbances are based on an analysis of the threat the disturbance poses. Factors to be considered are:

- Crowd size - how many people are actually present? Of those, how many are combative (armed or unarmed), and what type people comprise the crowd (grown men, women, juveniles, children, a mix)?
- Motivator - is this an individual or the crowd as a whole?
- Driving Force - what is the reason for the gathering/riot?

- Emotions and Intentions - listen to what the crowd is saying. You may be able to de-escalate the situation (treat the crowd like an individual person, but remain observant for changes).
- Crowd Evaluation - will the size of the force affect the crowd?
- Movement or Motion - where is the crowd trying to go?
- Type of crowd clothing – Light or full due to heat, heavy coats -- this will affect the type of munitions used along with the aiming point.

Area and Environment of the Situation: This will determine or affect the different types of munitions used.

- Gravel or rocks- can be thrown at the control force.
- Escape routes for the crowd - there should be at least two avenues of escape toward to which the crowd can proceed.
- Avenues of withdrawal for the controlling force - there must also be at least two avenues of withdrawal for the formation.

TYPES OF CROWDS

6.33 There are four basic types of crowds:

- Casual crowd - required elements of the casual crowd are space and people.
- Sighting Crowd - includes the above two elements and an event. The event provides the group's common bond.
- Agitated Crowd - has the three elements of the Sighting Crowd; plus, the element of emotion.
- Mob - characterized by hostility and aggression. It has the elements of space, people, event, emotions and physical activity.
 - To control the mob requires simultaneous actions.
 - The primary goal is to reduce the emotional levels of the individuals within the mob.
 - This action will de-escalate the aggressiveness and potential violence of the crowd.
 - Physical force of some type may be necessary to quell the disturbance.

“The worst cowards,
banded together, have
their power.”

Homer, *The Iliad*
c. 800 BC

CROWD LEADERSHIP

6.34 Leadership affects greatly the intensity and direction of crowd behavior. A skillful agitator can convert a group of resentful people into a angry mob and direct their aggression and anger toward the control group. The first person to start giving clear orders authoritatively is likely to be followed. Radical leaders can easily take charge, exploit the crowd's mood, and direct it toward a convenient target.

6.35 It is important to note the leader of the crowd or group does not necessarily fit into one category. The leader may be combative, vocal or seemingly low-key and may change roles as needed. Properly identifying the leader of an angry or potentially violent group, and skillfully removing the leader without causing additional violence, is key to defusing a potentially dangerous situation.

CROWD TACTICS

6.36 Crowd tactics can be unplanned or planned, violent or not. The more organized and purposeful a crowd becomes, the more likely the tactics used will have been planned. Organized

mobs will try to defeat the control force by employing several different types of tactics. These tactics include:

- Constructing barricades.
- Using Molotov cocktails, rocks, slingshots and smoke grenades.
- Feinting and flanking actions.

6.37 Crowd behavior during a civil disturbance is essentially emotional and without reason. The feelings and the momentum generated have a tendency to cause the whole group to follow the example displayed by its' worst members. Skillful agitators or subversive elements exploit these psychological factors during disorders. Regardless of the reason for violence, the results may consist of indiscriminate burning and looting or open and violent attacks on officials, buildings, and innocent passersby. Rioters may set fire to buildings and vehicles to:

- Block the advance of troops.
- Create confusion and diversion.
- Achieve goals of property destruction, looting, and sniping.

6.38 Mobs will often use various types of weapons against authorities. These include but are not limited to:

- Verbal Abuse.
- Use of perceived innocents or weak persons (using "human shields" such as the elderly, women and/or children).
- Thrown and/or blunt impact objects (rocks/bricks/clubs).
- Vehicles and other large movable objects.
- Use of firearms, explosives, and other pyrotechnic devices.

6.39 Types of resisters - individuals can be categorized according to what level of force or what threat they can present.

- Complacent resisters will be nonverbal and look at you when you are talking to them, but not reply in any way. They become limp when touched or forced to move their body. They can very quickly become violent and physically combative. Don't underestimate them.
- Vocal resisters will offer you a verbal reply and when touched, will highlight themselves in an effort to gain the attention of the media.
- Combative resisters pose the greatest danger to the control force and will not be passive once they are touched. Place the individual in a prone position, flexi-cuff and remove them from the area. See Appendix J, Detention Operations and Considerations.

TACTICAL PSYOP TEAMS (TPT)

6.40 TPT [using loudspeakers]) will often assist in the control of crowds and defusing a potentially hostile situation. TPT members may be assigned as members of a planned quick reaction force (QRF) or take part on the spur of the moment. In any case, proper planning, situational awareness and understanding are key tasks.

6.41 The TPT leader should attempt to gather as much information about the situation as quickly as possible. The clearer the leader's situational understanding is, the more effectively the plan can be conceptually developed and executed. Use the supported unit and intelligence assets to find out what friendly units are in the area and use them to gather specific information. These assets may be ODAs, CATAs, or MPs. The following are examples of the type of information that should be gathered during planning.

- Location of the crowd
- Size of crowd
- Known potential key communicators
- Agitators
- Are weapons present? If so, what types?
- Apparent grievance
- Stated goals of the crowd

6.42 During the initial stages of the disturbance the team monitors and attempts to identify facts and validate assumptions about the TA (crowd). The TPT uses the following questions as a guide to gain as complete a picture as possible of the disturbance:

- Identify the key communicator(s) or lead agitator. What is his message?
- What is the general attitude or behavior of the group?
- How many people are present in the group?
- What are the demographics (age and gender)?
- What is the cultural composition of the group?
- What language are they speaking?
- How are they moving (mounted or dismounted)?
- Are signs or banners present and, if so, what is the message?
- Is there any media on site? If so, identify whom they represent.
- Are there any weapons present among the demonstrators?
- Who else is present at the location (police, elected public officials, NGOs, CA, other organizations)? Do you have the officials' cell phone numbers?
- Is the crowd from that location or have they come from another locale? If from another locale, where, why and how?
- How did the people know or hear about the gathering, rally, or demonstration?
- What are their stated objectives or underlying grievances for the event?

6.43 Once these questions are answered, the team will have a well established situational understanding.

6.44 When the commander directs the TPT to broadcast in this environment, the team should adhere to the following guidelines:

- Give simple directions that are clear and concise.
- Always maintain composure.
- When constructing messages, avoid using the word "please" so the team does not display a passive appearance.
- Do not issue ultimatums that are not approved by the commander.
- If the commander does approve an ultimatum, ensure that the crowd has time to conform to its conditions.
- Ensure the supported commander is prepared to act upon his ultimatum should the crowd fail to respond favorably.
- Use approved lines of persuasion when possible and conduct impromptu broadcasting only as a last resort.
- Always rehearse with the translator prior to going "live" unless the situation makes this absolutely impossible.
- Ensure the gender and other social aspects of the translator are credible in the eyes of the TA.
- Always attempt to pick a broadcast position that communicates effectively with the crowd and does not compromise the security of the team.
- Direct the broadcast toward the primary agitators.

- Limit the volume of the broadcast so as not to be overbearing, and do not harass the crowd as this may only exacerbate the situation.

6.45 The team must maintain communication with the supported commander or his representative on the ground throughout the situation. The team leader also ensures PSYOP-relevant information, HUMINT, and PIR are forwarded through appropriate channels.

ELEMENTS OF A CONTROL FORCE FORMATION

6.46 Four elements make up the basic crowd control formation. They are:

- **Base Element:** This is the front line of the formation. This element is made up of two ranks. The first rank is shield holders while the second rank contains the NLW.
- **Support Element:** The support element forms up in a column formation behind the base element. They may be used to replace the base element members as needed or provide lateral or direct support. Can perform extraction team operations.
- **Command Element:** A general configuration for the command element is the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, radio operator, and when required, the interpreter, riot control agent dispenser operator, and video recorder operator.
- **Lethal Overwatch Element:** The lethal overwatch element is a team task formed from reserve security forces.


COMMANDS FOR	COMMAND	GIVEN BY
Formations	Platoon on Line	Platoon leader and or leader (PL/CDR) to form a line formation.
	Platoon Wedge	PL/CDR to form a wedge formation.
	Platoon Echelon	PL/CDR to form an echelon formation.
	Platoon Diamond	PL/CDR to form a diamond formation.
	Platoon Circle	PL/CDR to form a circle formation.
	Move	PL/CDR as a command of execution. Note: The PL/CDR identifies the proposed location for the formation by pointing his arm toward the next desired location for the formation.
Support	General Support	PL/CDR to place specified unit in rear of base element.
	Lateral Support	PL/CDR to place support elements on left or right flank of base element.
	Direct Support	PL/CDR moves support elements forward to strengthen the base element.
	Open	Extraction team leader or squad/team leader opens a space in the formation.
	Up	Extraction team leader informs the extraction team to start moving back to the main formation.
Fire	Weapon System Gunners, Number of Rounds, Type of Round, Prepare to Fire	PL/CDR readies NLW gunners to fire weapons “203 gunners, 3 rounds, area target, prepare to fire.”
	Fire	PL/CDR directs NLW gunners to fire weapons.
	Shield Down	NLW gunners tell shield holders to take a knee and lower the shield to the ground.
	Shield Up	NLW gunners tell shield holders to stand and raise the shield.

Weapon	Port Arms	PL/CDR used in formation when not in contact with crowd.
	High Port	PL/CDR used by NLW gunners while the formation is in physical contact with the crowd, rapid targeting and firing of NLW munitions.




Figure 6-7 Common Formations and Commands Used by the Control Force.

6.47 CONTROL FORCE FORMATIONS



The most frequently used control force formations are the line, echelon, and wedge. Two formations used infrequently are the diamond and circle.




The echelon is an offensive formation used to turn or divert groups in either open or built-up areas and to move crowds away from buildings, fences, and walls. The diagrams depict a platoon echelon left and a platoon echelon left with 1 squad in reserve.




The wedge is an offensive formation that is used to penetrate and split crowds into smaller groups.



A diamond formation is used to enter a crowd and is the formation of choice for extraction teams. As a defensive formation, the diamond is used when all-around security is required such as in open areas.



The circular formation is used for the same purposes as the diamond formation. The decision to use either the diamond or circle formation is based on the conformation of the crowd.



VEHICLES AND FORMATIONS

6.48 Vehicles may be employed with troops in control force formation especially when a large rioting crowd is on hand.

- When using vehicles, cover the windshield with sturdy, close mesh fencing and the standard safety glass. Create a buffer space between the two surfaces.
- Shields and or mobile barriers may be built by mounting a wooden or metal frame strung with barbed wire across the front of a vehicle.
- Members of the formation should walk as near to the front corners of each vehicle as possible to keep rioters from attacking the sides and rear of the vehicles.
- When up-armored HMMWVs or other armored vehicles are used in crowd control formations, the leader must ensure that he is still able to see and control the formation.

CROWD CONTROL OPTIONS

6.49 Leaders choose their options based on an evaluation of the particular crowd. Leaders select any combination of control techniques and force options they assess will influence the particular situation most effectively (based on METT-TC). Leaders must try to always choose the response that is expected to reduce the intensity of the situation. Options to consider for crowd control are:

- Monitor the crowd to gather necessary intelligence, and observe to determine whether leaders have emerged, volatility has increased and movement.

- Block the crowd's advance upon a facility or area.
- Disperse the crowd in order to prevent injury or prevent the destruction of property.
- Contain the crowd to limit it to the area it is occupying. This prevents it from spreading to surrounding areas and communities.

CONTAINMENT VS. DISPERSAL

6.50 Dispersal may result in a crowd breaking into multiple groups causing greater problems and continued threat to the control forces. A contained crowd has a limited duration; their numbers are likely to diminish as individual needs take precedence over those of the crowd.

6.51 Issue a proclamation to assist with dispersing a crowd. A proclamation officially establishes the illegal nature of a crowd's actions, and it puts the populace on official notice regarding the status of their actions. Ensure if a proclamation is issued, action is taken. Non-action will be seen as a sign of weakness to be exploited immediately or soon thereafter. See Figure 6.8 for a sample dispersion matrix.

- Intent cannot exceed response capability.
- Do not disclose the type of force / munitions to be used.

TECHNIQUES FOR CROWD CONTROL

6.52 Ensure that ROE, levels of force and uses, and the commander's intent (to include non lethal weapon (NLW) and lethal options if necessary) are clearly understood by all.

- Determine in advance the recent psychological characteristics of demonstrations and mobs.
- Identify local HN, community and tribal officials in advance – know their office and cell phone numbers.
- Application of ROE.
 - The force applied will continually change dependent on the threat levels and ROE.
 - As the threat increases or decreases, the level of force increases or decreases based on ROE.
- Establish command relationships and the authority to fire NLW munitions.
- Leaders must have an extraction plan and have flexible withdrawal drills.
- Always maintain a lethal overwatch of a control force. When marksmen are deployed, keep them covered and out-of-sight. Designated marksman teams build confidence in the members of the control force.
- Always maintain a reserve force to reinforce the control force. Hold reserves out-of-sight.
- Know who the media reps are and where they are located. Ask them in advance what the theme of any story and information is they are developing.
- Be reasonable and balanced. However, a mob's perceived lack of risk encourages rioters.
- Move the crowd, but don't smash them – they will fight if smashed.
- Individual weapons.
 - The M9 pistol is the weapon of choice for extraction / apprehension teams.
 - Use of the M203 Grenade Launcher and 12-gauge shotgun are recommended with NLW munitions capability especially for overwatch of front line personnel.
 - Add non-standard weapons such as shotguns for a greater NLW capability. Example: the shot gunner is used to protect the M203 gunner as he reloads.
- Balance weapons mix and munitions according to METT-TC.
- Soldiers in the front line of the formation should be armed with their standard weapon carried across the back, butt up and muzzle down. The weapon is cleared and the magazine is in the appropriate ammo pouch.

- Maximize distance and barriers between crowd and control formations. Use NLW munitions to create a standoff distance.
- If the use of force level escalates to a deadly force, adjusted aim points (head shots) with NLW munitions can produce lethal effects.
- Create NLW range cards for static positions.
- Consider environmental conditions and their effect on the performance of Less Than Lethal munitions.
- Keep in mind the potential for a lethal outcome is possible in all types of missions.

<p>UNLAWFUL GATHERING</p> <p>“Attention! Attention! This area must be cleared at once! Further unlawful behavior will not be tolerated. Clear this area at once or the necessary force to do so will be used.” *</p> <p>DEMONSTRATION</p> <p>“Disperse and retire peaceably! Disperse and retire peaceably! Attention all demonstrators!</p> <p>“The demonstration in which you are participating ends at _____. The permit that was agreed to by the leaders of the demonstration expires at that time. All demonstrators must depart from the _____ NLT _____. All persons who which to leave voluntarily may board the buses. These buses will go to the _____. Those who wish to take buses should move to _____. Those demonstrators who do not leave voluntarily NLT _____ will be arrested and taken to a detention center. All demonstrators are urged to abide by the permit.” *</p> <p>WARNING OF LOOTING</p> <p>“Return to your homes! Someone may be looting them at this moment! During a disturbance, criminal activity is at its peak. Your family and/or your property may be in danger.” *</p>	<p>EMPLOYMENT</p> <p>“Attention! Attention! Soldiers are present in this area. They are preparing to advance. Order must and will be maintained. Disperse peaceably and leave this area. To avoid possible injury, leave at once.</p> <p>Disperse now and avoid possible injury! Disperse now and avoid possible injury!” * (Repeat until Soldiers are committed.)</p> <p>WHEN SOLDIERS ARE COMMITTED</p> <p>“Soldiers are advancing now. They will not stop until this crowd is dispersed and order is restored. To avoid injuries, leave the area at once. Return to your homes as peaceful citizens. Soldiers have their orders, and they will not stop until the crowd is dispersed. Avoid injury. Leave this area.” *</p> <p>PRESENCE OF CHILDREN</p> <p>(Used in conjunction with other announcements.)</p> <p>“Attention! Attention! Do not attempt to cause further disorder. Disperse now in an orderly manner and avoid possible injury to children. Return at once to your homes.” *</p>
<p>* Indicates the method, the streets, and direction that the crowd should use when dispersing.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">Figure 6.8 Example of a Dispersion Matrix</p>	

Section IV – Non-Lethal Equipment and Weapons

6.53 There are many advantages and disadvantages in using NLW should any such weapon be procured for use. However, in the absence of any practical experience on which to base clear and firm principles, the following guidelines are appropriate when considering NLW use:

- NLW can be used alone, used when they are backed up with the ability to use lethal force or used in conjunction with lethal force. Leaders must apply ROE to determine when and where NLW may be used and should not jeopardize the right of Soldiers to protect life where necessary with lethal force.
- The employment of NLW should be consistent with extant treaties, conventions, international and national laws. Their use should be morally and ethically justifiable.
- NLW should be used proportionately (the least destructive way to defeat insurgents) and discriminately (protect non-combatants from direct intentional attack).
- In planning the employment of NLW, fully rehearse the operational response to all possible reactions.
- Anticipate, coordinate, and prepare for responses from the civil, public affairs, medical, and legal authorities as a consequence of unintended results and side effects caused by the use of NLW.
- NLW should be fully integrated with lethal weapons in order to provide a graduated response to a situation based upon the perception of the threat and use of minimum force.
- NLW should not be deployed without countermeasures consideration.
- NLW should not be deployed without political-military consideration for instructions that may be given.
- NLW should be employed in such a manner as to minimize casualties to one's own troops.

6.54 Any use of NLW would require formal approval from the MOD and agreement addressing any specific change(s) to current ROE or the agreement and issuance of new ROE with follow-on training.

Appendices:

H – Checklist for HSS and Preventive Medicine

I – Medical Evacuation

J – Detention Operations and Considerations

APPENDIX A

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

CIVIL AFFAIRS ASSESSMENT CHECKLIST

1. Community Map.
 - a. Obtain a map of the area or the community. If no map is available, draw one to scale.
 - b. Indicate road networks (include main and secondary roads).
 - c. Show location of religious institutions, schools, community hall, marketplace, etc.
 - d. Indicate distances to adjacent communities.
 - e. Describe what determines the center of the community and what factors are most important in giving the community its identification.
 - f. Describe the relation of the community as to the political, trade, school, and religious areas with that of the adjoining communities.
 - g. Describe the weather and terrain features directly affecting the location or life of the community.

2. History (As It Affects the Present Situation)
 - a. Natural crises in the history of the community.
 - b. First settlement.
 - c. Incidents giving rise to conflicts or cooperation in the community.
 - d. Immigration and emigration.
 - e. Outstanding leaders and famous citizens in the community.

3. Population
 - a. Census.
 - b. Occupations.
 - c. Ethnic groups, if applicable.

4. Communication
 - a. Transportation (roads, water, rail, air).
 - b. Electronic (telephones, television, radio, internet, telegraph).
 - c. Printed material (newspaper, posters, magazines).
 - d. Mail facilities.
 - e. Connections with other communities.
 - f. Degree of self-sufficiency or isolation.

5. Community Integration – What groups or individuals are independent of the local government; e.g., groups or individuals directly responsible to an outside or higher government? What effects do these have on the community; what is the attitude of the local citizens toward these individuals?

6. Economic Situation
 - a. Natural resources.

- b. Industries.
 - c. Agriculture (crops and products, markets, ownership, and Tenancy). Who are the landlords? Are they in the community or absentees?
 - d. Are there any local merchants? What is their influence on the community?
 - e. Professional (teachers, doctors, ministers).
 - f. Credit associations and their relations to the community.
 - g. Relative economic status of the people (debt, savings, taxes).
7. Religious Situation
- a. Number, make-up, attitude, and membership of each religion and/or sect.
 - b. Buildings and equipment.
 - c. Church schools.
 - d. Clash or cooperation with other groups.
8. Educational Organizations
- a. Schools (number, size, territory served, buildings, equipment, libraries).
 - b. History (how and by whom were the schools constructed?)
 - c. School activities and relation to the community.
9. Voluntary Organizations
- a. Number, types, composition of membership, equipment, activities, and their relation to other phases of community life.
 - b. Farmers' co-ops (4-H-type organizations, home economic organizations).
 - c. Other occupational groups.
10. Recreational Facilities
- a. Organizations for recreation (community buildings, athletic clubs, soccer teams, ball fields and courts).
 - b. Traditional forms of and local attitudes toward recreation needs.
11. Health
- a. Physicians, health workers, nurses.
 - b. Public and private health organizations, national and international (hospitals, dispensaries, clinics, school health program).
 - c. Health status of the people.
 - d. Prevalence, incidence, and types of diseases.
12. Political Situation
- a. Political structure and government (solidarity or strife and causes).
 - b. Dominant personalities.
13. Community Activities, Customs, and Ideals
- a. Community events other than religious observances.

- b. What are the community customs or traditions (taboos or social disapprovals)?
- c. Activity characteristics and pastimes.
- d. Ideals. What are the community's attitudes on all types of progress?

14. Leadership

- a. Dominant leaders. Family control.
- b. Is leadership representative, democratic or autocratic?
- c. What is being done to develop new leaders?
- d. Attitude of people toward new and old leaders.

15. Community Organization

- a. What is being done to integrate the community?
- b. What are the needs for community organizations?

16. Status of Law and Order

- a. Organization and capabilities of law enforcement agencies.
- b. Police techniques.
- c. Crime rate and trends.

APPENDIX B

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

USE OF INTERPRETERS

INTERPRETER SELECTION

1. Whenever possible, the interpreters used should be U.S. military personnel or at least U.S. citizens. In some operational or training settings abroad, the Soldiers will not be faced with the problem of selecting an interpreter—they will simply be assigned one by the chain of command or host government. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the host government. Finally, in many operational situations, interpreters will be hired from the general HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines will be critical to the success of mission accomplishment. The Soldier can use this opportunity to truly influence the outcome of the mission. Interpreters should be selected based on the following criteria:

- Native speaker. The interpreters should be native speakers of the socially or geographically determined dialect. Their speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience (TA) so that no attention is given to the way they talk, only to what they say.
- Social status. In some situations and cultures, interpreters may be limited in their effectiveness with a TA if their social standing is considerably lower than that of the audience. Examples include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the Soldier's personal feelings on social status, he should remember the job is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. The Soldier must accept local prejudices as a fact of life.
- *English fluency.* An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the Soldier and the Soldier understands the interpreter, then the interpreter's command of English should be satisfactory. The Soldier can check that "understanding" by asking the interpreter to paraphrase, in English, something the Soldier said; the Soldier then restates the interpreter's comments to ensure that both persons are in sync. In addition, interpreting goes both ways. The interpreter must be able to convey the information expressed by the interviewee or TA.
- Intellectual intelligence. The interpreter should be quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. He must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, generally speaking, the better educated the interpreter, the better he will perform due to increased exposure to diverse concepts.
- Technical ability. In certain situations, the Soldier may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. This type of interpreter will be able to translate the "meaning" as well as the "words." For instance, if the subject is very technical or specialized, such as nuclear physics, background knowledge will be useful.
- Reliability. The Soldier should beware of the potential interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less-developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. The Soldier should make sure that the interpreter understands the military's preoccupation with punctuality.
- Loyalty. If the interpreter used is a local national, it is safe to assume that his first loyalty is to the HN or subgroup, not to the U.S. military. The security implications are clear. The Soldier must be very cautious in how he explains concepts to give interpreters a greater depth of understanding. Additionally, some interpreters, for political or

personal reasons, may have ulterior motives or a hidden agenda when they apply for the interpreting job. If the Soldier detects or suspects such motives, he should tell his commander or security manager.

- Gender, age, and race. Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may render a female interpreter ineffective in certain circumstances. Another example would be the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the TA's group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.
- Compatibility. The Soldier and the interpreter will work as a team. For the interpreter to be most effective, he should become a psychic extension of the Soldier. The TA will be quick to recognize personality conflicts between the Soldier and the interpreter, which can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the Soldier should look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

2. If several qualified interpreters are available, the Soldier should select at least two. This practice is of particular importance if the interpreter will be used during long conferences or courses of instruction. When two interpreters are available, each interpreter ought to work for one-half hour periods. Due to the mental strain associated with this type job, four hours of active interpreting is usually the approximate maximum for peak effectiveness. In the case of short duration meetings and conversations when two or more interpreters are available one can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique is useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings, as one interpreter is used in an active role and the other pays attention to the body language and side conversations of the others present. Many times, the Soldier will gain important auxiliary information that assists in negotiations from listening to what others are saying among themselves outside of the main discussion.

TARGET ANALYSIS

3. Implied throughout the preceding points is the need for a careful analysis of the target population. This type of analysis goes beyond the scope of this appendix. Mature judgment, thoughtful consideration of the audience as individual human beings, and a genuine concern for their receiving accurate information will go a long way toward accomplishing the mission. The Soldier must remember that the individual from a farm or small village is going to have markedly different expectations than the jet-setting polo player.

EVALUATION CRITERIA

4. As mentioned, it is safe to assume that if the interpreter is not U.S. military or at least a U.S. citizen, his first loyalty will be to his country or subgroup and not to the United States.

5. The security implications of using local nationals are clear. The Soldier must be cautious about what information he gives his interpreter. The Soldier must always keep possible security issues in mind.

6. Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel as "field expedient" interpreters. Commanders should be aware of the increased security risk involved in

using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. If uncleared interpreters are used, any sensitive information should be kept to a minimum.

7. The interpreters must be honest and free from unfavorable notoriety among the local inhabitants. Their reputation or standing in the community should be such that persons of higher rank and standing will not intimidate them.

ESTABLISHING A RAPPORT

8. The interpreter is a vital link to the TA. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, the mission could be in serious jeopardy. Mutual respect and understanding is essential to effective teamwork. The Soldier must establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain rapport throughout the joint effort. The difficulty of establishing rapport stems most of the time from the lack of personal contact.

9. The Soldier begins the process of establishing rapport before he meets the interpreter for the first time by doing his homework in advance on the people, nations and areas to be discussed. Most foreigners are reasonably knowledgeable about the United States. The Soldier should obtain some basic facts about the HN. Useful information may include population, geography, ethnic groups, political system, prominent political figures, monetary system, business, agriculture, and exports. A good general outline can be obtained from a recent almanac or encyclopedia. More detailed information is available in the area handbook for the country, from the world-wide web (internet) and current newspapers and magazines, such as *The Washington Post*, *The Wall Street Journal* and *U.S. News and World Report*.

10. The Soldier should find out about the interpreter's background. The Soldier should show a genuine concern for the interpreter's family, aspirations, career, education, and so on. Many cultures place a greater emphasis on family over career than the United States, so the Soldier should start with understanding the interpreter's home life. The Soldier should also research cultural traditions to find out more about the interpreter and the nation in which the Soldier will be working. Though the Soldier should gain as much information on culture as possible before entering an HN, his interpreter can be a valuable source to fill gaps. Showing interest is also a good way to build rapport.

11. The Soldier should gain the interpreter's trust and confidence before embarking on sensitive issues, such as religion, likes, dislikes, and prejudices. The Soldier should approach these areas carefully and tactfully. Although deeply personal beliefs may be very revealing and useful in the professional relationship, the Soldier must gently and tactfully draw these out of his interpreter.

ORIENTATION

12. Early in the relationship with interpreters, the Soldiers should ensure that interpreters are briefed on their duties and responsibilities. The Soldiers should orient the interpreters as to the nature of their duties, standards of conduct expected, interview techniques to be used, and any other requirements necessary. The orientation may include the following:

- Current tactical situation.
- Background information obtained on the source, interviewee, or TA.
- Specific objectives for the interview, meeting, or interrogation.
- Method of interpretation to be used—simultaneous or consecutive:
 - Simultaneous—when the interpreter listens and translates at the same time.

- Consecutive—when the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph, then translates during natural pauses.
- Conduct of the interview, lesson, or interrogation.
- Need for interpreters to avoid injecting their own personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.
- Need for interpreter to inform interviewer (Soldier) of inconsistencies in language used by interviewee. An example would be someone who claims to be a college professor, yet speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews, this information will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.
- Physical arrangements of site, if applicable.
- Possible need for interpreter to assist in after action reviews or assessments.

INTERPRETER TRAINING

13. As part of the initial training with the interpreter, the Soldier should tactfully convey that the instructor, interviewer, or interrogator (Soldier) must always direct the interview or lesson. The Soldier should put the interpreter's role in proper perspective and stress the interpreter's importance as a vital communication link between the Soldier and the TA. The Soldier should appeal to the interpreter's professional pride by clearly describing how the quality and quantity of the information sent and received is directly dependent upon the interpreter's skills. Also, the Soldier should mention how the interpreter functions solely as a conduit between the Soldier and the subject.

14. The Soldier should be aware some interpreters, because of cultural differences, may attempt to "save face" by purposely concealing their lack of understanding. They may attempt to translate what they think the Soldier said or meant without asking for a clarification or vice versa. Because this situation can result in misinformation and confusion, and impact on credibility, the Soldier should let the interpreter know that when in doubt he should always ask for clarification. The Soldier should create a safe environment for this situation as early in the relationship as possible.

15. The Soldier should cover these points while orienting and training the interpreter —
- Importance of the training, interview, or interrogation.
 - Specific objectives of the training, interview, or interrogation, if any.
 - Outline of lesson or interview questions, if applicable.
 - Background information on the interviewee or TA.
 - Briefing, training, or interview schedules. The interviewer must remember that conducting an interview through an interpreter may take double or triple the amount of time needed under normal circumstances, i.e, when the interviewer is directly questioning the interviewee. For that reason, the interpreter may be helpful in scheduling enough time.
 - Copy of the briefing, questions, or lesson plan, if applicable. Special attention should be given to develop language proficiency in the technical fields in which the interpreters are expected to be employed. In general, a copy of the material will give the interpreter time to look up unfamiliar words or ask questions to clarify anything confusing.
 - Copies of handout material, if applicable.
 - General background information on subject.
 - Glossary of terms, if applicable.

INTERVIEW PREPARATION

16. The Soldier selects an appropriate site for the interview. He positions and arranges the physical setup of the area. When conducting interviews with VIPs or individuals from different cultures, this arrangement can be significant.

17. The Soldier instructs the interpreters to mirror the Soldier's tone and personality of speech. The Soldier instructs the interpreters not to interject their own questions or personality. He also instructs the interpreters to inform him if they notice any inconsistencies or peculiarities from sources.

INTERVIEW CONDUCT

17. Whether conducting an interview or presenting a lesson, the Soldier should avoid simultaneous translations, that is, both the Soldier and the interpreter talking at the same time. The Soldier should speak for a minute or less in a neutral, relaxed manner, directly to the individual or audience. The interpreter should watch the Soldier carefully and, during the translation, mimic the Soldier's body language as well as interpret his verbal meaning. The Soldier should observe the interpreter closely to detect any inconsistencies between the interpreter's and Soldier's manners. The Soldier must be aware not to force the interpreter into literal translation by being too brief. The Soldier should present one major thought in its entirety and allow the interpreter to reconstruct it in his language and culture.

18. Although the interpreter will be doing some editing as a function of the interpreting process, it is imperative that he transmit the exact meaning without additions or deletions. As previously mentioned, the Soldier should insist that the interpreter always ask for clarification, prior to interpreting, whenever not absolutely certain of the Soldier's meaning. However, the Soldier should be aware that a good interpreter, especially if he is local, can be invaluable in translating subtleties and hidden meanings.

19. During an interview or lesson, if questions are asked, the interpreter should immediately relay them to the Soldier for an answer. The interpreter should never attempt to answer a question, even though he may know the correct answer. Additionally, neither the Soldier nor interpreter should correct the other in front of an interviewee or class; all differences should be settled away from the subject or audience.

20. Just as establishing rapport with the interpreter is vitally important, establishing rapport with interview subjects or the TA is equally important. The Soldier and the interpreter should concentrate on rapport. To establish critical rapport, the subjects or audiences should be treated as mature, important human beings who are capable and worthy.

COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUES

21. An important first step for the Soldier in communicating in a foreign language is to polish his English language skills. These skills are important even if no attempt is made to learn the indigenous language. The clearer the Soldier speaks in English, including diction, the easier it is for the interpreter to translate. Other factors to consider include use of profanity, slang, and colloquialisms. In many cases, such expressions cannot be translated. Even those that can be translated do not always retain the desired meaning. Military jargon and terms such as "gee whiz" or "golly" are hard to translate. The Soldier should avoid using acronyms. While these

have become part of everyday military language, in most cases the interpreter and TA will not be familiar with them, and it will be necessary for the interpreter to interrupt the interview in order to get clarification regarding the expanded form. This can disrupt the rhythm of the interview or lesson. Moreover, if the interpreter must constantly interrupt the interviewer for clarification, he could lose credibility in the eyes of the TA, which could jeopardize the goals of the interview or lesson. In addition, if a technical term or expression must be used, the Soldier must be sure the interpreter conveys the proper meaning in the target language. The Soldier should speak in simple sentences. For instance, he may want to add words usually left off, such as “air” plane, to ensure that the meaning is obvious and that he is not misinterpreted as if talking about the Great Plains or a wood plane.

22. When the Soldier is speaking extemporaneously, he must think about what he wants to say. He should break his thoughts down into logical bits, and say them a piece at a time, using short, simple words and sentences, which can be translated quickly and easily. As a rule of thumb, the Soldier should never say more in one sentence than he can easily repeat word for word immediately after saying it. Each sentence should contain a complete thought without verbiage.

TRANSITIONAL PHRASES AND QUALIFIERS

23. These tend to confuse and waste valuable time. Examples are “for example,” “in most cases,” “maybe,” and “perhaps.” The Soldier should be cautious of using American humor, since humor does not translate well between cultures. Cultural and language differences can lead to misinterpretations by foreigners. The Soldier should determine early on what the interpreter finds easiest to understand and translate meaningfully. In summary, the Soldier should —

- Keep the entire presentation as simple as possible.
- Use short sentences and simple words (low context).
- Avoid idiomatic English.
- Avoid tendency toward flowery language.
- Avoid slang and colloquial expressions.
- Avoid “folk” and culture-specific references: if the interviewer mentions Paul Bunyan or the Simpsons, for example, the interpreter and/or TA may have no idea what he is talking about. Even if the interpreter understands the reference, he may find it extremely difficult to instantaneously find an appropriate equivalent in the TA’s cultural frame of reference to substitute for the original.

24. Whenever possible, the Soldier should identify any cultural restrictions before interviewing, instructing, or conferring with particular foreign nationals. For instance, when is it proper to stand, sit, or cross one’s legs? Gestures, being learned behavior, vary from culture to culture. The interpreter should be able to relate a number of these cultural restrictions, which, whenever possible, should be observed in working with the particular group or individual.

DO’S AND DON’T’S

25. The following are somedo’s and don’ts for the Soldier to consider while working with an interpreter. The Soldier should—

- Position the interpreter by his side (or even a step back). This method will keep the subject or audience from shifting their attention or fixating on the interpreter and not on the Soldier.
- Always look at and talk directly to the subject or audience. Guard against the tendency to talk to the interpreter.

- Speak slowly and clearly. Repeat as often as necessary.
 - Speak to the individual or group as if they understand English. Be enthusiastic and employ the gestures, movements, voice intonations, and inflections that would normally be used before an English-speaking group. Considerable nonverbal meaning can be conveyed through voice and body movements. Encourage the interpreter to mimic the same delivery.
 - Periodically check the interpreter's accuracy, consistency, and clarity. Have another American fluent enough in the language sit in on a lesson or interview to ensure that the translation is not distorted, intentionally or unintentionally. Another way to be sure is to learn the target language so that the interpreter's loyalty and honesty can be personally checked.
 - Check with the audience whenever misunderstandings are suspected and clarify immediately. Using the interpreter, ask questions to elicit answers that will tell whether the point is clear. If not clear, rephrase the instruction differently and illustrate the point again. Use repetition and examples whenever necessary to facilitate learning. If the audience asks few questions, it may mean the instruction is "not understood," or the message is not clear to them.
 - Make the interpreter feel like a valuable member of the team. Give the interpreter recognition commensurate with the importance of his contribution.
26. The Soldier should not—
- Address the subject or audience in the third person through the interpreter. Avoid saying, "Tell them I'm glad to be their instructor." Instead say, "I'm glad to be your instructor." Address the subject or audience directly, and make continual eye contact with the audience – watch them – don't watch the interpreter.
 - Make side comments to the interpreter he does not expect to be translated. This action tends to create the wrong atmosphere for communication and is rude.
 - Be a distraction while the interpreter is translating and the subject or audience is listening. The Soldier should not pace the floor, write on the blackboard, teeter on the lectern, drink beverages, or carry on any other distracting activity while the interpreter is actually translating.

APPENDIX C

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

POPULATION AND RESOURCES CONTROL

Principles

1. Population and resources control (PRC) provides a broad base of security in which COIN operations and national and community development programs, including civic action, can be executed. PRC is a mechanism to collect social and economic intelligence. Principles that apply to a PRC program are:

- Deny insurgents access to the population and resources. Deny the enemy the ability to live. Cut them off from food, water, clothing -- everything.
- Identify and prioritize population sectors and resources to be secured and protected.
- Unify and coordinate all civil and security forces and assets within the community with special attention given to 24/7 security, intelligence collection, psychological operations (PSYOP) and civil affairs.
- Include HN forces in security-related plans and operations to the maximum extent possible.
- Mobilize, arm and train the local population to provide their own local community security.
- Structure security force activity and actions to lead to the populace overtly picking a side. However, these activities and actions must not be abusive.
- Establish leverage. Use advice, equipment and money to attempt to change people's attitudes and behavior positively.
- U.S. and multinational personnel are trainers for the local HN personnel, but not advisors.

Objectives

2. Typical objectives for a population and resources control program include:

- Sever any relationship between the population and insurgents.
 - Identify and destroy insurgent support activities within the community.
 - Identify and destroy insurgent organizational infrastructure.
 - Identify and eliminate the insurgent political apparatus (communications).
- Institute harsh penalties for those caught supporting the insurgents.
- Create a secure physical and psychological environment for the population -- people are free to go about their business and prosper without worrying about insurgents taking their freedom and prosperity from them.
- Counteract enemy propaganda. A national information operations campaign strategy with interagency planning and resources that distributes its message and is responsive to current events to ensure relevancy. This is executed in the districts and locales.
- Provide a discreet means for citizens to provide information about the insurgent enemy. People tend to submit reports based on rumors or grudge reports. However, some of these are true -- look for the gold nugget in the manure pile.

PHASES

3.PhaseI: Preparation. In coordination with the Country Team and other government agencies, the initial conditions to create tactical success are established at the theater and operational-levels by establishing zones based on political geography and human terrain and in recognition of the level(s) of concern/ resistance/ and /or violence as a map overlay/ management/assessment tool. The staff will identify and recommend higher-priority facilities, elements, and routes. The Commander or Team Chief will assign program responsibilities down to the province, district and local levels. Finally, don't prepare too much – get out, get involved, and do the right things.

- Do not hurt the people, but kill the insurgents. Where U.S.Forces violate this dictum,U.S. policies may fail.
- Obtain legal authority to train and/or arrest or attack insurgents where necessary. A local judiciary representative or tribal leader/official's support will be crucial here. Remember, police arrest and bring personnel to trial while soldiers kill and capture.
- Establish unity of command and representation on the U.S. side. Indigenous leadership would optimally report to only one U.S. person. Do not confuse HN indigenous forces with a convoluted U.S. chain of command.
- Coordinate operations of the indigenous police, civil guard, and military through US, multinational, and HN command and control structures.
- Strongly recommend the indigenous local security forces unify their leadership -- the police, civil guard, and military that secure and control the populace, where possible.
- Secure the town, area and then the district – 24/7. Live among the people to develop local relationships and gain walk-in Intel. Patrolling should be active and avoid static positions. Plan to establish hasty roadblocks and checkpoints for no more than a few hours each to decrease the possibility of insurgent attacks.
- Study the local security force and police training plan. Develop a plan to augment and enhance the training to enable the locals to secure and police their village. Plan for recruiting, vetting, training, and equipping the local security people to begin as soon as possible.
- Plan to request to integrate an indigenous local unit into an equivalent-size US unit. Then, integrate a US organization into an indigenous local unit as trainers and liaison personnel. Stay alert.
- Research and plan to gain the information from a recent census or conduct a census of each village, community, district and region. If you do not have access to a current census or do not conduct a thorough census, you will not know who is supposed to live in the area as compared to who is actually there. Recognizing any discrepancy may help identify insurgents.
 - Within each town draw a diagram (or use satellite imagery) and number the buildings in each square block.
 - Within each building establish who and how many people are living in each apartment or room.
 - Record the names, gender, age, and relationship to the other occupants. Take pictures of each where possible (there may be cultural sensitivities in this area). Then, build a card/digital file with this information categorized.
 - Use GPS devices to establish exact locations and/or to locate huts, houses, or neighborhoods.
 - Two-three weeks later, cordon-and-search a block during the evening or night to verify the data. Avoid establishing a target sequence/pattern.

- Plan and contract for the upgrade and re-equipping of local security forces as required so these forces have a superior level of arms as compared to the insurgents – weapons such as technicals. Technicals are field expedient vehicles. Purchase pick-up trucks and equip them with crew-served, pintle-mounted weapons such as .50 Cal MGs or MK19 Automatic Grenade Launchers. Be prepared for increased interest in the weapons by all sides.
- IO planners should develop a PSYOP program designed to win the confidence and support of the population and establish a base of political allegiance. Ensure the U.S., multinational and HN forces are making the populace's life better on a daily basis – and, ensure the townspeople all know what you are doing. Start with clean water, sewage disposal, healthcare, dental checks and schools.
- Plan for and coordinate local intelligence development, gathering and analysis operations. Develop sources among the populace, while recognizing underlying purposes. Children are nondescript collectors of information for you as well as about you – they are very effective as lookouts and in surveillance. They will divulge incredible information as a reward for kindness. Verify and vet the information.
- Plan for development and issue of an identification card to each resident. Use this card to track personnel movement and as identification for elections. Checkpoints should have mobile card-reader technology that feeds movement data into a computer chip/database to track and enable ID of personnel movements and patterns.
- Plan to establish Civil-Military Coordination Committees. Find out the populace's priorities and fears. What are you and the security forces doing that works, and doesn't work? Listen to your soldiers who are listening to the people, and beware of local leaders because they are often working for their own interests. Publicize and inform the people what you are doing for them.
- Where no card-reader exists, track movement by assigning a color and stamp to the community or district (close group of villages or towns). All citizens will have that color. Anyone from outside the community/district will have a different color, or no color. Record the 5W's (who, what, where, when, and why) at all checkpoints -- pass this to the Intel NCO/officer for application with Intel analytical tools.
- Plan and coordinate civil programs.

4. Phase II: Task and Organization. Assign subordinates responsibility for each of the above and below-noted tasks. All brief their initial concept and the Commander de-conflicts and prioritizes; then, re-brief.

- The populace of each town (and the officials such as the Mayor, police and teachers) must be 24/7 secure. The security force families must be protected to prevent indirect threats and intimidation.
- Establish general surveillance measures and movement control on the roads and avenues leading to and into the town as well as inside the town.
- Organize, combine and carry out training for the security forces. The graduation exercise is an actual patrol against the insurgents to include scheduled surveillance.
- The local village/community must be trained to secure and police their village -- start recruiting, vetting, training, equipping the local security people. This should begin as soon as possible.
- Establish covert surveillance of the marketplace and stores. Record discreetly who buys what, how much and how often (frequency). Look for unusual amounts of food, clothing, equipment, fertilizers such as urea, ammonium nitrate and phosphates (not purchased

by farmers) and abnormal frequency. Recruit/draft locals to do this work, but cross-check them to determine who can be trusted. Reward the trusted ones.

- Conduct a daily comparison of the supplies purchase and movements information against the census card file information. Answer questions such as, “Why is someone buying a 50-lb bag of rice and 8 pairs of boots and ten pairs of pants or rolls of cotton cloth when they have only a wife and four children to feed and clothe”? If they are under employed, where did they get the money to buy the food and clothes? Look for breaks in patterns such as a farmer traveling to a nearby village at midday when he is working in the fields usually.
- Select and organize civil guards – draft those with a stake who will benefit from the security. Train and arm them. You must assist the populace to choose a side. If they are in some type of civil defense force where they are exposed to insurgent attacks but they have the weapons and training to defeat such attacks, they are far less likely to help the insurgents.
- Establish Security Coordination Centers. All Intel comes here, is recorded and analyzed and goes out to the security forces. Establish separate facilities for prisoner detention and interrogation. Use psychological profiling to set the conditions for gaining information. If prisoners are mistreated and/or tortured, the populace will find out, and the flow of insurgents turning themselves in will dry up. Mistreatment can seriously damage U.S., multinational, and HN objectives and motives. In Vietnam, the U.S. treated VC prisoners significantly different than South Vietnamese authorities treated them with these predictable results.
- Establish, exercise and refine security and alert systems.
- Intensify intelligence collection and analysis to identify the insurgent political and support apparatus.
- Establish a system of block wardens with reporting procedures as well as incentives. Hold the Wardens accountable for knowing what is going on in their block and environs. For example, do any residents go out surreptitiously in the evening and return late (but are not regulars at a coffee house or bar)? Are there any visitors in the block? Where are they from, and whom are they visiting? Are they suspicious, and in what way?
- Establish systems of coordination with security and military forces in the area.
- Intensify PSYOP to win the political allegiance of the people.

5. Phase III: Control.

- Direct main effort toward preventing any population support for the insurgents.
- Direct supporting effort toward preventing any popular support for the insurgents.
- Secure vital infrastructure using local personnel as the security force.
- Establish restrictions and controls (curfews, pass systems, surveillance, road blocks,)
- Transition to using HN local and civil security organizations in ambushes, area sweeps, and raids.
- Coordinate use of police and military units as backups.
- Establish and develop amnesty and rehabilitation programs – protect the families of those who choose to cooperate with the HN.
- Increase intelligence and psychological operations activities.

6. Phase IV: Relinquishment.

- Stage A:
 - Reduce intensity of controls from Phase III level, although patrols, surveillance and periodic hasty checkpoints throughout the district area continue.
 - Reduce major operations (e.g., ambushes and raids).
 - Gradually phase out military forces with primary responsibility for population and resources control passing to HN police and paramilitary units. Withdraw US forces to bases that are removed from the population.
 - Continue intelligence activities at a high level and increase PSYOP programs to the maximum level to prevent regeneration of a “hard-core apparatus.”

- Stage B:
 - Continue checks on the movement of personnel and goods.
 - Reduce controls and individual restrictions to a minimum and review block warden system.
 - Reward the population for cooperation and progress. Assess success by regions and areas in order to gradually ease population and resource control (PRC) measures as districts and provinces demonstrate cooperation and stability. Enable areas to earn less restrictive measures. As districts, provinces and regions gain a vested interest in assisting the HN government, they can compete against each other to gain better treatment and fewer restrictions.
 - Continue intelligence and PSYOP with an emphasis on programs designed to assist in providing a solid base of political allegiance to the HN.
 - Reduce civil guard/local militia units to a stand-by basis (although organization and training should continue).

Military Police and Security Activities

7. Military Police (MP) support the tactical commander and civil affairs personnel in planning and conducting PRC operations during COIN missions. These operations may consist of enforcing movement restrictions, curfews, resettling dislocated refugees, military supply route (MSR) regulation and enforcement, amnesty programs, inspecting facilities, and guarding humanitarian assistance distribution sites. The MPs also direct dislocated civilians and refugees to resettlement areas and work closely with local and district HN government agencies during this process.

8. MP training, firepower and mobility coupled with their interface with and acceptability by the local populace make them an asset in certain security-related PRC tasks in support of COIN.

CHECKPOINTS AND ROADBLOCKS

GENERAL

9. Checkpoints and roadblocks are set up to check and control the movement of personnel, vehicles, and materiel and prevent actions that aid the enemy. During COIN operations, checkpoints and roadblocks assist the commander in maintaining the initiative against the insurgents by disrupting, interfering with and deterring insurgent operations, and disrupting the insurgents' decision-making cycle. It is very important to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks with interpreters, HN police, and/or other HN security forces.

10. When conducting checkpoint operations, soldiers will need the following support:

- Engineers to build obstacles and barriers to channel traffic.
- Linguists that are familiar with the local language and understand your language.
- HN police and/or a civil affairs officer.
- Trained interrogators.
- Barrier Equipment.
- Signs/Lighting.
- Communications equipment.

CHECKPOINTS

11. Attitude and mindset. Think of a checkpoint as an ambush position with a friendly attitude. Trust no one outside of your checkpoint team members while on-duty. To reduce misunderstandings and confusion on the part of the local populace, recommend posting instructions in the indigenous language(s) on signs at the entrances to checkpoints.

12. Checkpoints site selection should be based on leader reconnaissance. The site must allow for a vehicle escape route and plans to destroy a hostile element that uses such a route. If the checkpoint is completely sealed off, insurgents may only penetrate it by attempting to run over or bypass emplaced barricades.

13. Duration of the checkpoint may vary from 1 to 72 hours depending on the purpose of the operation. Checkpoints that are established early, operate for several hours during periods of peak traffic flow, and then reposition to a different location may lessen the risk of insurgent attack and increase the probability of inadvertently detecting and attacking or capturing insurgents. Lessons learned from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM indicate checkpoints lasting over 72 hours were less effective for reasons related to predictability and fatigue.

14. Checkpoints are deliberate and hasty, but always must consist of the following:

- Obstacles or barriers emplaced in a serpentine design IOT slow or stop speeding vehicles.
- Search areas for personnel and vehicles.
- Security overwatch and fighting positions.
- Holding areas.
- Lighting for nighttime operations.
- Designated assault/reaction forces to attack or pursue individual, groups, and/or vehicles that attempt to maneuver through, or turn around and attempt to avoid the checkpoint.

DELIBERATE CHECKPOINT


15. A fixed position set up on a main road in a rural or built-up area that can be classified as either a heavy or light traffic checkpoint.

16. A heavy-traffic deliberate checkpoint normally requires a platoon for manning.

17. Squads can only operate a light traffic checkpoint for a short duration (12 hours or less).

18. To operate a heavy traffic checkpoint, task organize the platoon into:

- HQ element responsible for C2 and maintaining communications.
- Security element that provides early warning to the search and assault element; observes and reports suspicious activity, and monitors traffic flow up to and through the checkpoint; should have an anti-armor capability to protect the site from an armored vehicle threat.
- Search element, normally a squad that halts vehicles at the checkpoint; guides vehicles to the designated search point; conducts personnel and vehicle searches; and directs cleared vehicles through the checkpoint.
- Assault element, an additional squad that is responsible for destroying any insurgent element that forces its way past the search team; soldiers are positioned beyond the search point and emplaced obstacles/ barriers.



Deliberate Checkpoint Legend

A – Search Area/Team: Includes at least one indigenous military or police officer for language capability.

B – Berm/Obstacle/T-Wall to mitigate blast effect.

C – Vehicle turn-around.

D – Passenger holding area.

E – Crew-served weapons.

F – Fighting positions.

G – Central point.

H – Counter mobility serpentine barriers.

I – Concertina wall barrier.

Deliberate Checkpoint Notes.

- Due to possibility of a suicide bomber attack, the search area is outside the unit's perimeter.
- Search area to the side of the road permits two-way traffic. If vehicle is rejected due to protocol, it is turned back. If vehicle is accepted for transit, it is permitted to travel through the position. If the vehicle is enemy, the CP Leader will determine whether to attack or apprehend.
- Everyone on the CP Team must know the mission and intent. Be methodical, detail-oriented and focus on security.
- Be friendly and professional to all – nonetheless, don't trust anyone! Young women have been very effective suicide bombers. Children have unknowingly and knowingly carried bombs into and through checkpoints.
- Soldiers prepare and occupy fortified fighting positions. Stop all vehicles for an initial search outside the obstacle areas. When confronted by a potentially threatening vehicle:
 - The Search Element alerts the CP Leader, moves to a safe / fortified position and may engage or allow the vehicle to pass based on leader instructions and ROE.
 - If the vehicle passes through the escape lane, the CP Leader may direct the Assault Element to engage and attack the vehicle based on ROE.
 - If a vehicle turns around and attempts to avoid the CP, a designated element must pursue and engage them. Shoot the tires first. Approach carefully, and assume the worst. However, the occupants may simply be tired of waiting in lines.
- Overall don't hurt people unnecessarily – some people simply don't understand what you are directing them to do.

HASTY CHECKPOINT

19. Hasty checkpoints should be set up to last from 5 minutes to up to 30 minutes in duration. A technique to use is the maximum use of organic vehicles to serve as additional security and to assist in funneling traffic through the checkpoint in addition to concertina wire and, if available, tire spikes.

20. The short duration (5 to 30 minutes) reduces the risk of an insurgent organizing and conducting a mortar or car bomb attack against the checkpoint. Additionally, this may disrupt the timing of another planned insurgent action.

21. Characteristics of a Hasty Checkpoint are:

- Located along likely avenues of approach.
- Achieves surprise.
- Temporary and moved often.
- The platoon is able to carry the construction materials.
- Uses vehicles as an obstacle between the vehicles and personnel and reinforces them with concertina wire.
- Soldiers are positioned at each end of the checkpoint.
- Soldiers are covered by mounted &/or dismounted automatic weapons.
- Reaction force (at least one squad) is concealed nearby to attack or assault in case the site is attacked.

22. Soldiers establish hasty checkpoints where they cannot be seen by approaching traffic until it is too late for approaching traffic to unobtrusively withdraw. Effective locations on which to set up hasty checkpoints include:

- Bridges (near either or both ends, but not in the middle).
- Defiles (again, either end is better than in the middle).
- Highway intersections. This must be well organized to reduce the inherent danger.
- The reverse slope of a hill (hidden from the direction of the main flow of traffic).
- Just beyond a sharp curve.

VEHICLE SEARCH

23. The following is a vehicle search checklist

- Stop the vehicle at the search area.
- Direct the occupants to exit the vehicle, and escort them away to a nearby search area.
- Direct the male occupants to lift all clothing to ensure explosive devices are not attached to their body (females must check female occupants). When female inspectors are not present, an effective method is to search women by having them pull their garments tight to their bodies so that any contour formed by an explosive device or material will stand out. Note. There is new technology being tested in EUCCOM and SOUTHCOM that can pick up the scent of explosive residue without a search being required.
- Soldiers remain behind a secure and fortified position while this process is being conducted. (See Figure C.5 for prescribed standoff distances against explosives).
- Direct the occupants to open all doors, the trunk, the hood of the vehicles and the gas cap (to include inside enclosures such as glove compartments).

- Conduct a visual inspection while the occupants of the vehicles lift any and all obstructions from the soldiers' field of view while remaining behind the fortified positions. Such obstructions could include blankets or clothing on seats.
- The driver removes any loose items that are not attached to the vehicle for inspection.
- Once the leader determines it is safe to approach the vehicle, two members of the search team position themselves at both rear flanks of the vehicle. These soldiers maintain eye contact with the occupants once they exit the vehicle.
- Two soldiers conduct the search armed only with pistols.
- One soldier conducts interior searches and the other performs exterior searches. Use mirrors and metal detectors to thoroughly search each vehicle for weapons, explosives, ammunition, and other contraband. Depending on the threat level, the vehicle search area should provide blast protection for the surrounding area.

PERSONNEL SEARCHES

24. Personnel searches are only conducted when proper authorization has been obtained and IAW the ROE, HN agreements, or Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Planning considerations are:

- Plan for same-gender searches.
- HN authorities, whenever possible, should conduct or at least observe searches of local nationals.
- Preserve the respect and dignity of the individual.
- Consider local customs and national cultural differences. In many cultures it is offensive for men to touch or even talk to women in public.
- Searchers must be polite, considerate, patient, and tactful.
- Make every effort not to unnecessarily offend the local population.
- Search for weapons and ammunition, items of intelligence value, currency, drugs, and other inappropriate items or anything that seems out of the ordinary.

25. Soldiers conduct individual searches in search teams that consist of the following:

- Searcher: Actually conducts the search. This is the highest-risk position.
- Security: Maintains eye contact with the individual being searched.
- Observer: The observer is a leader who has supervisory control. He provides early warning.

26. The two most common methods used to conduct individual searches are frisk and wall search.

- Frisk search: Quick and adequate to detect weapons, evidence, or contraband. A frisk search is more dangerous because the searcher has less control of the individual being searched.
- Wall search: Affords more safety for the searcher. Any upright surface may be used such as a wall, vehicle, tree, or fence.
- The search team places the subject in the kneeling or prone position if more control is needed to search an uncooperative individual.

27. Strip searches should only be considered when the individual is suspected of carrying documents or other contraband on his person. This extreme search method should be conducted in an enclosed area and by qualified medical personnel when available.

28. Additional Checkpoint Considerations. The following should be considered when operating a checkpoint.

- Team duties and reactions must be well-defined, backbriefed by all and rehearsed.
- Standardize three mandatory minimum signals at every checkpoint: Stop - Get out of the car - Lift your shirt.
- Prepare and emplace signs in the local language instructing indigenous personnel what to expect and do at the checkpoint.
- Determine if it is necessary to apprehend or detain those who see the checkpoint ahead and attempt to turn around.
- Use HN police and military when available.
- Position a response force close to the approach route to block or detain vehicles that try to avoid the operation.
- Clear and maintain control of all buildings and terrain that dominate the checkpoint.
- Stay alert for any change of scenery around the checkpoint. Crowds gathering for no apparent reason or Media representatives waiting for an event are all indicators that something may happen.
- Use artificial illumination for night operations.
- If HN personnel are used to assist, ensure they do not represent a national, ethnic, or religious group of faction that is feared and/or hated by the majority of the local population.
- Move the checkpoint location and change the method of operation at random to avoid setting patterns. The longer your position remains static, the greater the risk you will be attacked.

29. Record the following information:

- The number and type of vehicles stopped. Report identifying markings, license plate number, vehicle identification numbers (where present) and any signs displayed on the vehicle.
- The point of origination and destination of the vehicle.
- The number of passengers in the vehicle. Report the nationality, ages, and the sex of passengers.
- The condition of passengers (general health, dress, attitude).
- The stated reason for travel by passengers.
- The type and quantity of cargo.
- Possible or actual sightings of weapons.
- Explosives or threatening action by the passengers.
- A description of arms, ammunition, explosives, and sensitive items found and confiscated from the vehicle.
- Anything unusual reported by the passengers.

30. The illustrations shown below suggest areas for security personnel to search for explosives or prohibited items.

SEARCH OF SEDAN-TYPE VEHICLES




Figure C.2: Search Areas for Family Cars

SEARCH OF COMMERCIAL VEHICLES




Figure C.3: Search areas for Commercial Vehicles

SEARCH OF BUSES AND COACHES





Figure C.4: Search Areas for Buses

Figure C.5: Standoff distance for explosive devices



ROADBLOCKS

31. A roadblock is defined as a barrier or obstacle (usually covered by fire) used to block or limit the movement of vehicles along a route. Position the roadblock so obstacles like cliffs, swamps, or rivers channel vehicles toward the roadblock. Select a defensible position: Ensure that defensive positions:

- Prepare a fighting position for crew-served weapons to provide overwatch and covering fire for the roadblock.
- Establish fields of fire that cover avenues of approach that lead to the roadblock to prevent breach.




Figure C.6: This illustration of a roadblock is modified from FM 3-19.4, MP Leaders Handbook, UK COIN Handbook ST 3-19.210, Access Control Handbook/Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Vehicle Inspection Guide

Lessons Observed During Past Operations

32. Monitor local media (radio, newspaper) both for rumor control/counter-propaganda purposes (essential in population control) as well as intelligence tip-offs (for both current intelligence and tactical indications & warning). You will notice a different slant from the news at home (observed in Bosnia & Haiti).

33. Identify and listen to what influential local leaders say in public and compare it to their actions in private. These people are leaders in political, government, criminal, ethnic, religious and family realms. It is important to live with the local people and listen to what they are also saying.

35. Infrastructure protection and repair/rehabilitation (i.e. electrical power & water, electrical pole repair teams) are critical both for improving the populations' physical well being as well as for the positive psychological effect it creates. The electrical grid is a good confidence target (very visible), and there is no effect equivalent to the lights going out. "Turning on the lights" in Port au Prince was critical to reducing criminal activity (as measured by the murder rate) by ~40 percent in a two-month period (observed in Haiti).

36. Intelligence screening and selected debriefing of migrants/ refugees can yield tactically useful intelligence especially when coupled with humanitarian relief/civic action activities. Asking the individuals who have turned themselves in to identify any of the people working for you is a very effective way to catch "planted agents". Expect them to be there.

37. Indicators of pending insurgent offensive actions are the theft of medical supplies, car and money thefts, and Intl. Red Cross Reps observed in the area when they are not otherwise present (Bosnia & Haiti).

38. In urban areas monitor electric power usage and telephone records. Deviations from normal usage may indicate terrorist activity (UK Royal Marine observation in N. Ireland).

APPENDIX D

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

ORDER OF BATTLE FACTORS

1. During COIN operations, the nature of the threat requires Order of Battle (OB) intelligence be produced in greater detail than is found in conventional operations. Usually the focus will be individuals or cells. In COIN operations, the category “Personalities” is added to the usual list of OB factors that are viewed from the same perspective as in conventional warfare and include:

- Composition.
- Disposition.
- Strength.
- Tactics and operations.
- Training.
- Logistics support.
- Combat effectiveness.
- Electronic technical data.
- Personalities.
- Miscellaneous data.

COMPOSITION

2. Composition is the identification of units and political, religious, or ethnic organizations. Unit identification consists of complete designation of a specific entity by name or number, type, relative size or strength, and subordination. Composition includes:

- Operational and support cells (similar to sections in a military unit).
- Echelons.
- Staff elements.
- Political, religious, ideological, and military aims.
- Internal and external C2.
- Operational organizations.
- Internal and external support structure.
- External ties.
- Assassination squads.
- Bomb and demolition squads.
- Attack or hit squads.

DISPOSITION

3. Disposition consists of the geographic location of insurgent elements and how they are deployed, employed, or located. Additionally, disposition includes the recent, current, and projected movements or locations of these elements:

- Training camps.
- Base camp.
- Logistics camps (external and internal).
- Headquarters (external and internal).
- Safe houses.

- Front organizations.
- Areas of control.

STRENGTH

4. Strength conventionally is described in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. In insurgency operations, strength as a factor is augmented with attack teams, political cadre or cells and, most importantly, popular support. Popular support can range from sympathizers to assistance in conducting operations, storage or moving logistics, or just withholding information.

TACTICS AND OPERATIONS

5. Tactics and operations include strategy, modus operandi, and doctrine. Each refers to the insurgent's accepted principles of organization and employment of forces. Tactics also involve political, military, psychological, and economic considerations. Insurgent tactics and operations vary in sophistication according to the level of training the individual or organization has received. Insurgents carefully plan and train for individual and small group operations. Typical insurgent tactics and operations include, but are not limited to:

- Assassination. A term generally applied to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic personnel as well as "traitors" who defect from the group.
- Arson. Less dramatic than most tactics, arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator and requires only a low level of technical knowledge.
- Bombing. The improvised explosive device (IED) is the insurgent's or terrorist's weapon of choice. IEDs can be inexpensive to produce and, because of the various detonation techniques available, may be a low risk to the perpetrator. However, suicidal bombing cannot be overlooked as an employment method. Other advantages include their ability to gain publicity, as well as the ability to control casualties through timed detonation and careful placement of the device. It is also easily deniable should the action produce undesirable results.
- Hostage taking. This is an overt seizure of one or more individuals with the intent of gaining publicity or other concessions in return for release of the hostage. While dramatic, hostage and hostage barricade situations are risky for the perpetrator.
- Kidnapping. While similar to hostage taking, kidnapping has significant differences. Kidnapping is usually a covert seizure of one or more specific persons in order to extract specific demands. It is normally the most difficult task to execute. The perpetrators of the action may or may not be known for a long time. Media attention is initially intense, but decreases over time unless the kidnapping is accompanied by acts of barbarism that extend news coverage. Because of the time involved, successful kidnapping requires elaborate planning and logistics. The risk to the perpetrators may be less than in the hostage situation.
- Intimidation/Blackmail. Insurgents may attempt to gain coerced political, fiscal or logistical support from local government officials, local businessmen or other influential community leaders through intimidation and/or blackmail. This could be in the form of threats on the individual's life, kidnapping of people close to the individual, threats to disrupt or destroy (bombing, arson, etc) infrastructure that is important to the individual.
- Seizure. Seizure usually involves a building or object that has value in the eyes of the audience. There is some risk to the perpetrator because security forces have time to

- react and may opt to use force to resolve the incident, especially if few or no innocent lives are involved.
- Raids or attacks on facilities. Armed attacks on facilities are usually undertaken for one of three purposes:
 - Gain access to radio or television broadcasts in order to make a statement.
 - Demonstrate the government's inability to secure critical facilities or national symbols.
 - Acquire resources (for example, robbery of a bank or armory).
 - Sabotage. The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how vulnerable a particular society, or government, is to insurgent actions. Industrialized areas are more vulnerable to sabotage than less highly developed societies. Utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of any one affects all of them and gains immediate public attention. Sabotage of industrial or commercial facilities is one means of identifying the target while making a statement of future intent. Military facilities and installations, information systems, and information infrastructures may become targets of insurgent sabotage.
 - Hoaxes. Any insurgent group that has established credibility can employ a hoax with considerable success. A threat against a person's life causes that person and those associated with that individual to devote time and efforts to security measures. A bomb threat can close a commercial building, empty a theater, or delay an aircraft flight at no cost to the insurgent. False alarms dull the analytical and operational efficiency of key security personnel, thus degrading readiness.
 - Use of technology. Technology has important implications for the insurgent threat faced by DOD. Infrastructure technologies provide attractive targets for insurgents who can apply a range of rudimentary and advanced attack techniques to disrupt or undermine confidence in a range of systems. Key elements of the national infrastructure—transportation, telecommunications, energy, banking, public health, and water supply—are becoming increasingly dependent on computerized systems and linkages.
 - Use of CBRN. Some insurgent groups may possess chemical and biological weapons, and there is a potential for use of both chemical and biological (CB) weapons in the future. These types of weapons, relatively cheap and easy to make, may be used in place of conventional explosives in many situations. The potential for mass destruction and the deep-seated fear most people have for CB weapons could be attractive to a group wishing to make the world take notice. Although an explosive nuclear device is acknowledged to be beyond the financial and/or technical reach of most insurgent groups, a CB weapon or even a radiological dispersion device using nuclear contaminants is not. The technology is simple and the payoff is potentially higher than conventional or nuclear explosives.
 - Psychological Operations. Since insurgents want to win over the support of the population – or at least separate the support of the population from the local national government, they will engage in many different types of psychological operations with this intent. They can accomplish this through many different means. For example, insurgents may stage and publicize real or fake atrocities which they will blame on local national government or US forces. They will also be quick to take advantage of any inadvertent mistakes that the local national government forces or US forces may make when dealing with the local population.

TRAINING

6. The type and depth of individual and group training that insurgents receive is tied to their tactics and operations. Higher education also plays a role in insurgent training. Insurgent training may include, but is not limited to:

- Indoctrination and strategy (political, ideological, or religious).
- Operations.
- Tactics.
- Weapons (individual and crew-served).
- Communications.
- Logistics.
- Transportation (covert movement).
- ISR.
- Psychological operations (PSYOP).
- Media manipulation.

LOGISTICS

7. The effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics. This dependency fluctuates horizontally and vertically between the various groups and levels of operation. The intensity of logistics activity is based on operations, internal and external logistics support. Critical components of logistics include, but are not limited to:

- Financing.
- Food.
- Water.
- Weapons and ammunition.
- Bomb-making components.
- PSYOP materials (paper, ink, printing press).
- Medical.
- Transportation (on-hand and required).

COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS

8. Combat effectiveness for insurgent forces does not equate the same as with combat effectiveness for conventional forces. Combat effectiveness factors for insurgent forces include, but are not limited to:

- Outside support (financial, physical, moral).
- Intimidation.
- Fear.
- Political change.
- Motivation.
- Popular support.

ELECTRONIC TECHNICAL DATA

9. In COIN operations, the lack of an obvious formal insurgent organizational structure or architecture impedes development of an extensive threat electronic OB database and an electronic technical database. The insurgent has communications equipment available ranging from the most modern to the most primitive. Insurgent forces often use high frequency (HF) short-wave, cellular phone, Internet, mail, courier, or ham radio sets. Citizen band-set is also used. While not playing a significant historical role, the insurgent's potential use of radar cannot be ruled out.

PERSONALITIES

10. Personality is a critical factor when conducting COIN operations. Attention must be focused on individuals. Insurgent organizational diagrams can be built through multidimensional link analysis (determining relationships between critical personalities and then their group association). This applies to virtually any threat represented in COIN operations. Once relationships and the level of contact or knowledge the personalities have are known, their activity can be determined. Personality files include, but are not limited to:

- Leaders (political, ideological, religious, military).
- Staff members.
- Organization's spokesperson.
- Family members (immediate and extended).
- Expert in demolition, weapons, and assassinations.
- Media manipulation personnel and PSYOP campaign personnel.
- Trainers.
- Code names and nicknames.

11. Leaders on the ground must understand the political and physical strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent leadership and how best to exploit those weaknesses. Considerations include:

- Who are the leaders? Is there a single, dominant charismatic leader?
- Is the leadership highly dedicated to an ideology?
- Are the leaders committed to a specific organizational and operational pattern?
- Are there differences of opinion among leaders as to purpose and methods? Will a schism or other event occur as a result?
- What is the relationship between the leadership and the operational and support elements? Are decisions made centralized or decentralized?
- What is the decision-making process of the insurgent leadership? Are decisions made centralized or decentralized?

MISCELLANEOUS DATA

12. Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed but not covered by an OB factor. This could include family history, false unit identification, names or designators, political and military goals, PSYOP, and demographics. PSYOP activities may result in insurgent-sponsored commercial or clandestine radio broadcasts. Covert broadcasts normally originate outside the national boundaries or from remote, inaccessible areas. Commercial radio broadcasts may use code words to control and coordinate threat operations. Television broadcasts are used similarly. PSYOP files contain:

- Copies of leaflets, posters, and other printed material.

- Video recordings of television broadcasts.
- Audio recordings of radio broadcasts.
- Copies of speeches.
- Analysis of local grievances.
- Background material.

13. Without an insurgent organizational or operational structure, intelligence analysis during COIN operations will primarily rely on pattern and trend analysis. This will allow the analysts to understand the relationships of key insurgency personnel and methods of operation in order to predict likely insurgent operations and pinpoint critical nodes of insurgent operations (personnel, intelligence, training, and logistics).

APPENDIX E
WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS

Table E-1. Enemy Activity Indicators - Indigenous Population

General Activities
Identification of agitators, insurgents, militias or criminal organizations, their supporters, and sympathizers who suddenly appear, in, or move out of, an area.
New faces in a rural community.
Unusual gatherings among the population.
Disruption of normal social patterns.
Mass urban rural migration or vice versa.
Massing of combatants of competing power groups.
Increase in the size of embassy or consulate staffs from a country or countries that support indigenous disaffected groups, particularly those hostile to the United States and/or the current intervention.
Increase in neighboring countries of staff and activities at embassies or consulates of countries associated with supporting indigenous disaffected groups.
Increased travel by suspected subversives or leaders of competing power bases to countries hostile to the United States or opposed to the current intervention.
Influx of opposition resident and expatriate leaders into the operations area.
Reports of opposition or disaffected indigenous population receiving military training in foreign countries.
Increase of visitors (e.g., tourists, technicians, businessmen, religious leaders, officials) from groups or countries hostile to the United States or opposed to the current intervention.
Close connections between diplomatic personnel of hostile countries and local opposition groups.
Communications between opposition groups and external supporters.
Increase of disaffected youth gatherings.
Establishment of organizations of unexplained origin and with unclear or nebulous aims.
Establishment of a new organization to replace an existing organizational structure with identical aims.
Appearance of many new members in existing organizations such as labor unions.
Infiltration of student organizations by known agitators.
Appearance of new organizations stressing grievances or interests of repressed or minority groups.
Reports of large donations to new or revamped organizations.
Reports of payment to locals for engaging in subversive or hostile activities.
Reports of formation of opposition paramilitary or militia organizations.
Reports of lists of targets for planned opposition attacks.
Appearance of "professional" agitators in gatherings or demonstrations that result in violence.
Evidence of paid and armed demonstrators' participation in riots.
Significant increase in thefts, armed robberies, and violent crime in rural areas; increase in bank robberies in urban areas.
Opposition-Directed Activities
Refusal of population to pay or unusual difficulty to collect rent, taxes, or loan payments.

Trends of demonstrated hostility toward government forces and/or mission force.
Unexplained population disappearance from or avoidance of certain areas.
Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.
Reported incidents of attempted recruitment to join new movements or underground organizations.
Criminals and disaffected youth who appear to be acting with and for the opposition.
Reports of extortion and other coercion by opposition elements to obtain financial support from the population.
Use of fear tactics to coerce, control, or influence the local population.
Reports of host nation government and/or mission force facilities and personnel surveillance.
Activities Directed Against the Government/Mission Force
Failure of police and informer nets to report accurate information, which may indicate sources are actively supporting opposition elements or are intimidated.
Decreasing success of government law enforcement or military infiltration of opposition or disaffected organizations.
Assassination or disappearance of government sources.
Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government officials, law enforcement employees, or mission personnel.
Reports of attempts to obtain classified information from government officials, government offices, or mission personnel.
Classified information leaked to the media.
Sudden affluence of certain government and law enforcement personnel.
Recurring failure of government or mission force raids on suspected opposition organizations or illegal activities apparently due to forewarning.
Increased hostile or illegal activity against the government, its law enforcement and military organizations, foreigners, minority groups, and/or competing political, ethnic, linguistic, or religious groups.
Demonstrations against government forces, minority groups, or foreigners designed to instigate violent confrontations with government or mission forces.
Increased antigovernment or mission force rhetoric in local media.
Occurrence of strikes in critical areas intended to cast doubt on the government's ability to maintain order and provide for the people.
Unexplained loss, destruction, or forgery of government identification cards and passports.
Recurring unexplained disruption of public utilities.
Reports of terrorist acts or extortion attempts against local government leaders and businessmen.
Murder of kidnapping of government, military, and law enforcement officials or mission force personnel.
Closing of schools.

Table E-2. Propaganda Indicators

General Propaganda Activities
Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.
Increase in the number of entertainers with a political message.
Increase of political themes in religious services.
Increase in appeals directed at intensifying general ethnic or religious unrest in countries where ethnic or religious competition exists.
Increase of agitation on issues for which there is no identified movement or organization.
Renewed activity by dissident or opposition organizations thought to be defunct or dormant.
Circulation of petitions advocating opposition or dissident demands.
Appearance of opposition slogans and pronouncements by word-of-mouth, graffiti, posters, leaflets, etc.
Propaganda linking local ethnic groups with those in neighboring countries or regions.
Clandestine radio broadcasts intended to appeal to those with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.
Use of bullhorns, truck-mounted loudspeakers, and other public address equipment in “spontaneous” demonstrations.
Presence of nonmedia photographers among demonstrators.
Rallies to honor “martyred” opposition personnel. Mass demonstrations honoring local dissident heroes or dates significant to the opposition.
Nationwide strikes called to demonstrate the strength of the opposition movement(s).
Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Established Government
Attempts to discredit or ridicule national or public officials.
Attempts to discredit the judicial and law enforcement system.
Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of foreign intervention forces.
Agitation against government projects and plans.
Radio propaganda from foreign countries that is aimed at the target country’s population and accuses the target country’s government of failure to meet the people’s needs.
Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Mission Force and Host Nation Military and Law Enforcement
Spreading accusations that the host nation military and police are corrupt and out of touch with the people.
Spreading accusations that mission force personnel will introduce customs or attitudes that are in opposition to local cultural or religious beliefs.
Character assassinations of mission, military, and law enforcement officials.
Demands to remove strong anti-opposition or anticrime military and law enforcement leaders from office.
Calls for the population to cease cooperating with the mission force and/or host nation military and law enforcement.
Deliberate incidents to provoke mission, military, or police reprisals during demonstrations or strikes.
Widespread hostile media coverage of even minor criminal violations or incidents involving mission force personnel.
Accusations of brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that mission or government forces initiated violence following confrontations.
Publication of photographs portraying repressive and violent acts by mission force or government forces.
Refusal of businessmen and shop owners to conduct business with mission force personnel.
Propaganda Activities Directed Against the Education System

Appearance of questionable doctrine and teachings in the educational system.
Creation of ethnic, tribal, religious, or other interest group schools outside the government educational system, which propagate opposition themes and teachings.
Charges that the educational system is only training youth to do the government's bidding.
Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations, demonstrations, and strikes against authority.

Table E-3. Commodities Indicators

Food-Related Activities
Diversion of crops or meat from markets.
Unexplained shortages of food supplies when there are no reports of natural causes.
Increased reports of pilfering of foodstuffs.
Sudden increase in food prices, possibly indicating an opposition-levied tax.
Unwillingness of farmers to transport food to population centers, indicating a fear of traveling highways.
Spot shortages of foodstuffs in regions or neighborhoods associated with a minority group or weaker competing interest group, while food supplies are generally plentiful in other areas. Conversely, sudden local shortages of foodstuffs in rural areas may indicate the existence of an armed opposition group operating in that region.
Sudden increase of meat in markets, possibly indicating slaughtered livestock because of a lack of fodder to sustain them.
Appearance of emergency relief supplies for sale in black markets, possibly indicating diversion from starving populations.
Appearance of relief supplies for sale in normal markets in a country or region recently suffering from large-scale hunger, which may indicate the severity of the food crisis is diminishing.
Arms and Ammunition-Related Activities
Increased loss or theft of weapons from police and military forces.
Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely manufactured, transported, or cached.
Attacks on patrols resulting in the loss of weapons and ammunition.
Increased purchase of surplus military goods.
Sudden increase in prices for arms and ammunition to the open market.
Reports of large arms shipments destined for neighboring countries, but not intended for that government.
Reports of known arms traffickers establishing contacts with opposition elements.
Increase in armed robberies.
Reports of thefts or sudden shortages of chemicals, which could be used in the clandestine manufacture of explosives.
Reports of large open-market purchases of explosive-related chemicals without an identifiable industrial user.
Appearance of manufactured or smuggled arms from noncontiguous foreign countries.
Clothing-Related Activities
Unusual, systematic purchase or theft of clothing materials, which could be used for the manufacture of uniforms or footwear.
Unusual scarcity of clothing or material used in the manufacture of clothing or footwear.
Distribution of clothing to underprivileged or minority classes by organizations of recent or suspect origin.

Discovery of caches of uniforms and footwear or the materials which could be used to manufacture uniforms and footwear.
Increase of males in the streets wearing military style clothing or distinctive markings.
Medicine-Related Activities
Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and medicines or the herbs used to manufacture local remedies.
Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the open or black markets.
Diversion of medical aid donations.
Discovery of caches of medical supplies.
Communications-Related Activities
Increase in the purchase and use of radios.
Discovery of caches of communications equipment.
Unusual increase in amateur radio or cellular telephone communications traffic.

Table E-4. Environment-Related Indicators

Rural Activities
Evidence of increased foot traffic in the area.
Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.
Unexplained trails and cold campsites.
Establishment of new, unexplained agricultural areas, or recently cleared fields.
Unusual smoke, possibly indicating the presence of a campsite or a form of communication.
Concentration of dead foliage in an area, possibly indicating use of camouflage.
Presence of foot traps, spikes, booby traps, or improved mines along routes and trails.
Urban Activities
Apartments, houses, or buildings being rented, but not lived in as homes.
Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.
Defacement of government and/or mission force information signs.
Sabotage of electrical power network; pollution of urban area's water supply.
Terrorist acts against physical targets such as bridges, dams, airfields, or buildings.
Change of residence of suspected agitators or opposition leaders.
Discovery of message dead-drops.
Increased smuggling of currency, gold, gems, narcotics, medical supplies, and arms into urban centers.
Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency.
Increase in bank robberies.
Work stoppages or slowdowns in essential industries.
Marked decline in product quality in essential industries.
Marked increase in equipment failures in essential industries.
Unexplained explosions in essential utilities and industries.
Establishment of roadblocks or barricades around neighborhoods associated with opposition elements.
Attempts to disrupt public transport through sabotage.
Malicious damage of industrial products or factory machinery.

APPENDIX F

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TOOLS AND INDICATORS


1. Analytical tools assist in the processing of relevant information that the G-2/S-2 use to develop products that can enhance the probability of successful operations. Tools assist in deriving a logical and correct solution to complex situations. Tools themselves are not products of intelligence and are not intended to be used to brief the commander.

2. There are four basic tools that may be used in analyzing relevant information in a COIN environment: time event chart, association matrix, activities matrix, and link diagram. These tools assist in processing events, personnel, and relationships between individuals and activities. Used together these tools will transform diverse, seemingly unrelated, and incomplete data or information within a complex situation into understandable analytical products that answer leader essential elements of information and CCIR.

TIME EVENT CHART

3. The time event chart is a chronological record of individual or group activities and is designed to store and display large amounts of information in as little space as possible.

TABLE F.1: Time Event Chart




4. Analysts use triangles to show the beginning and end of the chart. Triangles are also used to show shifts in method of operation or change in ideology. Rectangles or diamonds are used to indicate significant events or activities.

5. Analysts can highlight noteworthy or important events by drawing an “X” through the event symbol. Each symbol contains a chronological number and date (day, month, and year), and may contain a file reference number. The incident description is a very brief explanation of the incident and may include size, type of incident or activity, place and method of operation, and duration of incident. Arrows indicate time flow.

ASSOCIATION MATRIX

6. The association matrix demonstrates a relationship between individuals exists. It reflects associations within a group or similar activity, and is based on the assumption that people involved in a collective activity know one another. The format of an association matrix is a right triangle; each name requires a row and column.

TABLE F.2: Association Matrix.




7. The association matrix shows known and suspected associations. Analysts determine a known association by “direct contact” between individuals. “Direct contact” is defined as face-to-face meetings and/or confirmed telephonic conversation between known parties and all members of a particular organization; this is depicted as a filled circle and placed in the square where the two names meet within the matrix. An unfilled circle indicates suspected or “weak” associations. When an individual dies, a diamond is added at the end of his or her name.

ACTIVITIES MATRIX

8. The activities matrix determines connectivity between individuals and anything other than persons (interest/entity). Analysts develop a tab to the matrix listing the “short titles” of each interest/entity; each “short title” will explain its significance as an interest or entity.

9. The activities matrix can reveal an organization’s membership, organizational structure, cell structure and size, communications network, support structure, linkages with other organizations and entities, group activities and operations, and, national or international ties. The activities matrix format uses a rectangle base; rows are determined by the names from the association matrix, and columns are determined by the interest or entity “short titles.”

TABLE F.3: Activities Matrix




10. The activities matrix shows known and suspected connections. Analysts will develop the criteria for known connectivity. Criteria may be determined and defined by CCIR, commander's intent or directive, insurgent doctrine, and/or the Staff Judge Advocate. Known connectivity is depicted as filled circle and placed in the square where the individual and interest or entity meet within the matrix. An unfilled circle indicates suspected or "weak" associations.

LINK DIAGRAM

11. The link diagram depicts the linkages between interests or entities, individuals, events, organizations, and/or other interests or entities. Analysts use the link diagram to support investigative efforts in terrorism, counter intelligence, and criminal activity and to graphically portray pertinent information from the association matrix and activities matrix independently or synthesized. The link diagram format is the organization of symbols (circles, rectangles, and lines) and follows standardized rules set forth in FM 34-60.

TABLE F.4: Link Diagram



12. The link diagram displays known and suspected linkages. A solid figure represents known linkages. Suspected or “weak” linkages are dashed figures. Each individual and interest or entity is shown only once in a link diagram.

13. Circles represent individuals. The name is written inside the circle. “Also known as” (AKA) is depicted as an overlapping circle. A diamond is placed next to the circle for a deceased person.

14. Rectangles represent anything other than persons and may overlap to show a circle included in multiple interests or entities. The “short title” is written inside the rectangle. Lines are not required for circles of common association inside the same rectangle; connection is therefore implied.

15. Lines represent linkages, associations, and connectivity. Lines do not cross.

APPENDIX G
WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
TREND, PATTERN AND NETWORK ANALYSIS

1. Purpose.
2. Trend Analysis.
3. Pattern Analysis.
4. Network (Nodal) Analysis.

TO BE PUBLISHED

APPENDIX H

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

CHECKLIST FOR HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

HEALTH – MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS PRE-DEPLOYMENT

- Provide vaccinations as required.
- Check standards of fitness (PULHES) prior to deployment. This will decrease issues once deployed and may reduce redeployments to CONUS.
- Take malaria prophylaxis (if required), and other prophylaxis measures directed by military medical authority, prior to, during, and post deployment.
- Know the Soldiers. Be aware of their health issues, e.g., prior heat injury.
- Continuously maintain dental and medical fitness of Soldiers.

TRAINING AND PREPARATION – PRE-DEPLOYMENT

- Train and maintain high levels of physical fitness. High levels of fitness aid in mission accomplishment while reducing the potential of injury.
- Train all Soldiers in first aid, self-aid, buddy-aid.
- Train all Soldiers in immediate treatment, use of tourniquet, casualty evacuation, and calling in MEDEVAC while maintaining focus on the primary mission.
- Select and train combat lifesavers; then, ensure their assignment into all teams-squads. Prepare to cross-level combat lifesavers once deployed, ensuring they are maintained in every team-squad.
- Make training using realistic scenarios and drills for assigned combat medics a top priority. Once deployed, use them in health-PM duties. They will be very busy maintaining the health of the unit and in preventing the unnecessary loss of duty time by unit personnel.
- Train all Soldiers in heat and cold injury prevention, identification, and treatment.
- Train all personnel in proper field expedient personal hygiene.
- Ensure training is conducted in unit field sanitation and proper waste management. Form and train field sanitation teams. Every Soldier has a role in field sanitation. Field sanitation teams cannot function effectively without command emphasis and Soldier participation.
- Review FM 21-10 (Field Hygiene and Sanitation, 21 Jun 00) in areas such as field expedient waste management, field sanitation, water purification, control of vectors and mess sanitation prior to deploying into an area with minimal civilian or military infrastructure.
- Conduct briefings for all Soldiers regarding sexually transmitted diseases.
- Brief Soldiers on the effects and consequences of the abuse of drugs and alcohol.
- Train Soldiers in stress management techniques and to identify stressed soldiers.
- Conduct stress management training for leaders.
- Train leaders and Soldiers in the unique environmental considerations for the anticipated deployment area, such as high altitude considerations, desert terrain, tropical areas, and cold weather conditions. Ensure personnel are properly equipped and prepared.
- Use the DOD insect repellent system as a personal protective measure depending on the mission profile. Treat uniforms with the standard military clothing repellent (permethrin) prior to deployment
- Brief deploying personnel on indigenous wild and domestic animals, plants, and unique local precautions for the deployment area. Maintain command focus and medical management of injury, poison, and illness avoidance. Prevention of injury and illness is key.

- Ensure medical personnel are prepared to continually train the unit in appropriate medical, health, and first aid subjects at home station, during pre-deployment and while deployed.
- Ensure medical personnel continue training when not performing assigned duties. Continual refresher training of medical personnel is a priority for the medical unit. This is a priority at home station, during the pre-deployment phase and during deployment, when the mission profile allows.
- Acquire and distribute appropriate graphic training aids for leaders and Soldiers, e.g., prevention, identification, and treatment of sun, heat, and cold injuries; identification and avoidance of dangerous insects, plants, and animals in the deployed region; and, other available and appropriate aides.

DEPLOYMENT – ENSURE, OBSERVE AND CONTROL

- Make frequent and timely field sanitation inspections by qualified personnel.
- Once deployed, Soldiers apply 33% time release DEET as appropriate, as ordered.
- Precautions are taken reference climatic conditions, heat-cold injury prevention, high altitude exposure, cold weather, and other environmental conditions, e.g., intake of fluids, consumption of meals, application of sun screen, wearing of proper clothing, layering of clothing, utilizing eye protection, adequate rest, and other techniques as suitable.
- Personal PM practices are properly employed. Leaders and authorized personnel should ensure the use of proper techniques regarding potable water (only from approved sources, both unit and or field expedient), safe food, and personal hygiene.
- Maintain appropriate prophylaxis, e.g. malaria prophylaxis and any other preventive measures directed by command and medical authority.
- Medical personnel conduct random health checks of personnel and keep leaders informed concerning the unit health status.
- Medical personnel and unit field sanitation teams will conduct frequent and timely inspections on a periodic basis of the unit's food-water acquisition, preparation, and distribution system, the unit and personnel waste and trash disposal methods, and any other areas deemed necessary and appropriate regarding field sanitation issues.
- Medical care and facilities are accessible and properly employed in the current and anticipated AOs.
- Coordinate, plan and train for MEDEVAC or CASEVAC. Reinforce throughout the unit that all personnel must know and understand MEDEVAC request procedures. Coordinate with higher command to ensure the prompt availability of evacuation resources.
- Plan and coordinate for Class VIII re-supply.
- Monitor stress management and use the buddy system.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

Contact U.S. Army Center for Health and Promotion Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM at the following website: chppm-www.apgea.army.mil/ .

APPENDIX I

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

MEDICAL EVACUATION

REQUEST MEDICAL EVACUATION

1. Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is the timely, efficient movement and en route care given to the wounded, injured, or ill persons by medical personnel from the point of injury or illness, from other locations to the medical treatment facility (MTF). MEDEVAC may utilize various ground transport methods or employ MEDEVAC – CASEVAC assets.
2. The senior military person present makes the determination to request MEDEVAC and assignment of precedence. This decision is based on the advice of the senior medical person at the scene, the patient's condition, and the tactical situation.
3. It is necessary to be aware of security considerations in the area for rendezvous for the MEDEVAC vehicle and casualty. Aggressive security measures should be planned and executed.

PROCEDURES FOR REQUESTING A MEDEVAC

- | | |
|--------|---|
| Line 1 | Location of pickup site by grid coordinates with grid zone letters. |
| Line 2 | Requesting unit radio frequency, call sign, and suffix. |
| Line 3 | Number of patients by precedence. Note the brevity codes used.
A-Urgent Complete (evacuate as soon as possible or within 2 hours)
B-Urgent Surgical (evacuate within 2 hours to the nearest surgical unit)
C-Priority (evacuate promptly or within 4 hours)
D-Routine (evacuate within 24 hours)
E-Convenience (medical convenience rather than necessity) |
| Line 4 | Special equipment required.
A-None
B-Hoist
C-Extraction equipment
D-Ventilator |
| Line 5 | Number of patients by type.
L-Litter plus the number of patients
A-Ambulatory plus the number of patients |
| Line 6 | Security of pickup site. (War)
N-No enemy personnel in the area.
P-Possible enemy personnel in the area (approach with caution)
E-Enemy personnel in the area (approach with caution)
X-Enemy personnel in the area (armed escort required) |

Line 6 Number and type of wound(s). (Peace)

Line 7 Method of marking at pickup site.
A-Panels
B-Pyrotechnic signal
C-Smoke signal
D-None
E-Other

Line 8 Patient Nationality and Status.
A-U.S. military
B-U.S. civilian
C-Non-U.S. military
D-Non-U.S. civilian
E-Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW)

Line 9 NBC Contamination (War).
N-Nuclear
B-Biological
C-Chemical

Line 9 Terrain description (Peace).

- Clear debris- mark obstacles.
- VS-17 panels – secure beanbag light properly.
- Cleared diameter for UH-60=50M.
- Cleared diameter for CH-47=80M.
- Land heading into the wind.
- Avoid landing on a down-slope.
- Do not land on slope >16 degrees.
- Prevent over-classification - tendency to classify a wound as more severe than it actually is.
- Do not violate radio silence.
- Use the order of precedence accurately.
- Keep transmissions 25 seconds or less in length.

APPENDIX J

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

DETENTION OPERATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

FIELD RESTRAINTS

1. In tactical situations, the use of field expedient restraints, to include flexi-cuffs, duct tape, parachute cord, or other restraint means, is necessary to temporarily restrain insurgents for FP, custody and control, and movement. The following considerations are provided:

- Field expedient restraints on insurgents shall be employed in a manner that is safe, secure, humane, and professional.
- Combat commanders shall plan for and train personnel in field expedient restraint measures. US personnel are expected to employ restraints in a manner consistent with training provided by the Army.
- US personnel handling insurgents shall make an assessment of the insurgents' risks to the unit mission. This assessment will include, at a minimum, the insurgents' behavior and physical condition for purposes of restraint positioning (i.e., front or rear).

2. US personnel should also take into consideration:

- The nature of the mission, such as type of insurgents.
- Length of travel.
- Destination.
- Current situation.

Note: Regardless of whether restraints are used, or the level of restraints, no insurgents shall be transported without first being searched for weapons or contraband except when circumstances pose a safety hazard or danger to the mission.

3. When circumstances pose a safety hazard or danger to the mission, a search will be conducted as soon as practicable. A pat down search shall be the minimum search conducted. Confiscated items shall be bagged and tagged as soon as practical. The use of zip lock bags is suggested to secure identity documents and small personal items. An inventory sheet of all items confiscated should be placed in the zip lock bag and affixed to the insurgents to prevent loss. Duct tape may be used to secure zip lock bag to the insurgents during transport. Large trash bags may be used to secure larger items.

4. Exercise caution in cases where insurgents are gagged and/or hooded, as such field expedient measures, when required, may impair, restrict, prevent, or stop an insurgent's ability to breathe. Sandbags used as hoods restrict airflow and should be used as a last resort. In some areas of the world, the insurgent's own headgear, i.e., turbans and/or burqas, can be used as an ideal hood device.

5. Restrain insurgents behind the back who have demonstrated violent behavior or a strong likelihood of escape while being transported, as well as at any other time in custody when held in

an area that is not secure, including vehicles or buildings. Compliant insurgents are restrained in the front to facilitate movement during transport.

6. There are advantages in restraining insurgents to fixed objects or to one another in certain circumstances. For example, insurgents can and should be linked together during transport.

7. The mission leader has the discretion to remove, adjust or apply restraints during transportation or escort. The level and types of restraints used shall be reasonable under the circumstances. Restraints shall not be used to inflict punishment nor to restrict blood circulation or breathing. US personnel shall take reasonable and prudent care to avoid causing unnecessary physical pain or extreme discomfort when applying restraints.

EVIDENCE COLLECTION AND STORAGE

8. The capturing unit implements the “Five S’s and T” principles. The basic principles are search, segregate, silence, speed, safeguard, and tag (see Table J-1).

<i>Procedure</i>	<i>Description</i>
Search	Search insurgents for weapons and ammunition, items of intelligence value, and other inappropriate items. The search should include all clothing on the individual, to include shoes. Nothing should be excluded to ensure the safety and security of the capturing forces. NOTE: Conduct same-gender searches when possible. If mixed-gender searches are necessary for speed or security, conduct them in a respectful manner and avoid any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. To prevent allegations of sexual misconduct, the on-site supervisor carefully controls soldiers who perform mixed-gender searches.
Segregate	Segregate insurgents based on perceived status of authority or position. During initial screening, leaders may be identified and thus must be segregated from the remainder of the population.
Silence	Insurgents are not allowed to speak nor is anyone allowed to speak to them. Speak to insurgents only to give orders.
Speed	Remove insurgents from the point of capture as quickly as possible.
Safeguard	Safeguard insurgents according to the Geneva Conventions and US policy. Provide medical care as needed. Five S’s and T, Table J-1
Tag	Tag insurgents with a DD Form 2745 (Capture Tag) or a field-expedient capture tag that includes the following information: Date of capture. Location of capture (grid coordinates). Capturing unit. Special circumstances of capture (how the person was captured, if he resisted, if he gave up, and so forth). Did the persons have weapons on them during their capture?

	NOTE: The capturing unit must complete a capture tag because failure to do so hinders further processing and disposition.
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Table J-1, The Five S's and T

- The STRESS (Search, Tag, Report, Evacuate, Segregate, and Safeguard) principles are also applied to insurgent operations. Following these principles, along with the “Five S’s and T” procedure, will make for a smooth and successful transition of insurgents from initial capture to a forward collection point or a holding facility.

- SEARCH

(a) Search and inspect each insurgent and his possessions, to include all clothing, shoes, headgear. Conduct same-gender searches when possible. If mixed-gender searches are necessary for speed or security, conduct them in a respectful manner and avoid any action that could be interpreted as sexual molestation or assault. To prevent allegations of sexual misconduct, the on-site commander/leader carefully controls soldiers who perform mixed-gender searches. Some items are impounded and eventually returned, and certain items are confiscated and never returned, even if the insurgent is released or repatriated. Determination of what items may be returned is made at the holding facility.

(b) Personal protective equipment, once all items have been searched and deemed safe to US/allied and coalition forces, may be returned to the captured person. These items include:

- Helmet.
- Protective clothing and equipment (NBC suits, helmets, and protective masks)

for use during evacuation from the combat zone.

(c) Confiscated Items. All items, minus the above protective equipment, are confiscated and accompany the capturing unit to the holding facility where they are turned over to appropriate officials for determining final disposition.

(d) The capturing unit coordinates with accompanying interrogation/intelligence teams (if available) to determine which confiscated items have intelligence value. Personal items (diaries, letters from home, and family pictures) can be taken by interrogation/intelligence teams for review.

NOTE: For an in-depth discussion on impounded and confiscated property, see Multi-Service Regulation AR 190-8 and DFAS-IN 37-1.

(e) Property Accountability. When seizing property from a insurgent, it should be bundled or placed in a bag to keep it intact and separate from other insurgents’ possessions. Such carrying items could include:

- Ziplock bags
- Sandbags
- 5x50 cord
- Socks
- Duct tape

It is necessary to prepare for the turnover of those items to the holding facilities.

- TAG

(f) Tag each insurgent with a DD Form 2745. The following information is required:

- Date and time of capture.
- Capturing unit.
- Place of capture.
- Circumstances of the capture.
- Did the individual have a weapon when captured?

The remaining information on the tag is included as it becomes available.

(g) DD Form 2745 is a perforated, three-part form that is individually serial-numbered. It is constructed of durable, waterproof, tear-resistant material with reinforced eyeholes on Parts A and C. Part A is attached to the insurgent with wire or string, Part B is maintained by the capturing unit for their records, and Part C is attached to confiscated property so that the owner can be identified later.

(h) DD Form 2745 is placed on each insurgent prior to the arrival at the holding facility. The holding facility may direct the capturing unit to complete a capture tag before accepting the insurgent.

(i) Instruct the insurgent not to remove or alter the tag.

(j) Annotate the tag's serial number and the insurgent's name on a locally developed manifest.

NOTE: See Soldier Training Publication (STP) 21-24-SMCT for more information on DD Form 2745.

- REPORT

Report the number of insurgents at each point of capture through appropriate command channels. This aids in determining transportation and security requirements.

- EVACUATE

Evacuate insurgents from the point of capture through appropriate channels as humanely and quickly as possible. When moving insurgents, give them clear, brief instructions in their own language when possible. Military necessity may require a delay in movement. When this occurs, ensure that there is an adequate supply of food and potable water, appropriate clothing, shelter, and medical attention available.

When time and mission priorities allow, the capturing unit ensures the proper paperwork is complete before insurgents are evacuated. The proper paperwork includes DA Form 4137 (Evidence/Property Custody document), DD Form 515 (Roster of Prisoners), and DD Form 2708 (Receipt for Inmate or detained person). If necessary, a DD Form 2708 (annotated with the number of prisoners) and a manifest will suffice. Insurgents should not be exposed to unnecessary danger, and they should be protected while they are awaiting evacuation. Medical personnel must determine if prompt evacuation is more dangerous medically than holding seriously wounded or sick insurgent prisoners in the combat zone.

- SEGREGATE

(k) The commander/leader is responsible for the custody of insurgents. He designates segregation procedures and levels to ensure their security, health, and welfare. Insurgents are segregated as required to ensure the safety of US/coalition forces.

(l) An insurgent is protected under the rules of the Geneva Conventions and US policy until competent authorities can determine formal status. (See multi-Service regulation AR 190-8 for further information.)

(m) Coercion must not be used to obtain information from insurgents. Coercion or inhumane treatment of insurgents is prohibited and is not justified by the stress of combat or deep provocation. Inhumane treatment is a serious violation of international law and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

(n) Insurgents should not be spoken to except to give orders or directions. Insurgents should not be permitted to talk to or signal each other; a gag should be used only for as long as needed to ensure that it does not harm the captive. This prevents them from plotting ways to counter security and plan escapes.

o SAFEGUARD

(o) To safeguard insurgents according to the Geneva Conventions and US policy —

- Provide first aid and medical treatment for wounded and sick insurgents.

Evacuate them through medical channels, using the assets available to evacuate US and coalition forces.

- Provide food and water. These supplies must be commensurate with those for US and multinational forces (see FM 27-10 and STANAG 2044).

- Provide firm, but humane treatment.

- Allow insurgents to use protective equipment in case of hostile fire or NBC threat.

- Protect insurgents from abuse by other insurgents and local civilians.

Report acts and allegations of inhumane treatment through appropriate command channels (see AR 190-40). Do not locate insurgents near obvious targets (ammunition sites, fuel facilities, and communications equipment).

APPENDIX K

WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION

LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN COIN

GENERAL

1. Leaders should remember COIN operations must conform to the law and the application of the law varies depending on the overall COIN mission. Leaders maintain constant awareness of their ability to lawfully use certain tactics, weapons, or procedures, and understand that there are various agreement or treaty obligations that have COIN operational implications. Judge Advocates assist leaders in tackling the complexities of the law and in integrating legal considerations into the overall pattern of COIN operations.

2. Legal Basis. Leaders should know and understand the legal basis of their operations. By doing so, leaders promote the legitimacy of their operations and are able to better plan their missions, structure public statements, and conform their conduct to policy. Further, since the very goal of COIN operations is to help maintain law and order, those conducting COIN operations must know and respect the legal parameters within which they operate. Those who conduct COIN operations while intentionally or negligently breaking the law defeat their own purpose and lose the confidence and respect of the community in which they operate.

The legal basis of COIN operations derives from many international, U.S., and local/HN legal sources. These sources may be U.N. Security Council resolutions, regional and international agreements, and decisions, regulations, and orders from U.S. National Command, coalition or local/HN authorities. While legal sources differ depending on the specific mission (COIN in an international or internal armed conflict) and military role in mind (lead or in support), COIN mission statements drafted with these sources in mind demonstrate and encourage adherence to law and order.

3. Law of War (LOW) Principles. All COIN operations will comply with LOW principles to the extent practicable and feasible. Some of the basic LOW principles to which COIN operations must conform include the following:

- a. Provide Humane Treatment. Regardless of the legal status of those persons captured, detained, or otherwise held in custody by U.S. Soldiers, they will receive humane treatment until properly released. They will be provided with the minimum protections delineated in the Geneva Conventions until competent authorities state otherwise.
- b. Avoid Causing Unnecessary Suffering. Weapons, munitions, and techniques calculated to cause unnecessary pain and suffering are forbidden.
- c. No Toleration of Violations of LOW and Human Rights. Orders to commit LOW and human rights violations are illegal and must be disobeyed. Report all known or suspected LOW and human rights violations. Those who violate LOW and human rights will be held responsible for their actions.

4. Status of Forces. The nature of the conflict (internal or international armed conflict, stability operations, support operations, peace operations) will dictate the legal status of forces conducting COIN operations. Where U.S. Soldiers conduct COIN operations in another nation without that nation's prior consent (as in an occupation), the law of the U.S. is what is applicable. However, if U.S. Soldiers conduct COIN operations in another nation's territory with that nation's prior consent or invitation, in the absence of some type of grant of immunity those Soldiers must

comply with that nation's law. As a result, leaders conducting COIN operations in this environment should understand in detail the extent and effect of any relevant HN criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction over their assigned Soldiers and their actions. A status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) or similar understanding between the U.S. or multinational partner and the HN may resolve many of these matters and prevent them from adversely affecting COIN operations.

5. Claims. Injuries, death, and property damage are an unavoidable reality of military operations. The leader's ability to promptly and thoroughly redress meritorious claims against the U.S. will pay considerable dividends in maintaining a community's confidence and respect. Several statutes and agreements will determine whether and how claims against the U.S. may be adjudicated. In some situations, claims against the U.S. may not be adjudicated, but payments in sympathy or in recognition of a loss (*solatia*) may be made. Multinational partners may be able to adjudicate claims that U.S. law does not recognize. In all circumstances, leaders planning COIN operations should consider that the prompt and effective handling of resultant claims fosters good will and positive civil-military relations.

6. Fiscal Law. U.S. legal principles on the proper expenditure of public funds apply to U.S. Soldiers even when they are part of a multinational force or support multinational operations. Fiscal law affects training, humanitarian and civic assistance, construction, medical care, transportation, maintenance, the logistics civilian augmentation program, and other activities. Requests for support may come from the HN, U.S. agencies, multinational partners, local civilians, international military headquarters, the Army, and other sources. Leaders in COIN operations must be prepared to find the correct funding authority and appropriation for the mission and specified tasks to be performed, articulate the rationale for proposed expenditures, and seek approval from higher headquarters when necessary.

7. Contracting and Acquisition. Leaders may have to acquire goods and services and carry out construction projects while conducting COIN operations. The significant legal issues involved in battlefield acquisition, contingency contracting, or acquisition and cross-servicing agreements present challenges that demand creative analysis. Lawfully conducted, confiscation, seizure and requisition of property, and use of the local populace as a source of services may be valuable means to support the needs implicit in COIN operations. However, even when lawfully done, there are practical considerations in acquiring supplies and services from the local populace that may negatively affect COIN operations. The key to successful contracting and acquisition is the proper training and appointment of personnel who are authorized to carry out pertinent actions and know the legal and practical limitations on their authority.

8. Foreign Gifts. Besides the practical and political considerations involved in receiving and accepting foreign gifts, leaders should remember the legal implications. As a general rule, U.S. Soldiers are prohibited from soliciting gifts from foreign governments. Depending on the circumstances, U.S. Soldiers may be prevented from accepting gifts from foreign governments altogether. There are several statutory limitations on the type of gift and the gift's value that leaders should consider prior to accepting any foreign gift.

9. Intelligence Law. Leaders conducting COIN operations probably consider their ability to conduct intelligence gathering as critical to their success. COIN intelligence collection, information gathering, and counterintelligence operations involve substantial contact with sources from nongovernment organizations, the local populace, and multinational partners. There are many legal implications in collecting intelligence or gathering information from these

sources. There are also legal restrictions on intelligence collection against U.S. persons, on disseminating intelligence to other agencies, and in using special collection techniques such as electronic surveillance. The complexities of intelligence law require leaders to obtain legal review of all proposed intelligence activities.

10. Law and Order. Maintaining law and order throughout the host nation is a desired end state of COIN operations. Under FM 3-07, within both U.S. and multinational forces and the HN community, are essential enforcement and detention operations information:

- a. Policy on treatment of detained persons.
- b. UCMJ.
- c. Military tribunals/commissions.
- d. MEJA (jurisdiction over contractors and private security firms).
- e. HN authorities (Art. 98 agreements).
- f. Evidence collection and war crimes.

11. War Crime Disclosures and the Handling Of Evidence. In recent years it has become necessary for troops to be aware of the possibility of incidents that could constitute war crimes. The development of international judicial agencies to deal with allegations of war crimes makes the issue of providing evidence an increasingly difficult and complicated process. Expert policing, pathological, and forensic skills are essential in gaining evidence that could lead to successful prosecution.

12. The Military Police within the Army is the most appropriate agent for dealing with such incidents that could have important international significance. MP resources should invariably be called upon immediately if and when such incidents or disclosures are discovered. Where a member of the U.S. Army is suspected of committing a war crime (and indeed any crime) it is the MP that will carry out the formal investigation. Where a host nation national is suspected, the procedure to be adopted will depend upon the theater involved. Usually it will be for the local HN civilian police organization to investigate, albeit with assistance from the MP or multinational police mission as the case may be. Theater-specific procedures should be clearly understood prior to deployment, with advice being sought from Army Legal Services if need be. The guidance below provides a few basic drills and procedures likely to be common good practice in circumstances where involvement by non-MP troops is necessary.

GUIDELINES ON HOW TO DEAL WITH CRIME SCENES

13. In general two kinds of suspected crime scenes can occur. In the first place there are sites where bodies are present, and then there are sites where destruction of property has occurred. Certain basic common procedures are recommended for both categories of sites. More specific actions with regard to each kind of site can be recommended after these have been dealt with.

AIM

14. At whatever kind of site actions are taken for recording or preserving evidence, the ultimate goal of these actions is to collect evidence that should be admissible in a court of law at some indeterminate time in the future. To a large extent the basic principle that should be followed is that whatever actions are taken should be clearly documented. The precise conduct of the investigative actions should be noted and recorded for use in the future. If the history of the investigation is not clear, it opens the way for challenging the reliability of evidence.

15. In dealing with physical pieces of evidence, it is imperative that an evidentiary chain be created which starts at the site of the investigation and will ultimately end in court upon production of the evidence. The chain consists of clearly documenting the collection, handling, processing, and storage of potential evidence at all stages. Upon submission of a piece of evidence in court, the precise trail of that evidence must be traceable directly back to the site of the investigation. Any break in that chain may result in that piece of evidence being ruled inadmissible at trial.

BASIC PROCEDURES

16. The following actions are recommended for the recording and preservation of evidence at all categories of sites:

- a. Make a photographic and/or video record of the site.
- b. Make a detailed report of all observations at the site.
- c. Make sketches and diagrams if possible.
- d. Record measurements and distances where appropriate.
- e. Record the details of any witnesses to the events before they disappear.
- f. Record details of any surviving victims.
- g. Record any details or information on the identity of the alleged perpetrators (names, descriptions, insignia or uniforms worn).

Be prepared to make your own witness statement describing in detail your involvement, be it as a witness to an incident or upon attending the aftermath.

17. The particulars of those persons undertaking the above activities should be clearly documented. It should be clear who these persons are, in what capacity they were acting, and where they can be traced.

18. It is important to safely preserve all evidence and material collected until the arrival of an investigative or prosecuting authority. This entails keeping the evidence and material in such a manner that it cannot be tampered with or contaminated. The evidence and material should be essentially kept under seal until it can be handed over to the appropriate investigative or prosecuting authority.

DEAD BODIES

19. It is important to establish the cause of death and to identify the deceased if possible for the investigation of a scene where dead bodies are present. Undertake the basic common procedures described in the previous paragraph with this in mind. Important, therefore, are matters such as:

- a. The number and position of bodies.
- b. Are the bodies manacled or blindfolded? Are there bruises or swelling around the wrists or ankles indicating a person might have been bound prior to their death?
- c. Are there any indications of a battle. For example: are the bodies uniformed? Are they armed? Is there battlefield debris such as equipment, munitions, boxes, binoculars in the area near the body? Are there any blunt objects or tools with blood debris on them?
- d. Can any injuries be identified? Was the person shot, stabbed, strangled, crushed? Is blunt trauma evident anywhere on the body?
- e. The clothing on the bodies (often identification can be done on the basis of the clothing). Civilian casual, work, business, or formal wear? Necktie, dress or scarf present?
- f. Documentation found on bodies (or at the site). ID tags?
- g. Jewelry or other items found on the body (or at the site). Ear rings?
- h. Is any physical evidence present that could indicate the cause of death - bullet casings, weapons?
- i. Are there any bloodstains or splattering visible on furniture/walls? Any stains should be protected because they provide information to forensic experts.

20. If possible, a pathologist should conduct a post mortem with a view to determining the cause of death and the identity of the deceased.

21. In some instances the next-of-kin of persons killed in the conflict may want to retrieve the bodies of their loved ones for burial or cremation. Once a site has been found it is likely that very little time will be available to record evidence at that site. Especially where a formal investigation has not yet been sanctioned, it may be very difficult to delay handing over the bodies to next of kin. As it may not be possible to send off a site with a view to proper examination at a later stage, it is important that as much information and evidence as possible be collected at such sites. Frequently, however, it will be appropriate for the troops first on the scene to set up a cordon so that potential evidence is not interfered with prior to the arrival of the investigative authorities.

SITES OF DESTRUCTION

22. The main object of investigating sites of destruction is to determine the cause of the destruction and identify the perpetrators. The cause of destruction is often a matter of observation - was the cause burning, artillery fire, bombing etc. The data the observation is based on must be thoroughly documented, along with any additional evidence that may be found which could substantiate the observation.

Interviewing Witnesses in Criminal Investigations

GUIDELINES FOR THE SCREENING AND INTERVIEWING OF WITNESSES

24. Two-Phase Approach. During the process of identifying and recording potentially valuable evidence for use later in a criminal prosecution, a two-phase approach can be adopted.

- a. Undertake a wide screening of potential witnesses initially. The purpose of this is to identify persons who can give direct, first-hand, evidence with regard to events that may fall within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
- b. Investigators should take detailed statements from those witnesses who have been identified during the first phase as being able to give direct and relevant evidence pertaining to events relating to the investigations.

25. Initial Screening. This phase is undertaken at the outset of the investigation. It serves to provide the investigators with some idea of the amount of information potentially available, and its quality and consistency. It helps the investigators focus their attention on the events they are investigating, and identify direct witnesses to relevant events. Apart from identifying witnesses who can give direct evidence, detailed biographical information concerning those being interviewed (with a view to tracing persons in the future) must be collected during this phase as well. It should be borne in mind that it might not always be immediately apparent during this phase whether information being provided will be relevant to investigations of subsequent trial proceedings. Good biographical information will therefore facilitate the locating of persons who are immediately identified as eyewitnesses, as well as those who are only identified as relevant witnesses at a later stage.

26. Biographical Information. Obtain as much biographical information as possible from the witness. This includes the following:

- a. Comprehensive personal details.
- b. Full details of relatives.
- c. Full details regarding where the person lived during the conflict.
- d. Full details of where the witness intends to go in the future.
- e. Any other contact details such as phone numbers or email addresses.

IDENTIFYING WITNESSES

27. During this first phase it is worth the effort to establish whether the individual to be interviewed is able to relate events that fall within his or her own direct knowledge or is simply relaying events that he or she has been told about by others (hearsay).

28. It should be borne in mind that persons being interviewed are likely to be traumatized by recent events that they have personally experienced, but which may not necessarily be relevant to investigations. In the desire to speak out about what has been experienced or vent outrage

and frustrations, interviewees are prone to rely heavily on information obtained second or third hand through discussions with other persons. Such information is generally not reliable with a view to ultimate prosecution of criminal cases before a court. Such people may still be of use, however, as they may be able to provide the details of a previously unknown person(s) who is able to provide direct evidence. The time spent on clearly establishing whether a person is indeed a direct witness to relevant events (or potentially relevant events) is, therefore, an investment in the future of the investigation and may ultimately save considerable time and resources at a later stage.

TAKING STATEMENTS

29. Once a potential witness who possesses direct information has been identified, a comprehensive statement should be obtained from that person. The statement should include the following information in as much detail as possible:

- a. Full particulars of the incident or event (in terms of what the witness saw, felt, heard, experienced).
- b. Full particulars of the time and place of the event.
- c. Particulars of the weather and lighting conditions, and distances or measurements if relevant. (Diagrams or drawings by witnesses may prove useful.)
- d. Details of other witnesses.
- e. Details with a view to identification of alleged perpetrator(s) - name/uniform/unit/description.
- f. Details about which a witness is likely to be questioned in court, such as whether he had been drinking alcohol prior to the incident or whether he has any loyalties to, or grudges against, any of those about whom he is giving evidence.

FORMATS FOR STATEMENTS

30. The format of the statement would depend to a large extent on the evidentiary requirements of the tribunal ultimately responsible for trying any cases emerging from any investigation. Where the tribunal has not been determined, the format is in the discretion of the head of the investigation.

31. Whichever situation pertains, careful consideration should be given as to whether it is necessary to require witnesses to sign or attest their statements. While the immediate advantage is the perception that the witness personally agrees with what is contained in the statement, there is also a disadvantage. The problem is that, should the witness make later statements that appear to contradict or conflict with that earlier statement, this could compromise his credibility. An alternative approach would be to not require the witness to sign the statement, but simply to rely on the investigator's notes of the interview. The drawback with such a procedure is that it is less likely to be admissible as evidence of the witness's version of events if he dies or cannot be located.

CONTINUITY OF EVIDENCE

32. Introduction. One of the primary roles of overt surveillance is to provide detailed information, in the form of sightings, for local police and other agencies to use in their attempts to cause attrition to the insurgent organizations. This information could potentially be used as evidence in a court of law to secure convictions. Soldiers on surveillance duty must therefore be evidence-aware to ensure that opportunities from which convictions could arise are not missed because of errors in evidence continuity or information handling by the observation post (OP) team.

33. Types of Evidence. Information gathered by OPs can be recorded in a variety of formats such as:

- a. Written.
- b. Photographic.
- c. Video.

34. Written Evidence. There is a number of types of written evidence that could be produced by an OP, the main ones being:

- a. AF B58 Log Sheet
- b. Patrol Note Book

35. Photographic Evidence. It is important that the film number and frames used should be correlated with the sightings entered in the log if it is believed photographic evidence has been captured of an event or incident. The film should be left complete inside the camera body and the whole package handled as evidence.

36. Video Evidence. Video evidence can be extremely useful provided that the tape has been correctly accounted for. There are a number of considerations that should be taken into account, such as:

- a. The date-time group display on the camera must be correctly set and visible on any tape recording. The time on the video monitor is the time to be used on all log entries. The VCR tape position counter should be zeroed at this time and also used as a reference in the log. These procedures ensure that any video evidence is coordinated with written evidence.
- b. For full continuity of evidence any sequence of video footage should be supported by complete coverage of that day, up to and including the event. This is possible to achieve using 24-hour time lapse VCRs, so that a complete 24-hour period is recorded onto one tape. This then provides continuity. OPs should ensure the VCR is switched to 3-hour mode to improve the quality of the recording when recording an event of interest.
- c. These continuity tapes should be continuously recording while the OP is operational. They should be changed over at midnight, logged, and stored. The formation HQ will direct the time period of storage and method of handling.

37. If an OP captures some vital evidence on film or video, then it must deal with it in the correct manner in order for it to have any value in a court of law. This involves the use of an evidence handling kit and procedures.

38. Evidence Handling Kit. A suggested evidence handling kit to be kept in OPs is:

- a. Army Form 38/29 (A).
- b. A sturdy, opaque bag or envelope.
- c. Self-adhesive labels.
- d. Cellophane tape.

39. Handling Procedure. Record all markings on the film/tape, whether operational serial numbers or the manufacturer's. These should be written on the Form 38/29 (A). Place the tape or film into a bag or envelope and seal all edges with tape. Tape the Form 38/29 (A) onto the evidence package and only sign the statement section on the form when the evidence is handed over to the police or other agencies as authorized by the formation HQ.

APPENDIX L
WORKING DRAFT - NOT FOR IMPLEMENTATION
DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING OF INDIGENOUS
SECURITY FORCES

1. Purpose.
2. Types of Forces and the Purpose of Each Force.
3. Principles for Leader Selection
4. Principles for Leader Training.
5. Principles for Training Soldiers.
6. Principles and Criteria for Trainer Selection.

TO BE PUBLISHED

